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About This Report 
This report provides a 100-year look at the impact of immigration on the nation’s demographics 
since passage of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act. It explores how the nation’s population 
has changed since the law was enacted and includes new Pew Research Center population 
projections through 2065. These projections are included for the nation as a whole as well for its 
immigrant generations and its racial and ethnic groups. The new projections are based on detailed 
assumptions about births, deaths and immigration levels—the three key components of population 
change. All these assumptions are built on recent trends, but it is important to note that these 
trends can change. As a result, all population projections have inherent uncertainties, especially 
for years further in the future, since they can be affected by changes in behavior, new immigration 
policies or other events. 
The projections and historical population estimates that are the focus of Chapter 2 of this report 
are adjusted for undercount in the census data in order to ensure consistency over time and with 
estimates of immigrants by legal status (Passel and Cohn 2015). Accordingly, the projections and 
estimates are not consistent with Census Bureau data about the number and characteristics of 
immigrants analyzed in Chapters 3 and 5 of this report, and the two sets of numbers may differ. 
For more, see Appendix A: Methodology. 
New survey findings from the Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel exploring the U.S. 
public’s views of immigrants and their impact nationally and in local communities are also 
included in this report. The survey was conducted online among a nationally representative 
probability sample from March 10 to April 6, 2015, before the current national discussion about 
national immigration policy, unauthorized immigration and birthright citizenship. The survey’s 
margin of sampling error is plus or minus 2.4 percentage points at the 95% confidence interval. 
The report also examines the economic and demographic characteristics of immigrants in the U.S. 
today as well as trends in the characteristics of immigrants who have arrived since the 1960s. The 
data for this portion of the report and the accompanying statistical portrait of the nation’s foreign-
born population in 2013 come from several sources, including the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2013, 
2010 and 2007 American Community Surveys, which provide detailed geographic, demographic 
and economic characteristics of the nation’s immigrant population, and the 1960, 1970, 1980, 
1990 and 2000 decennial censuses (IPUMS).  
Accompanying the report are two interactives. The first is a legislative timeline highlighting key 
U.S. immigration policy legislation and executive actions since 1790. The second is an interactive 
map showing, at the state level, the largest immigrant group in each state from 1850 through 2013.  
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Many people contributed to the writing and development of this report. Richard Fry, senior 
researcher, was the primary project leader and wrote Chapter 3. Mark Hugo Lopez, director of 
Hispanic research, and D’Vera Cohn, senior writer/editor, wrote the overview. Lopez also provided 
editorial guidance on all aspects of the report. Chapter 1 was written by Cohn. Chapter 2 was 
written by Cohn and Jeffrey S. Passel, senior demographer. Chapters 4 and 5 were written by Anna 
Brown, research assistant, who also compiled the statistical portrait of immigrants.  
Editorial guidance was provided by Claudia Deane, vice president, research; Kim Parker, director 
of social trends research; Juliana Menasce Horowitz, associate director of social trends research; 
and Paul Taylor, former executive vice president of the Pew Research Center. Brown and Horowitz 
managed development of the survey questionnaire; research methodologists Kyley McGeeney and 
Andrew Mercer provided guidance on questionnaire development and survey implementation. 
Gustavo López, research assistant, and Renee Stepler, research assistant, created charts and tables 
for various parts of the report. Stepler also compiled the immigration law timeline. Michael 
Keegan, information graphics designer; Michael Suh, associate digital producer; and Dana 
Amihere, Web developer, provided digital support for the report and its accompanying 
interactives. Eileen Patten, research analyst, number-checked the graphics and text, as did Brown, 
López and Stepler. Marcia Kramer copy edited the report.  
Find related reports online at pewresearch.org/hispanic and pewresearch.org/socialtrends.  
 
About Pew Research Center 
Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan fact tank that informs the public about the issues, attitudes 
and trends shaping America and the world. It does not take policy positions. The center conducts 
public opinion polling, demographic research, content analysis and other data-driven social 
science research. It studies U.S. politics and policy; journalism and media; internet, science and 
technology; religion and public life; Hispanic trends; global attitudes and trends; and U.S. social 
and demographic trends. All of the center’s reports are available at www.pewresearch.org. Pew 
Research Center is a subsidiary of The Pew Charitable Trusts, its primary funder. 
© Pew Research Center 2015 
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A Note on Terminology 
“Foreign born” refers to persons born outside of the United States, Puerto Rico or other U.S. 
territories to parents neither of whom was a U.S. citizen. The terms “foreign born” and 
“immigrant” are used interchangeably in this report. Unless otherwise noted, recent arrivals 
include all the newly arrived regardless of their legal status, that is, both legal immigrants and 
unauthorized immigrants. However, in Pew Research Center survey data, “immigrant” is defined 
as someone born in another country, regardless of parental citizenship. 
“Recent arrivals” or “newly arrived immigrants” refer to foreign-born persons who arrived within 
five years of the census enumeration or date of the survey. Unless otherwise noted, recent arrivals 
include all the newly arrived regardless of their legal status, that is, both legal and unauthorized 
immigrants. 
“Legal immigrants” are those who have been granted legal permanent residence; those granted 
asylum; people admitted as refugees; and people admitted to the U.S. under a set of specific 
authorized temporary statuses for longer-term residence and work. This group includes 
“naturalized citizens,” legal immigrants who have become U.S. citizens through naturalization; 
“legal permanent resident aliens,” who have been granted permission to stay indefinitely in the 
U.S. as permanent residents, asylees or refugees; and “legal temporary migrants” (including 
students, diplomats and “high-tech guest workers”), who are allowed to live and, in some cases, 
work in the U.S. for specific periods of time (usually longer than one year). 
“Unauthorized immigrants” are all foreign-born non-citizens residing in the country who are not 
legal immigrants. This definition reflects standard and customary usage by the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security and academic researchers. 
Immigrant generations living in the U.S. are as follows: “First generation” refers to the foreign 
born (see above for definition). “Second generation” refers to people born in the U.S. who have at 
least one immigrant parent. “Third-and-higher generation” refers to people born in the U.S. with 
U.S.-born parents.  
“U.S. born” refers to individuals who are U.S. citizens at birth, including people born in the United 
States, Puerto Rico or other U.S. territories, as well as those born elsewhere to parents who were 
U.S. citizens. The U.S.-born population encompasses the second generation and the third-and-
higher generation. 
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References to all racial groups, including “Other,” refer to only non-Hispanics. References to 
specific racial groups, such as Asians, blacks and whites, include only single-race individuals. 
Asians do not include Pacific Islanders, unless otherwise noted. Hispanics are of any race. 
“College completion” refers to those who have completed at least a bachelor’s degree. Prior to 1990 
it refers to those who have completed at least four years of college. 
Persons finishing “some college” have finished at least some college education, including those 
completing associate degrees. Those completing any college at all, including less than one year, are 
designated as finishing some college. 
A “high school completer” refers to those who have at least obtained a high school diploma or its 
equivalent (such as a General Educational Development certificate, or GED). Prior to 1990 it refers 
to those who have completed at least four years of high school. 
Throughout this report, the term “Latin America” refers to Central and South America, as well as 
the Caribbean and Mexico; references to “Central and South America” in Chapter 3 do not include 
the Caribbean, but do include Mexico, unless otherwise noted. In referring to countries of origin, 
“South and East Asia” refers to only those regions, while “Asia” refers to the full continent (see 
Recent Arrivals: Data Sources in Appendix A).  
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Modern Immigration Wave Brings 59 Million to U.S., 
Driving Population Growth and Change Through 
2065 
Views of Immigration’s Impact on U.S. Society Mixed 
 
Overview 
Fifty years after passage of the landmark law that rewrote U.S. 
immigration policy, nearly 59 million immigrants have arrived 
in the United States, pushing the country’s foreign-born share 
to a near record 14%. For the past half-century, these modern-
era immigrants and their descendants have accounted for just 
over half the nation’s population growth and have reshaped its 
racial and ethnic composition.  
Looking ahead, new Pew Research Center U.S. population 
projections show that if current demographic trends continue, 
future immigrants and their descendants will be an even bigger 
source of population growth. Between 2015 and 2065, they are 
projected to account for 88% of the U.S. population increase, 
or 103 million people, as the nation grows to 441 million.  
These are some key findings of a new Pew Research analysis of 
U.S. Census Bureau data and new Pew Research U.S. 
population projections through 2065, which provide a 100-
year look at immigration’s impact on population growth and 
on racial and ethnic change. In addition, this report uses newly 
released Pew Research survey data to examine U.S. public 
attitudes toward immigration, and it employs census data to 
analyze changes in the characteristics of recently arrived 
immigrants and paint a statistical portrait of the historical and 
2013 foreign-born populations. 
FIGURE 1 
U.S. Foreign-Born Share 
Projected to Hit Record 
Milestone by 2065 
 
Note: Data labels are for 1850, 1890, 1970, 
2015 and 2065.  
Source: Gibson and Jung (2006) for 1850 to 
1890. Edmonston and Passel (1994) 
estimates for 1900-1955; Pew Research 
Center estimates for 1960-2015 based on 
adjusted census data; Pew Research Center 
projections for 2015-2065 
PEW RESEARCH CENTER 
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Post-1965 Immigration Drives U.S. Population Growth Through 2065 
Immigration since 1965 has swelled the nation’s foreign-born population from 9.6 million then to 
a record 45 million in 2015.1 (The current immigrant population is lower than the 59 million total 
who arrived since 1965 because of deaths and departures from the U.S.)2 By 2065, the U.S. will 
have 78 million immigrants, according to the new Pew Research population projections. 
The nation’s immigrant population increased sharply from 1970 to 2000, though the rate of 
growth has slowed since then. Still, the U.S. has—by far—the world’s largest immigrant 
population, holding about one-in-five of the world’s immigrants (Connor, Cohn and Gonzalez-
Barrera, 2013).  
Between 1965 and 2015, new immigrants, their children and their grandchildren accounted for 
55% of U.S. population growth. They added 72 million people to the nation’s population as it grew 
from 193 million in 1965 to 324 million in 2015.  
                                                        
1 These and other estimates and projections in this report may differ from census data in Chapters 3 and 5; see the methodology in  
Appendix A.  
2 Among the nearly 59 million immigrants who have arrived in the U.S. since 1965, Pew Research estimates that 43.4 million still live in the 
U.S., some 10.8 million departed the U.S., and 4.3 million died. In 2015, about 1.5 million of the 1965 foreign-born population still lived in the 
U.S. 
FIGURE 2 
Immigrants and Their Descendants Accounted for 72 Million in U.S. Population 
Growth from 1965 to 2015; Projected to Account for 103 Million More by 2065 
Note: Difference due to immigration refers to immigrants arriving from 1965 to 2015, and from 2015 to 2065, and their descendants. 
Source: Pew Research Center estimates for 1965-2015 based on adjusted census data; Pew Research Center projections for 2015-2065 
PEW RESEARCH CENTER 
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This fast-growing immigrant population also has driven the share of the U.S. population that is 
foreign born from 5% in 1965 to 14% today and will push it to a projected record 18% in 2065. 
Already, today’s 14% foreign-born share is a near historic record 
for the U.S., just slightly below the 15% levels seen shortly after 
the turn of the 20th century. The combined population share of 
immigrants and their U.S.-born children, 26% today, is 
projected to rise to 36% in 2065, at least equaling previous peak 
levels at the turn of the 20th century. 
The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act made significant 
changes to U.S. immigration policy by sweeping away a long-
standing national origins quota system that favored immigrants 
from Europe and replacing it with one that emphasized family 
reunification and skilled immigrants. At the time, relatively few 
anticipated the size or demographic impact of the post-1965 
immigration flow (Gjelten, 2015). In absolute numbers, the 
roughly 59 million immigrants who arrived in the U.S. between 
1965 and 2015 exceed those who arrived in the great waves of 
European-dominated immigration during the 19th and early 
20th centuries. Between 1840 and 1889, 14.3 million 
immigrants came to the U.S., and between 1890 and 1919, an 
additional 18.2 million arrived (see Table 1 for details). 
After the replacement of the nation’s European-focused origin 
quota system, greater numbers of immigrants from other parts 
of the world began to come to the U.S. Among immigrants who 
have arrived since 1965, half (51%) are from Latin America and 
one-quarter are from Asia. By comparison, both of the U.S. 
immigration waves in the mid-19th century and early 20th 
century consisted almost entirely of European immigrants.  
 
FIGURE 3 
U.S. Foreign-Born 
Population Reached  
45 Million in 2015, 
Projected to Reach  
78 Million by 2065 
 
 
Note: Data labels are for 1850, 1900, 1965, 
2015 and 2065.  
Source: Gibson and Jung (2006) for 1850 to 
1890. Edmonston and Passel (1994) 
estimates for 1900-1955; Pew Research 
Center estimates for 1960-2015 based on 
adjusted census data; Pew Research Center 
projections for 2015-2065 
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Latin American and Asian Immigration Since 1965 Changes U.S. Racial and Ethnic 
Makeup 
As a result of its changed 
makeup and rapid growth, new 
immigration since 1965 has 
altered the nation’s racial and 
ethnic composition. In 1965, 
84% of Americans were non-
Hispanic whites. By 2015, that 
share had declined to 62%. 
Meanwhile, the Hispanic share 
of the U.S. population rose 
from 4% in 1965 to 18% in 
2015. Asians also saw their 
share rise, from less than 1% in 
1965 to 6% in 2015. 
The Pew Research analysis 
shows that without any post-
1965 immigration, the nation’s 
racial and ethnic composition 
would be very different today: 
75% white, 14% black, 8% 
Hispanic and less than 1% 
Asian.  
The arrival of so many 
immigrants slightly reduced the nation’s median age, the age at which half the population is older 
and half is younger. The U.S. population’s median age in 1965 was 28 years, rising to 38 years in 
2015 and a projected 42 years in 2065. Without immigration since 1965, the nation’s median age 
would have been slightly older—41 years in 2015; without immigration from 2015 to 2065, it 
would be a projected 45 years. 
By 2065, the composition of the nation’s immigrant population will change again, according to 
Pew Research projections. In 2015, 47% of immigrants residing in the U.S. are Hispanic, but as 
immigration from Latin America, especially Mexico (Passel, Cohn and Gonzalez-Barrera, 2012), 
has slowed in recent years, the share of the foreign born who are Hispanic is expected to fall to  
FIGURE 4 
Post-1965 Immigration Wave Reshapes America’s 
Racial and Ethnic Population Makeup 
% of U.S. population 
 
Note: Whites, blacks and Asians include only single-race non-Hispanics. Asians include 
Pacific Islanders. Hispanics are of any race. Numbers for “2015 without 1965-2015 
immigration” exclude immigrants arriving from 1965 to 2015 and their descendants. 
Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on adjusted census data 
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31% by 2065. Meanwhile, 
Asian immigrants are 
projected to make up a larger 
share of all immigrants, 
becoming the largest 
immigrant group by 2055 and 
making up 38% of the foreign-
born population by 2065. 
(Hispanics will remain a 
larger share of the nation’s 
overall population.) Pew 
Research projections also 
show that black immigrants 
and white immigrants 
together will become a slightly 
larger share of the nation’s 
immigrants by 2065 than in 
2015 (29% vs. 26%). 
The country’s overall 
population will feel the impact 
of these shifts. Non-Hispanic 
whites are projected to 
become less than half of the 
U.S. population by 2055 and 46% by 2065. No racial or ethnic group will constitute a majority of 
the U.S. population. Meanwhile, Hispanics will see their population share rise to 24% by 2065 
from 18% today, while Asians will see their share rise to 14% by 2065 from 6% today. 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5 
Asians Projected to Become the Largest Immigrant 
Group, Surpassing Hispanics 
% of immigrant population 
  
Note: Whites, blacks and Asians include only single-race non-Hispanics. Asians include 
Pacific Islanders. Hispanics are of any race. Other races shown but not labeled. 
Source: Pew Research Center estimates for 1965-2015 based on adjusted census data; 
Pew Research Center projections for 2025-2065 
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TABLE 1 
Sources of Immigration to the U.S., by Era 
Era and country Total % 
Modern Era (1965-2015) 58,525,000 100 
Mexico 16,275,000 28 
China* 3,175,000 5 
India 2,700,000 5 
Philippines 2,350,000 4 
Korea 1,725,000 3 
Vietnam 1,500,000 3 
Cuba 1,550,000 3 
El Salvador 1,500,000 3 
Former USSR 1,450,000 2 
Dominican Republic 1,325,000 2 
R
e
g
io
n
 t
o
ta
ls
 
Latin America 29,750,000 51 
South/East Asia 14,700,000 25 
Europe, total 6,900,000 12 
Africa/Middle East 4,550,000 8 
Canada** 1,150,000 2 
All other 1,450,000 2 
    
Southern/Eastern Europe Wave (1890–1919) 18,244,000 100 
Italy 3,764,000 21 
Austria-Hungary 3,690,000 20 
Russia & Poland 3,166,000 17 
United Kingdom 1,170,000 6 
Germany 1,082,000 6 
Ireland*** 917,000 5 
R
e
g
io
n
 t
o
ta
ls
 
Europe, total 16,134,000 88 
   North/West Europe 4,757,000 26 
   South/East Europe 11,377,000 62 
Canada 835,000 5 
Latin America 551,000 3 
South/East Asia 315,000 2 
Africa/Middle East 332,000 2 
Other/Not specified 77,000 <0.5 
    
Northern Europe Wave (1840–1889) 14,314,000 100 
Germany 4,282,000 30 
Ireland*** 3,209,000 22 
United Kingdom 2,586,000 18 
Norway-Sweden 883,000 6 
R
e
g
io
n
 t
o
ta
ls
 
Europe, total 12,757,000 89 
   North/West Europe 11,700,000 82 
   South/East Europe 1,058,000 7 
Canada 1,034,000 7 
Latin America 101,000 1 
South/East Asia 293,000 2 
Africa/Middle East 5,000 <0.5 
Other/Not specified 124,000 1 
Note: Population figures rounded to the nearest 25,000 for 1965-2015; nearest thousand 
for earlier waves. Data for 1965–2015 include legal and unauthorized immigrants; for 
1840–1919, only legal admissions are included. *Includes Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao. 
**Includes other North America. ***Includes Northern Ireland. Persons from Puerto Rico 
not included. 
Source: For 1965–2015, Pew Research Center estimates based on adjusted census data; 
for 1840–1919, Office of Immigration Statistics, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2008, 
Table 2  
PEW RESEARCH CENTER 
12 
PEW RESEARCH CENTER 
www.pewresearch.org 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From Ireland to Germany to Italy to Mexico: Where Each State’s Largest Immigrant 
Group Was Born, 1850 to 2013 
The United States has long been—and continues to be—a key destination for the world’s immigrants. Over 
the decades, immigrants from different parts of the world arrived in the U.S. and settled in different states 
and cities. This led to the rise of immigrant communities in many parts of the U.S. 
The nation’s first great influx of immigrants came from Northern and Western Europe. In 1850, the Irish 
were the largest immigrant group nationally and in most East Coast and Southern states. By the 1880s, 
Germans were the nation’s largest immigrant group in many Midwestern and Southern states. At the same 
time, changes to U.S. immigration policy had a great impact on the source countries of immigrants. In 
1880, Chinese immigrants were the largest foreign-born group in California, Oregon, Washington, Idaho and 
Nevada. But with the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, Chinese immigrants were prevented from entering the 
U.S. As a result, other immigrant groups rose to become the largest in those states.  
By the early 20th century, a new wave of immigration was underway, with a majority coming from Southern 
Europe and Eastern Europe. By the 1930s, Italians were the largest immigrant group in the nation and in 
nine states, including New York, Louisiana, New Jersey and Nevada. 
The composition of immigrants changed again in the post-1965 immigration era. By the 1980s, Mexicans 
became the nation’s largest immigrant group; by 2013, they were the largest immigrant group in 33 states. 
But other immigrant groups are represented as well. Chinese immigrants are the largest immigrant group in 
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania. Indians are the largest immigrant group in New Jersey. Filipinos are the 
largest immigrant group in Alaska and Hawaii. 
For more, explore our decade-by-decade interactive map feature. 
 
EP – fix bottom of box. 
MS – inonline version interactive should go here.  
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For the U.S. Public, Views of Immigrants and Their Impact on U.S. Society Are 
Mixed 
For its part, the American public has mixed views on the impact immigrants have had on 
American society, according to a newly released Pew Research Center public opinion survey. 
Overall, 45% of Americans say immigrants in the U.S. are making American society better in the 
long run, while 37% say they are making it worse (16% say immigrants are not having much 
effect). The same survey finds that half of Americans want to see immigration to the U.S. reduced 
(49%), and eight-in-ten (82%) say the U.S. immigration system either needs major changes or it 
needs to be completely rebuilt. 
The public’s views of 
immigrants’ impact on the 
U.S. vary across different 
aspects of American life. 
Views are most negative about 
the economy and crime: Half 
of U.S. adults say immigrants 
are making things worse in 
those areas. On the economy, 
28% say immigrants are 
making things better, while 
20% say they are not having 
much of an effect. On crime, 
by contrast, just 7% say 
immigrants are making things 
better, while 41% generally see 
no positive or negative impact 
of immigrants in the U.S. on 
crime. 
On other aspects of U.S. life, Americans are more likely to hold neutral views of the impact of 
immigrants. Some 45% say immigrants are not having much effect on social and moral values, and 
56% say they are not having much effect on science and technology. But when it comes to food, 
music and the arts, about half (49%) of adults say immigrants are making things better.  
 
FIGURE 6 
Half Say Immigrants in the U.S. Are Making Crime, the 
Economy Worse, but Food, Music and the Arts Are 
Better  
% saying immigrants in the United States are making things … 
 
Note: Those who did not answer the question are not shown. 
Source: Pew Research Center American Trends Panel survey conducted March 10-April 6, 
2015 (N=3,147) 
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U.S. adults’ views on the impact of immigrants on American society also differ depending on 
where immigrants are from. Some 47% of U.S. adults say immigrants from Asia have had a mostly 
positive impact on American society, and 44% say the same about immigrants from Europe. 
Meanwhile, half of Americans say the impact of immigrants from Africa has been neither positive 
nor negative.  
However, Americans are more likely to hold 
negative views about the impact of immigrants 
from Latin America and the Middle East. In 
the case of Latin American immigrants, 37% of 
American adults say their impact on American 
society has been mostly negative, 35% say 
their impact is neither positive nor negative, 
and just 26% say their impact on American 
society has been positive. For immigrants from 
the Middle East, views are similar—39% of 
U.S. adults say their impact on American 
society has been mostly negative, 39% say 
their impact has been neither positive nor 
negative, and just 20% say their impact has 
been mostly positive on U.S. society.  
Many Americans say that immigrants to the 
U.S. are not assimilating. Two-thirds of adults 
say immigrants in the U.S. today generally 
want to hold on to their home country customs 
and way of life, while only about a third (32%) 
say immigrants want to adopt Americans 
customs. The survey also finds that 59% of 
Americans say most recent immigrants do not 
learn English within a reasonable amount of time, while 39% say they do.  
The nationally representative bilingual survey of 3,147 adults was conducted online using the Pew 
Research Center’s American Trends Panel from March 10 to April 6, 2015, before the current 
national discussion began about national immigration policy, unauthorized immigration and 
birthright citizenship. The survey has a margin of error of plus or minus 2.4 percentage points at 
the 95% confidence level. 
FIGURE 7 
European and Asian Immigrants Viewed 
Most Positively 
% saying that the impact of immigrants from each 
region on American society has been …  
 
Note: Those who did not answer the question are not shown. 
Source: Pew Research Center American Trends Panel survey 
conducted March 10-April 6, 2015 (N=3,147) 
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The Profile of Today’s Newly Arrived Is Markedly Different than that of New 
Arrivals in Previous Decades 
The rewrite of the nation’s immigration policy 
in 1965 opened the door to new waves of 
immigrants whose origins and characteristics 
changed substantially over the ensuing 
decades. As a result, newly arrived immigrants 
in 2013 (those who had been in the U.S. for 
five years or less) differ in key ways from those 
who were new arrivals in the 1970s, 1980s and 
1990s.  
Overall, the number of newly arrived 
immigrants peaked in the early 2000s: Some 8 
million residents of other countries came to 
the U.S. between 2000 and 2005. The number 
of recent arrivals declined after that, to about 
6 million for the years 2008 to 2013, according 
to a Pew Research Center analysis of federal 
government data. 
Perhaps the most striking change in the profile 
of newly arrived immigrants is their source 
region. Asia currently is the largest source 
region among recently arrived immigrants and 
has been since 2011.3 Before then, the largest 
source region since 1990 had been Central and South America, fueled by record levels of Mexican 
migration that have since slowed. Back in 1970, Europe was the largest region of origin among 
newly arrived immigrants. One result of slower Mexican immigration is that the share of new 
arrivals who are Hispanic is at its lowest level in 50 years. 
Compared with their counterparts in 1970, newly arrived immigrants in 2013 were better educated 
but also more likely to be poor. Some 41% of newly arrived immigrants in 2013 had at least a 
bachelor’s degree. In 1970, that share was just 20%. On poverty, 28% of recent arrivals in 2013 
                                                        
3 Measured on the basis of those arriving in the past five years, immigrants from Asia outnumbered those from Central and South America in 
2011. On the basis of those arriving in the past year, Asia immigrants supplanted those from Central and South America in 2008. 
FIGURE 8 
The Number of Immigrants Coming to 
the U.S. Peaked in 2005 
Immigrants arriving in the past 5 years 
 
 
Note: Data labels are for 1970, 2005 and 2013. Figures for 2001 
to 2005 are based on the household population and do not include 
arrivals residing in group quarters. 
Source: Pew Research Center tabulations of U.S. decennial census 
data, 1970-2000, and 2001-2013 American Community Survey 
(IPUMS) 
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lived in poverty, up from 18% in 1970. In addition, fewer of the newly arrived in 2013 were 
children than among the newly arrived immigrants in 1970—19% vs. 27%. 
Yet on several other measures, the characteristics of the newly arrived today are returning to those 
of the newly arrived in 1970. On gender, 51% of the newly arrived in 2013 were women, compared 
with 47% in 2000 and 54% in 1970. In terms of geographic dispersion, half of new arrivals in 2013 
lived in one of four states: California, Florida, New York or Texas. Nearly two-thirds of new 
arrivals lived in those four states in 1990, up from a third in 1970. California alone had 38% of 
recently arrived immigrants in 1990, but the share has since declined, to 18% in 2013. 
 
 
 
 
Unauthorized Immigration 
This report’s estimates and projections of foreign-born residents in the U.S. comprise both legal and 
unauthorized immigrants. However, the numbers for each status group are not broken out separately 
except where stated. 
In 2014, 11.3 million unauthorized immigrants lived in the U.S., according to the latest preliminary Pew 
Research estimate (Passel and Cohn, 2015). That estimate is essentially unchanged since 2009, as the 
number of new U.S. unauthorized immigrants roughly equals the number who voluntarily leave the country, 
are deported, convert to legal status or (less commonly) die. 
According to Pew Research estimates going back to 1990, this population rose rapidly during the 1990s 
and peaked in 2007. The number of unauthorized immigrants declined during the recession of 2007-2009 
before stabilizing. Illegal immigration from Mexico has been the main factor in these changes in the U.S. 
unauthorized immigrant population, though Mexicans remain by far the largest unauthorized immigrant 
group.   
For more Pew Research analysis of unauthorized immigration, see 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/topics/unauthorized-immigration/  
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Roadmap to the Report 
The report is organized as follows: Chapter 1 provides an overview of the nation’s immigration 
legislation, with a focus on key changes since 1965. It is accompanied by an interactive timeline 
highlighting U.S. immigration legislation since 1790. Chapter 2 explores the impact of post-1965 
immigration on the nation’s demographics up to 2015 and provides a look forward at the future 
impact of immigration with new Pew Research population projections through 2065. Chapter 3 
looks at the post-1965 flow of immigrants through the lens of the recently arrived, exploring 
changes in the group’s origins and other characteristics. Chapter 4 explores the U.S. public’s views 
of immigration and immigration policy. Chapter 5 provides a statistical portrait of the nation’s 
immigrants from 1960 to 2013 and is accompanied by an online interactive statistical portrait of 
the foreign born and an online interactive exploring the top country of origin among immigrants 
in each state from 1850 to 2013. Appendix A explains the report’s methodology, including for the 
population projections. Appendix B contains a U.S. immigration law timeline. Appendix C 
includes 1965 to 2065 population tables, and Appendix D contains the survey topline. 
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Chapter 1: The Nation’s Immigration Laws, 1920 to Today 
Fifty years ago, the U.S. enacted a sweeping immigration law, the Immigration and Nationality 
Act, which replaced longstanding national origin quotas that favored Northern Europe with a new 
system allocating more visas to people from other countries around the world and giving increased 
priority to close relatives of U.S. residents. 
Just prior to passage of the 1965 law, residents of only three countries—Ireland, Germany and the 
United Kingdom—were entitled to nearly 70% of the quota visas available to enter the U.S. (U.S. 
Department of Justice, 1965).4 Today, immigration to the U.S. is dominated by people born in Asia 
and Latin America, with immigrants from all of Europe accounting for only 10% of recent arrivals. 
The 1965 law undid national origin quotas enacted in the 1920s, which were written into laws that 
imposed the first numerical limits on immigration. Those laws were the culmination of steadily 
tightening federal restrictions on immigration that began in the late 1800s with prohibitions or 
restrictions on certain types of immigrants, such as convicts, in addition to a ban on Chinese 
migrants and later virtually all Asian migrants. 
This chapter explores the history of immigration law in the U.S., focusing on provisions of major 
legislation from the 20th century onward. Accompanying this chapter is an interactive timeline of 
U.S. immigration legislation since the 1790s. 
New Restrictions in the 1920s 
The visa arrangement in place when the 1965 law was passed was a legacy from half a century 
earlier. At that earlier time, a giant wave of immigration that began in the late 1800s had raised 
the nation’s population of foreign-born residents to a then-record high of 13.9 million in 1920, 
making up a near-record 13% of the U.S. population (Gibson and Jung, 2006; Passel and Cohn, 
2008).5 The first arrivals in this wave were mainly Northern Europeans, but by the early 1900s 
most new arrivals came from Italy, Poland and elsewhere in Southern and Eastern Europe 
(Martin, 2011).  
Reacting to the change in immigrant origins, laws enacted in the 1920s sought to return U.S. 
immigration patterns to those that prevailed decades earlier, when Northern Europeans were the  
                                                        
4 Although these three nations were allowed 108,931 visas out of the total quota-visa allotment of 158,561, not all visas were used, and the 
three nations represented 57% of actual immigrants admitted under the national origins quotas in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1965.  
5 From 1860 to 1920, the foreign-born share of the population fluctuated between 13% and 15%. 
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largest group of immigrants. A 1921 law 
imposed the first overall numerical quota on 
immigration to the U.S.—about 350,000, 
reduced to 165,000 in 1924 (Martin, 2011). 
The 1924 law set annual quotas for each 
European country based on the foreign-born 
population from that nation living in the U.S. 
in 1890.6 The 1921 and 1924 laws exempted 
from the new quota highly skilled immigrants, 
domestic servants, specialized workers such as 
actors and wives or unmarried minor children 
of U.S. citizens, and the 1924 law also created 
preferences for quota visas for certain family 
members and agricultural workers (Martin, 
2011). 
Nationality quotas were imposed only on 
Europe, not on countries in the Western 
Hemisphere. There were no quotas for Asia, 
because immigration from most countries 
there already was prohibited through other 
restrictions imposed in 1875 and expanded in 
later decades.  
These laws were passed against a backdrop of 
growing federal regulation of immigration, 
which was mainly controlled by states until a 
series of Supreme Court rulings in the late 
1800s declared that it was a federal 
responsibility. Aside from country limits, 
federal laws already in place barred immigration by criminals, those deemed “lunatics” or “idiots,” 
and people unable to support themselves, among others (U.S. Department of Homeland Security). 
These laws also required that immigrants older than 16 prove they could read English or some 
other language. The federal immigration bureaucracy, created in 1891, grew in the 1920s with 
creation of the Border Patrol and an appeals board for people excluded from the country (U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security). 
                                                        
6 The 1921 law had set quotas based on the 1910 foreign-born population of each nationality. 
FIGURE 1.1 
Latin American, Asian Immigrants Make 
Up Most of Post-1965 Immigration  
%  
 
Note: Data for 1965–2015 include legal and unauthorized 
immigrants; for 1840–1919, only legal admissions. 
Source: For 1965–2015, Pew Research Center estimates based on 
adjusted census data; for 1840–1919, Office of Immigration 
Statistics, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2008, Table 2 
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Immigration slowed sharply after the 1920s. But there were some exceptions to U.S. immigration 
restrictions. For example, because of labor shortages during World War II, the U.S. and Mexico 
signed an agreement in 1942 creating the Bracero program to allow Mexican agricultural workers 
to enter the U.S. temporarily. The program lasted until 1964. 
Longstanding bans on immigration from Asia were lifted in the 1940s and 1950s. A prohibition on 
Chinese immigration enacted in 1882 was repealed in 1943. The 1952 Immigration and Nationality 
Act included the first quotas, though small, allowing immigrants from Asian nations, and created a 
preference system among quota visas that included highly skilled workers for the first time.  
President Harry S. Truman, who opposed national origin quotas, appointed a commission to 
review the nation’s immigration policy after Congress passed the 1952 law over his veto. The 
commission’s report criticized the national origin quotas for perpetuating racial and national 
discrimination. The commission recommended that national origin quotas be replaced by higher 
limits with priority status based on granting asylum, reunifying families and meeting the nation’s 
labor needs (President’s Commission on Immigration and Naturalization, 1953). Congress did not 
act on those recommendations, but in 1953 it did approve a commission proposal for separate 
quotas for refugees (Martin, 2011). 
The 1965 Law Brings Major Change 
It was not until 1965, when amendments were passed to the Immigration and Naturalization Act, 
that the old national origins system was abolished.  
Instead, the new law emphasized visas for family and employment categories, but exempted 
spouses, parents and minor children of U.S. citizens from those visa limits. That exemption, and 
other priority given to family members of U.S. residents, meant that about three-quarters of visas 
were set aside for relatives of those already in the U.S.—putting the emphasis in U.S. immigration 
policy on family reunification.  
Most remaining visas were for employment purposes, given to people with certain job skills and 
their family members. The Labor Department was required to certify that an American worker was 
not available to fill the job of the visa seeker and that U.S. workers would not be harmed if the visa 
were issued (Martin, 2011). 
The 1965 law also included a quota for refugees, who were granted 6% of annual visas, compared 
with 74% for families; 10% for professionals, scientists and artists; and 10% for workers in short 
supply in the country (Kritz and Gurak, 2005). Later, the Refugee Act of 1980 separated refugee 
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admissions from the overall quota system, expanded the definition of a refugee and set up 
comprehensive procedures for handling refugees.  
Although the 1920s-era national origins quotas were abolished, the new 1965 law did include total 
hemisphere and country quotas. Though the hemisphere quotas were dropped in the following 
decade (Martin, 2011). Importantly, the law imposed the first limits on immigration from Western 
Hemisphere countries, including Mexico. Those limits, combined with the end of the Bracero 
program in 1964, are associated with a rise in unauthorized immigration, mostly from Mexico.7  
Scholars attribute passage of the 1965 law in part to the era’s civil rights movement, which created 
a climate for changing laws that allowed racial or ethnic discrimination, as well as to the growing 
clout of groups whose immigration had been restricted (Martin, 2011). The economy was healthy, 
allaying concerns that immigrants would compete with U.S.-born workers (Reimers, 1992). Some, 
however, say that geopolitical factors were more important, especially the image of the U.S. abroad 
in an era of Cold War competition with Russia (FitzGerald and Cook-Martin, 2015). Labor unions, 
which had opposed higher immigration levels in the past, supported the 1965 law, though they 
pushed for changes to tighten employment visas. And political players changed: President Lyndon 
B. Johnson lobbied hard for the bill, and a new generation of congressional leaders created a 
friendlier environment for it (Martin, 2011). 
Its sponsors praised the law for its fairness but downplayed its potential impact on immigration 
flows. “This bill that we will sign today is not a revolutionary bill. It does not affect the lives of 
millions,” Johnson said in remarks at the signing ceremony. “It will not reshape the structure of 
our daily lives, or really add importantly to either our wealth or our power.” 
Laws Since 1965 
In the 1970s and early 1980s, new laws mainly focused on the growing flow of refugees from 
Southeast Asia. Since then, concerns about unauthorized immigration have guided the nation’s 
immigration policy agenda. In 1986, Congress addressed the growing issue of unauthorized 
immigration with the Immigration Reform and Control Act, which offered temporary protection 
from deportation and legal permanent resident status to millions of people who had lived in the 
country since the 1980s. Roughly 2.7 million people were given legal status under the law’s general 
legalization or its special program for farmworkers.  
The Immigration Act of 1990 increased the number of visas for legal immigrants coming for family 
and employment reasons and created a new category of visas for “diversity immigrants.” Among 
                                                        
7 Massey and Pren (2012) argue that the end of the Bracero program caused the surge in unauthorized immigration. 
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other provisions, it also created a new type of relief from deportation for nationals of countries 
undergoing armed conflicts, environmental or health disasters, or other “extraordinary and 
temporary conditions,” known as “temporary protected status,” which has been used mainly by 
Central American immigrants.  
The primary emphasis of more recent immigration legislation has been to reduce government 
benefits to immigrants, increase border security and provide broader reasoning for excluding 
immigrants on terrorism grounds (Migration Policy Institute, 2013).  
Notable exceptions to that pattern were President Barack Obama’s two recent executive actions on 
unauthorized immigration—Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) in 2012 and Deferred 
Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) in 2014. DACA allowed 
young adults, ages 15 to 30, who had been brought illegally to the U.S. as children to apply for 
deportation relief and a temporary work permit. In 2014, the president eliminated the age limits 
for DACA eligibility. Under DAPA, some unauthorized immigrants with U.S.-born children were 
allowed to apply for deportation relief and a work permit. The 2014 actions are on hold because of 
a legal challenge filed by 26 states (Lopez and Krogstad, 2015).  
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Chapter 2: Immigration’s Impact on Past and Future U.S. 
Population Change 
Foreign-born Americans and 
their descendants have been 
the main driver of U.S. 
population growth, as well as 
of national racial and ethnic 
change, since passage of the 
1965 law that rewrote national 
immigration policy. They also 
will be the central force in 
U.S. population growth and 
change over the next 50 years. 
According to new Pew 
Research Center projections, 
immigrants will make up a 
record 18% of the U.S. 
population in 2065, compared 
with 14% today and 5% in 
1965. Immigrants and their 
children will represent 36% of 
the U.S. population in 2065, 
which equals or surpasses the 
peak levels last seen around 
the turn of the 20th century. 
That share will represent a 
doubling since 1965 (18%) and a notable rise from today’s 26%. 
The arrival of new immigrants and the births of their children and grandchildren account for 55% 
of the U.S. population increase from 193 million in 1965 to 324 million today. The new Pew 
Research Center projections also show that the nation is projected to grow to 441 million in 2065 
and that 88% of the increase is linked to future immigrants and their descendants. 
FIGURE 2.1 
First- and Second-Generation Share of the Population 
to Reach Record High in 2065 
% of U.S. population who are …  
 
Note: Data labels are for 1900, 1965, 2015 and 2065. “First generation” is foreign born; 
“second generation” is people born in the U.S. with at least one foreign-born parent. 
Source: Edmonston and Passel (1994) estimates for 1900-1955; Pew Research Center 
estimates for 1960-2015 based on adjusted census data; Pew Research Center projections 
for 2015-2065 
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Immigration has had only a modest impact on the nation’s age structure, but a striking one on its 
racial and ethnic makeup.8 Without immigration since 1965, the U.S. today would have a median 
age of 41, not 38. The nation would be 75% white instead of 62%. Hispanics would be 8% of the 
population, not 18%. And Asians would be less than 1% of Americans, instead of 6%. 
Immigration’s Contribution to U.S. Population Size and Growth 
The nation’s population grew by 131 million 
people from 1965 to 2015, and 72 million of 
them are linked to immigration—that is, they 
are immigrants who arrived during this period 
or they are their children or grandchildren.  
If no immigrants had entered the country after 
1965, when the U.S. population numbered 193 
million, the nation’s population still would 
have grown—to 252 million people by 2015, 
rather than 324 million. The population would 
have grown by less than half as much as it 
actually did (30% vs. 67% growth). 
Over the next five decades, the U.S. immigrant 
population of 45 million is projected to grow to 
a record 78 million.9 The growth rate of 74% 
will be more than double that for the U.S.-
born population (30%).  
Foreign-born U.S. residents will make up 18% 
of the population by 2065, higher than the previous record share of nearly 15% during the late 
19th- and early 20th-century wave of immigration. The U.S.-born children of immigrants—the 
second generation—will more than double in number by 2065, from 38 million to 81 million, and 
will become 18% of the total population. 
Since 1965, when the U.S. had 9.6 million immigrants, the total foreign-born population has more 
than quadrupled. The growth rate rose for each 10-year period from 1965 to 1995, peaking at 56% 
                                                        
8 As noted in the Note on Terminology, only non-Hispanics are included in estimates and projections for whites, blacks, Asians and other 
races. Hispanics are of any race. 
9 Unauthorized immigrants are included in all totals for the immigrant population, but not broken out separately. According to the latest Pew 
Research Center preliminary estimate (Passel and Cohn, 2015), there were 11.3 million unauthorized immigrants living in the U.S. in 2014. 
FIGURE 2.2 
Immigrants and Descendants Account 
for 72 Million in Population Growth from 
1965 to 2015 
  
Note: “Difference due to immigration” refers to immigrants arriving 
from 1965 to 2015 and their descendants.  
Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on adjusted census 
data 
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growth from 1985 to 1995. The volume of 
immigration grew from 1995 to 2005, though 
the growth rate of the foreign born decreased 
slightly (49%). From 2005 to 2015, the growth 
rate of the foreign born declined substantially, 
to 17%, largely because of a sharp drop in 
unauthorized immigration, especially from 
Mexico (Passel, Cohn and Gonzalez-Barrera, 
2012).  
Projections Methods 
The new Pew Research projections are 
calculated based on immigration rates, birth 
rates and death rates that are derived from 
past trends and assumptions about future 
patterns. Among the assumptions are that the 
current slowdown in immigration will last 
through the decade, but that growth will pick 
up somewhat after that. Fertility rates are not 
projected to rise, but rates will 
vary by group. Lifespans are 
projected to improve 
modestly.  
These projections employ 
today’s racial categories. It 
should be noted that race and 
ethnicity are fluid concepts 
that can change through social 
consensus, personal self-
identification or other means 
(Liebler et al., 2014; Pew 
Research Center, 2015b; 
Wang, 2015). For more details 
on assumptions and racial  
 
 
FIGURE 2.3  
Immigration Projected to Account for 
103 million in U.S. Population Growth by 
2065 
 
Note: “Difference due to immigration” refers to immigrants arriving 
from 2015 to 2065 and their descendants. 2015 numbers are 
estimates; numbers for other years are projected. 
Source: Pew Research Center projections 
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FIGURE 2.4 
Percent Change in the Foreign-Born Population, by 
Decade, 1965-2015 and 2015-2065 
 
Note: Intervals begin mid-year and do not overlap.  
Source: Pew Research Center estimates for 1965-2015 based on adjusted census data; 
Pew Research Center projections for 2015-2065 
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categories, see Appendix A: Methodology. 
The immigrant population is expected to rise within a range of about 9% to 16% each decade from 
2015 to 2065. By comparison, the overall U.S. population is projected to grow by 5% to 8% each 
decade.  
Immigrants contribute to population growth because of both their own numbers and their above-
average fertility. Most of those who immigrate are working-age adults, so immigrants are more 
likely than U.S.-born residents to be in their child-bearing years. They also have higher age-
adjusted birth rates than people born in the U.S. (Livingston and Cohn, 2012). 
Immigrant Generations 
Immigrants made up only 5% of the U.S. population in 1965, compared with 14% today. The 
second generation, the children of immigrants, represent about the same share of the population 
today (12%) as in 1965 (13%). However, as shown below, today’s children of immigrants are 
considerably younger than their counterparts in 1965, and they are less likely to be white. 
The second generation, today representing 38 million children of immigrants, is projected to be a 
major force driving future population growth. The foreign-born population has grown more 
rapidly than the second generation over the past five decades, but the second generation is 
projected to grow at a faster pace over the next five decades. The number of second-generation 
Americans is projected to more than double by 2065, to 81 million, when they will slightly 
outnumber the 78 million foreign-born Americans. 
The third-and-higher generations—those born in the U.S. to U.S.-born parents—will grow more 
slowly, by 17% over the next five decades. This group now makes up about three-quarters (74%) of 
the U.S. population, but it will decline to about two-thirds (64%) in 2065. 
Past Racial and Hispanic Change 
Immigration is the primary reason behind the striking growth in the nation’s Hispanic and Asian 
populations since passage of the 1965 immigration law that ended a visa system favoring Europe 
over other regions of the world. Immigrants and their descendants account for most growth in the 
Hispanic population (76%) and virtually all growth in the Asian population (98%) from 1965 to 
2015. 
Five decades ago, the U.S. was a mainly (84%) white nation with an 11% black minority. Hispanics 
of all races made up 4% of the population, and other races made up the remaining 1%. All these 
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groups grew in the ensuing 50 years, especially Hispanics, whose numbers grew sevenfold, and 
Asians, whose numbers rose more than 
thirteenfold. 
The Hispanic share of the population more 
than quadrupled from 1965 to 2015, to 18%, 
and the Asian share more than quintupled, to 
6%. The white share declined (to 62% in 
2015), and the black share changed little (to 
12% in 2015). 
The Hispanic population, 8 million in 1965, is 
nearly 57 million in 2015. The Asian 
population, 1.3 million in 1965, grew to 18 
million in 2015. 
The white and black populations did not grow 
as sharply, and less than a third of growth for 
each race (29%) can be linked to immigration. 
The 1965 white population of nearly 162 
million grew to 200 million in 2015. The black 
population, 21 million in 1965, increased to 40 
million in 2015. 
Looking at immigrants’ total contribution to 
population growth, by racial and ethnic group, 
Hispanics and their descendants can be linked 
to 28% of the overall U.S. increase over the past five decades. Asian immigrants and their 
descendants contributed 13% of growth. White immigrants and their descendants accounted for 
8%, and black immigrants and their descendants are linked to 4% of overall growth over the past 
five decades. An additional 45% of growth was not linked to immigration, but to births to people 
living in the U.S. in 1965 and their descendants. 
 
FIGURE 2.5 
Asian, Hispanic U.S. Population Shares 
Have Grown Rapidly Since 1965 
% of U.S. population 
 
Note: Whites, blacks and Asians include only single-race non-
Hispanics. Asians include Pacific Islanders. Hispanics are of any 
race. Other races shown but not labeled. Shares less than 3% not 
labeled. 
Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on adjusted census 
data 
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FIGURE 2.6 
Impact of Immigration on Population Growth of Major Racial and Ethnic  
Groups in the United States, 1965-2015 
 
Note: Whites, blacks and Asians include only single-race non-Hispanics. Asians include Pacific Islanders. Hispanics are of any race. Note 
scale difference for whites. “Difference due to immigration” refers to immigrants arriving from 1965 to 2015 and their descendants. 
Difference calculated before rounding.  
Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on adjusted census data 
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Projected Future Racial and Hispanic Change 
Over the next five decades, the majority of U.S. 
population growth is projected to be linked to 
new Asian immigration (35%) and new 
Hispanic immigration (25%). An additional 
18% will be due to new white immigrants and 
their descendants, and 8% to black 
immigrants and their descendants.10 Only 
about 12% of projected growth is attributable 
to the population already in the country in 
2015 and its descendants. 
Differing growth rates of the nation’s racial 
and ethnic groups will reshape the U.S. 
demographic profile. By 2055, the United 
States will be a nation without a majority 
racial or ethnic group. The Hispanic and Asian 
populations will continue to grow more rapidly 
than whites and blacks. The white population, 
now 62% of the total, will decline to less than 
50% sometime between 2050 and 2055.  
In 2065, according to Pew Research 
projections, whites will make up 46% of the 
population and Hispanics 24%. Asians will be 
14% of the total; after 2060, they are projected to surpass blacks, who will be 13% of the U.S. 
population. 
Nearly all (97%) of the growth in the nation’s Asian population over the next five decades will be 
due to new immigrants, their children and grandchildren. Most growth will be due to immigration 
for Hispanics (57%) and blacks (61%). The white population, projected to rise by 1% from 2015 to 
2065, would decline by 9% without new immigrants and their descendants.  
 
                                                        
10 About 2% of total growth will be due to immigrants and their descendants from other racial groups. 
FIGURE 2.7 
By 2055, the U.S. Will Have No Racial or 
Ethnic Majority Group 
% of projected U.S. population 
 
Note: 2015 numbers are estimates; numbers for other years are 
projected. Whites, blacks and Asians include only single-race non-
Hispanics. Asians include Pacific Islanders. Hispanics are of any 
race. Other races shown but not labeled.  
Source: Pew Research Center projections 
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FIGURE 2.8 
Projected Impact of Immigration on Population Growth of Major Racial and Ethnic  
Groups in the United States, 2015-2065 
 
Note: Whites, blacks and Asians include only single-race non-Hispanics. Asians include Pacific Islanders. Hispanics are of any race. Note scale 
difference for whites. “Difference due to immigration” refers to immigrants arriving from 2015 to 2065 and their descendants. 2015 numbers 
are estimates; numbers for other years are projected. 
Source: Pew Research Center projections 
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Race and Ethnicity among Immigrants 
Among immigrants, the white 
share of the foreign-born 
population will remain at a 
historic low over the next five 
decades. Based on Pew 
Research Center assumptions 
about immigration, fertility 
and mortality rates, Asians 
are projected to surpass 
Hispanics as the largest single 
group among the foreign-born 
population, beginning in 
2055.  
In 1965, most immigrants 
(80%) were white, but 
immigration over the 
subsequent five decades was 
dominated by Hispanics and 
Asians. In 2015, only 18% of 
immigrant population was 
white; in 2065, 20% are 
projected to be white. The 
Hispanic share of immigrants, 
now 47%, will decline to 31% as a growing share of Hispanic growth is fed by births in the U.S. and 
not new immigration. Asians, who surpassed Hispanics among new immigrants by 2011, are 
projected to rise to 38% of the immigrant population in 2065 from today’s 26%.11  
Asians will be a growing share of the second generation (26% in 2065), but Hispanics will remain 
the largest single group in the second generation (40%). In 2065, Hispanics will nearly triple their 
representation in the third-and-higher generation (18% from today’s 8%), but Asians will remain a 
small share (3%) of this group. 
The combined share of immigrants and children of immigrants—sometimes called “immigrant 
stock”—varies widely among the nation’s major race and ethnic groups. The white and black 
                                                        
11 Among immigrants who arrived in the previous year, Asians surpassed Hispanics in 2009 (Pew Research Center, 2012). 
FIGURE 2.9 
Asians Projected to Become the Largest Immigrant 
Group, Surpassing Hispanics 
% of immigrant population 
  
Note: Whites, blacks and Asians include only single-race non-Hispanics. Asians include 
Pacific Islanders. Hispanics are of any race. Other races shown but not labeled. 
Source: Pew Research Center estimates for 1965-2015 based on adjusted census data; 
Pew Research Center projections for 2015-2065 
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shares are expected to rise over the next five decades, while the Hispanic and Asian shares will 
decline somewhat.  
In 1965, nearly one-in-five whites (18%) were immigrants or the children of immigrants, which 
declined to 10% in 2015 but will rebound to 16% in 2065. Among blacks, only 1% were immigrants 
or the children of immigrants in 1965, which rose to 15% in 2015 and will go up to 27% in 2065. 
Among Hispanics, 38% were first or second generation in 1965, compared with 68% today and just 
over half (53%) in 2065, according to projections. Among Asians, 69% were first or second 
generation in 1965, 93% are today and 84% are projected to be in 2065. 
Today, Asians are the only major racial or ethnic group whose numbers are rising mainly because 
of immigration. Although immigration contributes to growth of the U.S. Hispanic population, 
births in the U.S. to Hispanic women are a more important contributor. Births overtook 
immigration as the main driver of Latino population growth after 2000 (Krogstad and Lopez, 
2014).  
Nearly two-thirds of the Asian population (64%) is foreign born, compared with 37% of U.S. 
Hispanics. About a quarter (23%) of the Hispanic population will be foreign born in 2065, and 
barely half (49%) of the Asian population will 
be immigrants.  
Due to a gradual increase in black 
immigration, 13% of blacks will be foreign 
born, compared with 9% today. The white 
population will have only an 8% share of 
immigrants, compared with 4% today. 
Median Age 
In 1965, immigration rates had been low for 
several decades, so both immigrants and their 
U.S.-born children were considerably older 
than the U.S. population overall. The contrast 
is striking in terms of median age—the age at 
which half the population is older and half 
younger. For the U.S. population overall, in 
1965, the year after the end of the post-World 
War II baby boom, the median age was 28. 
FIGURE 2.10 
U.S. Median Age Projected to Rise to 42 
by 2065 
 
Source: Pew Research Center estimates for 1965-2015 based on 
adjusted census data; Pew Research Center projections for 2015-
2065 
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The median age for immigrants was 56. The median age for the second generation, whose parents 
mainly came during the early 20th-century wave of immigration, was 45. 
By 2015, the U.S. population was older, with a median age of 38, mainly because of the aging of the 
large Baby Boom generation. Had there been no immigration after 1965, the population would 
have been slightly older, with a median age of nearly 41. Today’s immigrant population is 
substantially younger than in 1965, with a median age of nearly 45. 
The most striking change, though, is in the second generation. The children of immigrants today 
have a median age of 19, so they are about a quarter century younger than their counterparts in 
1965 and are substantially younger than the overall population.  
The U.S. median age is projected to rise steadily, reaching 42 in 2065. The median age of foreign-
born Americans is projected to reach nearly 53, close to its level in 1965. The median age of the 
second generation will increase even more sharply, to 36, though this group is projected to remain 
slightly younger than the overall population. Over the next five decades, projected immigration 
would have the impact of keeping the median age of the overall population slightly lower than it 
would be otherwise, by 2.7 years. 
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Chapter 3: The Changing Characteristics of Recent 
Immigrant Arrivals Since 1970 
Today’s recently arrived immigrants are 
sharply different from their counterparts of 50 
years ago, not only in their origins and current 
states of residence, but also in their education 
levels, occupations and economic well-being, 
according to a Pew Research Center analysis of 
U.S. Census Bureau data. Most visibly, Asia is 
now the largest region of origin among 
recently arrived immigrants—those who have 
been in the U.S. for five years or less—
supplanting Central and South America in 
2011.12 
Newly arrived immigrants today also are 
markedly better educated than their 
counterparts of 50 years ago, and have 
narrowed their schooling gap with the U.S.-
born population. About half work in 
managerial, professional, and sales and 
administrative support jobs, a higher share 
than in any decade from 1970 on. However, 
they also are more likely to be living in poverty 
than in 1970, and their family incomes are no 
higher. 
The broad rewrite of the nation’s immigration law in 1965, which ended a longstanding national 
origins quota system that favored Europe, was an important facilitator of these changes. Its 
passage is linked to the third great wave of immigration to the United States—a wave that 
continues today. Since 1965, nearly 59 million immigrants have come to the U.S.  
But more changes are underway. After increasing steadily for three decades, the number of new 
immigrant arrivals appears to have peaked around 2005 and then began to fall.  
                                                        
12 Measured on the basis of those arriving in the past five years, immigrants from Asia outnumbered those from Central and South America in 
2011. On the basis of those arriving in the past year, Asia immigrants supplanted those from Central and South America in 2008. 
FIGURE 3.1 
The Number of Immigrants Coming to 
the U.S. Peaked in 2005 
Immigrants arriving in the past 5 years 
 
 
Note: Data labels are for 1970, 2005 and 2013. Figures for 2001 
to 2005 are based on the household population and do not include 
arrivals residing in group quarters. 
Source: Pew Research Center tabulations of 1970-2000 U.S. 
decennial census data and 2001-2013 American Community 
Survey (IPUMS) 
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The decline is mainly the result of an abrupt slowdown over the past decade in unauthorized 
immigration, mainly from Mexico. Hispanic immigration to the U.S.—both legal and illegal—
crested in the early 2000s, and the share of new arrivals who are Hispanic is at its lowest level in 
50 years.  
From Europe to the Americas to Asia: The Changing Origins of Newly Arrived Immigrants 
Since passage of the 1965 immigration law, the dominant region of origin of new immigrants has 
shifted three times. In earlier waves of immigration, most arrivals came from Europe, and this 
trend continued even into 1970, when a plurality of recently arrived immigrants was from there 
(30%). Meanwhile, roughly equal shares of recent immigrants were from Central and South 
America (20%), Asia (19%) 
and the Caribbean (18%), 
regions that had long had 
little representation among 
newly arrived immigrants.13  
By 1980, patterns shifted as 
growth in immigration from 
Asia and from Mexico 
increased. As a result, new 
immigrants from Asia (36%) 
and Central and South 
America, including Mexico, 
(31%) outnumbered the share 
arriving from Europe (14%). 
Immigration from Central 
and South America grew 
rapidly through the 1980s, 
increasing the share of newly 
arrived immigrants in 1990 from these countries to 41%, making the region the top sender of 
immigrants to the U.S. Throughout the 1990s, immigration from the region—especially from 
Mexico—continued to grow. As a result, by 2000, Mexico alone accounted for a third (34%) of 
recent immigrants, up from just 11% in 1970. And the total from Central and South America 
reached 48%.  
                                                        
13 For a listing of the countries included in each region, see Recent Arrivals: Data Sources in Appendix A. This chapter differs somewhat from 
other parts of this report in that it analyzes Central and South America and the Caribbean separately, instead of combining them into Latin 
America. Throughout this chapter, references to “Central and South America” include Mexico, unless otherwise noted. 
TABLE 3.1 
Region of Birth of Recent Immigrant Arrivals 
%  
 1970 1980 1990 2000 2013 
Central and South America 20 31 41 48 28 
Mexico 11 22 26 34 15 
Other Central/South America 9 9 15 13 13 
Asia 19 36 31 25 41 
Europe 30 14 11 13 10 
Caribbean 18 7 7 7 10 
Africa 2 3 2 4 8 
Other 11 9 7 3 3 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Note: Recent arrivals refer to the foreign born who arrived within five years of the census or 
survey date. “Other” includes Canada, Atlantic Islands, Australia and New Zealand, and 
Pacific Islands. 
Source: Pew Research Center tabulations of 1970-2000 U.S. decennial census data and 
2013 American Community Survey (IPUMS) 
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More recently, there has been another change. An abrupt slowdown in new immigration from 
Mexico, especially of unauthorized immigrants (Passel, Cohn and Gonzalez-Barrera, 2013), 
reduced the Mexican share of new arrivals to only 15% by 2013. Altogether, new immigrants from 
Central and South America represented just 28% of the total in 2013.  
At the same time, immigration from Asia increased. The number of new arrivals from Asia, fueled 
in part by the greater propensity of Asian immigrants to obtain green cards based on employer 
sponsorship, grew 30% between 2000 and 2013 (Pew Research Center, 2012). By 2011, new 
arrivals from Asia were the single largest origin 
group among new immigrants. By 2013, their 
share had grown to 41% of new arrivals, the 
highest share from that continent in U.S. 
history. 
Europe accounted for only one-in-ten new 
immigrants to the U.S. in 2013, even though it 
had been the main source of the U.S. foreign-
born population for most of the nation’s 
history. In 1910, for example, 89% of recently 
arrived immigrants came from Europe. 
Immigration from Africa also has picked up 
markedly (Anderson, 2015) and accounted for 
8% of new arrivals in 2013, quadruple its share 
among newly arrived immigrants in 1970. 
The Number of New Arrivals 
Even though Europe’s share of new arrivals has 
declined since the 1970s, the absolute number 
of new immigrants from Europe grew, then 
receded. In 2013, the number of new European arrivals stood at 580,000, slightly higher than the 
520,000 European immigrants who were newly arrived in 1970.  
The number of new immigrants from Central and South America, dominated by Mexico, grew 
more than tenfold in the first three decades since the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act’s 
enactment. In 2000, about 2.6 million immigrants from Mexico and an additional 1 million from 
other Central and South American nations had recently settled in the U.S. By comparison, the 
FIGURE 3.2 
Asia Largest Source of Recent Arrivals 
Immigrants arriving in the past 5 years 
 
Note: The arrivals from Central and South America include those 
from Mexico. Figures for 2001 to 2005 are based on the household 
population and do not include arrivals residing in group quarters. 
Source: Pew Research Center tabulations of 2001-2013 American 
Community Survey (IPUMS) 
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1970 census recorded less than 350,000 newly arrived Central and South American immigrants, 
including 188,000 from Mexico. More recently, immigration from Mexico and other Central and 
South American countries has diminished. For example, in 2013 only 900,000 immigrants from 
Mexico recently arrived here, down from a peak of 2.8 million in 2005. 
 
In 2013, there were 2.5 million recently arrived immigrants from Asia, a more than sevenfold 
increase since 1970. New immigration from Asia nearly quadrupled in the 1970s, and it grew by 
about a quarter in the 1980s and again in the 1990s.  
The number of newly arrived immigrants from the Caribbean and Africa also has grown. New 
Caribbean immigrants now exceed those from Europe. The number of newly arrived immigrants 
from Africa grew 41% from 2000 to 2013, a sharper rise than for other major groups. 
 
 
 
TABLE 3.2 
Region of Birth of Recent Immigrant Arrivals 
Immigrants arriving in the past 5 years (in thousands) 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 2013 
Central and South America 350 1,049  1,981  3,641   1,659  
Mexico 188  730  1,257  2,618  905  
Other Central/South America 162  319  723  1,023  754  
Asia 323  1,214  1,522  1,905  2,470  
Europe 522  467  532  994  577  
Caribbean 309  235  357  513  595  
Africa 27  85  114  335  473  
Other 182  313  342  217  183  
Total 1,712  3,363  4,848  7,604  5,957  
Note: “Other” includes Canada, Atlantic Islands, Australia and New Zealand, and Pacific Islands. 
Source: Pew Research Center tabulations of 1970-2000 U.S. decennial census data and 2013 American Community Survey (IPUMS) 
PEW RESEARCH CENTER 
38 
PEW RESEARCH CENTER 
www.pewresearch.org 
The Changing Demographics of the Newly Arrived 
Settlement  
In the two decades after passage of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, newly arrived 
immigrants increasingly settled in four large 
states—California, New York, Texas and 
Florida. In 1970, these four magnet states were 
home to only about one-in-three new 
immigrants. By 1980, more than half of newly 
arrived immigrants lived in these four states, 
and by 1990, nearly two-thirds did.  
In recent years, though, new arrivals have 
dispersed more widely across the country. In 
2013, half of new arrivals lived in states other 
than the big four. Meanwhile, these four states 
have somewhat different patterns of change. 
The share of newly arrived immigrants settling 
in Texas and Florida has grown steadily since 
1970, but the share settling in the other two 
states declined—markedly so in California. 
Fully 38% of recently arrived immigrants lived 
in the Golden State in 1990, but that share 
declined to 18% in 2013.  
Since 1990, many states that previously had little exposure to international migration became the 
new home for recent arrivals. 
FIGURE 3.3 
Settlement of Recent Arrivals: Growing 
Concentration, then Dispersion 
 
Note: Recent or new arrivals refer to the foreign born who arrived 
within five years of the census or survey date. 
Source: Pew Research Center tabulations of 1970-2000 U.S. 
decennial census data and 2013 American Community Survey 
(IPUMS) 
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Racial and Ethnic Background 
Accompanying the change in the national 
origins of recently arrived immigrants was a 
shift in their racial and ethnic backgrounds. 
The share of new immigrants who are white, 
45% in 1970, was 19% in 2013. Asians 
represented 35% of recent arrivals in 2013, 
about triple their share in 1970 (12%). 
Hispanics were a third of recent arrivals in 
2013, after peaking at 50% in 2000. Their 
share of the total in 2013 was about the same 
as in 1970, when it was 35%.14 
 
                                                        
14 This comparison is not entirely a clean comparison. Since 1980, Hispanic identity is based on a direct question soliciting Hispanic identity. 
For 1970, Hispanic identity is imputed based on Hispanic birthplace, parental birthplace, grandparental birthplace, Spanish surname, and/or 
family relationship to a person with one of these characteristics. Direct information on Hispanic identity is not available in the 1970 census. 
FIGURE 3.4 
Marked Changes in the Race and 
Ethnicity of Recent Arrivals 
%  
 
Note: Recent arrivals refer to the foreign born who arrived within five 
years of the census or survey date. Whites, blacks and Asians 
include only single-race non-Hispanics. Hispanics are of any race.  
Source: Pew Research Center tabulations of 1970-2000 U.S. 
decennial census data and 2013 American Community Survey 
(IPUMS) 
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Gender 
Following the 1965 Immigration and 
Nationality Act, a rising proportion of new 
arrivals were men. By 2000 a majority (53%) 
of new arrivals were men, up from less than 
half (46%) in 1970. However, in the 2000s, the 
gender pattern reversed, with women 
accounting for a majority (51%) of recent 
arrivals in 2013.  
The changing gender pattern for recent 
immigrants is explained in part by the rise and 
fall of unauthorized immigration. 
Unauthorized immigrants are more likely to be 
men (Fry, 2006). As the number of 
unauthorized immigrants grew in the decades 
after passage of the 1965 law, so did the male 
share of recently arrived immigrants. Yet as 
the flow of unauthorized immigrants fell 
sharply in the wake of the Great Recession 
(Passel and Cohn, 2010, Passel, Cohn, and 
Gonzalez-Barrera, 2013), the female share of 
recent arrivals increased. 
The temporary U.S. trend toward a more male-dominated immigration flow was noteworthy in 
part because of its rarity. In many countries of the world, women have constituted a rising share of 
international migrants since 1960 (United Nations Population Fund, 2006).  
FIGURE 3.5 
Recent Arrivals Are Once Again Majority 
Female 
% female 
 
Note: Recent arrivals refer to the foreign born who arrived within five 
years of the census or survey date. 
Source: Pew Research Center tabulations of 1970-2000 U.S. 
decennial census data and 2013 American Community Survey 
(IPUMS) 
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Age 
The age of newly arrived immigrants has not 
significantly changed since 1970. The majority 
of new arrivals are 18 to 44 years old. 
Relatively few new arrivals are children. In 
1980, 30% of recently arrived immigrants 
were children. While the 1965 law emphasized 
family reunification, the share of newly arrived 
immigrants who are children has steadily 
declined to less than 20% in 2013. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3.6 
Fewer Recent Arrivals Are Children 
 
Note: Recent arrivals refer to the foreign born who arrived within five 
years of the census or survey date. Age shown is age at census or 
survey date. Children are those younger than 18. 
Source: Pew Research Center tabulations of 1970-2000 U.S. 
decennial census data and 2013 American Community Survey 
(IPUMS) 
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Newly Arrived Immigrants Better Educated than in 1970, but Many Live in Poverty  
Education 
Regardless of the educational 
benchmark chosen, those 
coming to the U.S. are much 
better educated than their 
counterparts of 50 years ago. 
Among adults ages 25 and 
older, a larger share in 2013 
had a high school diploma, a 
college degree or an advanced 
degree, and a smaller share 
had less than a ninth-grade 
education. For example, half 
of newly arrived immigrants 
in 1970 had at least a high 
school education; in 2013, 
more than three-quarters did. 
In 1970, a fifth had graduated 
from college; in 2013, 41% had 
done so.  
The improved levels of 
education attainment of 
recently arrived immigrants 
partly reflects rising education 
levels worldwide. In 2010, 
45% of the world’s population 
had attended secondary 
school, up from less than 20% 
in 1960 (Morrison and 
Murtin, 2010). Among adults 
ages 20 to 24 in Mexico, which has been the largest source country of U.S. immigrants, the share 
with a secondary school education grew to a majority in 2010, compared with less than 10% in 
1965 (Barro and Lee, 2013). 
FIGURE 3.7 
Educational Attainment of Newly Arrived Immigrants 
Has Increased 
% among recently arrived immigrants ages 25 and older 
 
Note: Recent or new arrivals refer to the foreign born who arrived within five years of the 
census or survey date. The Census Bureau altered its educational attainment question in 
1990. See Appendix A for details on comparability. Comparable data on completion of post-
graduate degrees is unavailable before 1990. 
Source: Pew Research Center tabulations of 1970-2000 U.S. decennial census data and 
2007 and 2013 American Community Survey (IPUMS) 
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Compared with U.S.-born adults, recent 
arrivals are less likely to have finished high 
school, but they are more likely to have 
completed college or to hold an advanced 
degree.  
The gap in high school completion between 
recent immigrant arrivals and the U.S. born 
was only four percentage points in 1970, but it 
widened to 18 points by 2000, reflecting a 
slowed increase in education levels of recent 
immigrants even as levels among the U.S. born 
steadily rose. Subsequently, the gap narrowed 
to 13 percentage points in 2013: 77% of recent 
immigrants and 90% of U.S.-born adults had 
completed high school. 
In 1970, recently arrived immigrants (30%) 
were more likely than U.S.-born adults (23%) 
to have completed at least some college. 
However, U.S.-born adults surpassed newly 
arrived immigrants by 1990. In 2013, 57% of 
newly arrived immigrants had completed at 
least some college, compared with 61% of U.S. 
adults. But this is due entirely to the higher 
share of U.S. born adults who have some college education, but no degree.  
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3.8 
Recent Arrivals Less Likely than  
U.S. Born to Have Finished High School 
% of those ages 25 and older who have completed at least 
high school  
 
Note: Recent arrivals refer to the foreign born who arrived within five 
years of the census or survey date. The Census Bureau altered its 
educational attainment question in 1990. See Appendix A for 
details on comparability.  
Source: Pew Research Center tabulations of 1970-2000 U.S. 
decennial census data and 2013 American Community Survey 
(IPUMS) 
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Throughout the past 50 years 
newly arrived immigrants 
have been more likely than 
their U.S.-born peers to have 
finished at least a bachelor’s 
degree. In 1970, about one-in-
five newly arrived immigrants 
had at least a bachelor’s 
degree compared with slightly 
more than one-in-ten U.S.-
born adults. The immigrant 
advantage in college 
completion narrowed through 
the 1990s and 2000s until 
recently, when it began to 
widen again. The gap in 2013 
was wider than that observed 
in 1970, reflecting the recent 
shift in the origins of newly 
arrived immigrants. In 2013, 
41% of newly arrived 
immigrants had completed at 
least a bachelor’s degree, 
compared with 30% of U.S.-
born adults. 
Newly arrived immigrants 
also are more likely than U.S.-
born adults to hold advanced 
degrees: In 2013, 18% did so, 
compared with 11% among 
those born in the U.S.15 
 
 
                                                        
15 The decennial census has collected information on advanced degree completion only since 1990. 
FIGURE 3.9 
Recent Arrivals More Likely than the U.S. Born to 
Have Finished College and Advanced Degrees 
% of those ages 25 and older who have completed at least a bachelor’s 
degree 
 
% of those ages 25 and older who have completed a post-graduate degree 
 
Note: Recent arrivals refer to the foreign born who arrived within five years of the census or 
survey date. The Census Bureau altered its educational attainment question in 1990. See 
Appendix A for details on comparability. Comparable data on completion of post-graduate 
degrees is unavailable before 1990.  
Source: Pew Research Center tabulations of 1970-2000 U.S. decennial census data and 
2013 American Community Survey (IPUMS) 
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Occupation 
In 1970, 42% of newly arrived immigrants were in managerial, professional, technical, sales and 
administrative support occupations. But as more immigrants arrived in the 1980s, 1990s and 
2000s, the share in these occupations fell, until recently. Similarly, in 1970, 28% of new arrivals 
were operatives and laborers. The share of new arrivals working in this broad occupational group 
has also steadily contracted over the decades.  
 
However, the long-term trends hide some variation in shorter-term patterns. A rise in the share of 
newly arrived immigrants holding managerial and professional jobs, which tend to require more 
education, has taken place since 2007. This has coincided with the shift to Asia as a source region 
and the downturn in unauthorized immigration. Only 19% of new arrivals held those jobs in 2007, 
compared with 28% in 2013. Similarly, in 2007 only 19% of recent arrivals were employed in 
technical, sales and administrative support occupations, compared with 23% in 2013. The share of 
recent arrivals holding service jobs—which include a broad array of employment from fast-food 
workers to law enforcement—rose in most decades except the 1990s. 
TABLE 3.3 
Occupation Distribution of Recently Arrived Immigrants 
% among recently arrived immigrants 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 2007 2013 
Managerial and Professional 20 18 17 19 19 28 
Technical, Sales and Administrative Support 22 22 23 22 19 23 
Service 17 19 23 21 24 24 
Farming, Forestry and Fishing 3 5 6 6 7 5 
Precision Production, Craft and Repairers 10 10 10 11 13 7 
Operatives and Laborers 28 27 21 21 19 13 
Note: Recent arrivals refer to the foreign born who arrived within five years of the census or survey date. 
Source: Pew Research Center tabulations of 1970-2000 U.S. decennial census data and 2007 and 2013 American Community  
Survey (IPUMS) 
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Family Income 
The gap between recent 
arrivals and the U.S.-born 
population in median family 
income widened considerably 
during the first few decades 
after passage of the 1965 
Immigration and Nationality 
Act. However, it has narrowed 
more recently as U.S.-born 
family incomes plummeted 
after the Great Recession. 
In 2013, newly arrived 
immigrants had lower 
adjusted median family 
incomes than the U.S. born – 
$40,000 compared with 
$61,000. The gap in 2013 was 
also wider than it was in 
1970.16  
Family incomes of newly 
arrived immigrants have not 
exceeded their 1970 levels in 
any subsequent decade. 
Median adjusted family incomes of U.S.-born residents were larger in 2013 than in 1970, but lower 
than they were when the recession began in 2007. 
These income calculations incorporate changes in family size over time. Family size has fallen 
more sharply for the U.S. born than for recently arrived immigrants.17 The average family size for 
both groups was nearly equal in 1970, but it was somewhat larger for new immigrants (3.5) than 
                                                        
16 Standard Pew Research Center methodology is to adjust income amounts for inflation using the Consumer Price Index Research Series 
Using Current Methods (CPI-U-RS). In addition, to reflect gains in well-being due to economies of scale in consumption, family income is 
divided by the square root of family size. This is common practice in depicting trends in household well-being (DeNavas-Walt and Proctor 
[2014]; Burkhauser and Larrimore [2014]). See Fry et al. (2011) for further justification of size-adjusted incomes. 
17 A family is two or more persons related by blood, marriage or adoption living in the same household. But family size is available for the 
entire population living in a household (including non-family households) because persons not living with others related to them by blood, 
marriage or adoption are considered to have a family size of one. For instance, a person living alone has a family size of one. 
FIGURE 3.10 
Gap in Typical Family Income Has Widened 
Median adjusted family income (in 2013 dollars) 
 
Note: Recent arrivals refer to the foreign born who arrived within five years of the census or 
survey date. Based on family income in the previous year. Income standardized to a family 
size of three. For details, see http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/11/07/appendix-a-
data-sources-and-methodology/. 
Source: Pew Research Center tabulations of 1970-2000 U.S. decennial census data and 
2007 and 2013 American Community Survey (IPUMS) 
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for the U.S. born (3.1) in 2013. All other things being equal, larger families are worse off than 
smaller ones with the same income because there are more people to feed, clothe and otherwise 
support.  
Poverty 
As with median family income, the share of 
recent immigrants in poverty is higher than for 
the U.S. born, and the gap has grown since 
1970 (DeNavas-Walt and Proctor, 2014).18  
In 1970, 18% of newly arrived immigrants 
lived below the official poverty line. Poverty 
among newly arrived immigrants trended 
upward until 1990, when it reached 30%. 
Poverty among recent immigrants fell after 
1990 and was 24% in 2007. The Great 
Recession and weak recovery pushed poverty 
among recent immigrants to 28% in 2013. 
Poverty among the U.S.-born population 
remained relatively steady at about 12% to 13% 
over most of the past 50 years. In the 
aftermath of the Great Recession, poverty 
peaked at 15% in 2013. The gap in poverty 
rates between recent arrivals and the U.S. born 
peaked in 1990 (at 18 percentage points); in 
2013, it was 13 points. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
18 The poverty rate examines the fraction of a group that is below a threshold level of well-being deemed “poor” or inadequate. The poverty 
level is adjusted upward for inflation over time but otherwise the threshold is fixed over time. It is based on household income in the previous 
year.  
FIGURE 3.11 
Poverty of Recently Arrived Immigrants 
Has Grown 
% in poverty 
 
Note: Recent arrivals refer to the foreign born who arrived within five 
years of the census or survey date. Poverty status based on 
household income in the previous year.  
Source: Pew Research Center tabulations of 1970-2000 U.S. 
decennial census data and 2007 and 2013 American Community 
Survey (IPUMS) 
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The Impact of Changing 
Region of Origin 
Earlier sections of this chapter 
documented the dramatic 
changes in the origins of recent 
immigrants to the U.S. since 
the 1965 Immigration and 
Nationality Act and the overall 
changes for recent immigrants 
in certain characteristics. This 
section looks in more detail at 
the trends in educational 
attainment and family incomes 
of recent immigrants by region 
of origin.  
Immigrants to the U.S. in 
recent years are better 
educated than earlier 
immigrants, both because of 
overall changes in region of 
origin and the fact that 
immigrants from every major 
region are better educated than 
their counterparts were in 
1970. 
Recent arrivals from Mexico in 
2013 were three times as likely 
to have at least completed high 
school as those who came prior 
to 1970. In 1970, 14% of 
Mexican arrivals ages 25 and 
older had finished high school. 
By 2013, 48% of Mexican 
recent arrivals had completed 
TABLE 3.4 
More Newly Arrived Immigrants Have at Least 
Finished High School 
% of recently arrived immigrants ages 25 and older who have completed at 
least high school 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 2013 
Mexico 14 17 26 30 48 
Other Central/South America 52 57 53 60 66 
Asia 75 72 75 82 84 
Europe 48 68 81 87 95 
Caribbean 36 48 52 58 72 
Africa 81 91 88 85 85 
Note: Recent or new arrivals refer to the foreign born who arrived within five years of the 
census or survey date. The Census Bureau altered its educational attainment question in 
1990. See Appendix A for details on comparability. 
Source: Pew Research Center tabulations of 1970-2000 U.S. decennial census data and 
2013 American Community Survey (IPUMS) 
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TABLE 3.5 
More Newly Arrived Immigrants Have Finished College  
% of recently arrived immigrants ages 25 and older who have completed at 
least a bachelor’s degree 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 2013 
Mexico 3 3 6 6 13 
Other Central/South America 15 17 15 21 28 
Asia 47 33 41 54 57 
Europe 15 29 36 46 61 
Caribbean 8 9 9 15 16 
Africa 45 42 42 37 36 
Note: Recent or new arrivals refer to the foreign born who arrived within five years of the 
census or survey date. The Census Bureau altered its educational attainment question in 
1990. See Appendix A for details on comparability. 
Source: Pew Research Center tabulations of 1970-2000 U.S. decennial census data and 
2013 American Community Survey (IPUMS) 
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that education level. 
In 2013, 95% of European arrivals had finished high school. This is nearly twice the level of high 
school completion by Europeans arriving in the five years prior to 1970 (48%). High school 
completion among immigrants coming from the Caribbean has doubled in the past 50 years. In 
2013, 72% of Caribbean arrivals had finished high school, up from 36% in 1970. 
In terms of college, there has been a steady upward march in the attainment of immigrants coming 
from Europe. In 1970, only 15% of European recent immigrants had at least a bachelor’s degree. 
By 2013, more than 60% of European immigrants had finished college. 
The prominent exception to this upward trend in educational attainment is among recent 
immigrants from Africa, who were among the most educated immigrants in 1970. In 1970, 45% of 
recent immigrants from Africa ages 25 and older had completed at least a bachelor’s degree (at 
that time only 11% of the similarly aged U.S.-born population was college-educated). In 2013, 36% 
of new arrivals from Africa had finished at least a bachelor’s degree. 
 
In regard to median adjusted family income, the overall stagnation in this measure among all 
recent immigrants hides some variation among national origin groups over the past half century. 
Median adjusted family income was larger in 2013 than in 1970 for recent arrivals from Mexico, 
TABLE 3.6 
Median Family Income of Recent Immigrant Arrivals 
Median adjusted family income (in 2013 dollars) 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 2007 2013 
Mexico $26,700 $27,500 $26,100 $30,800 $32,000 $31,100 
Other Central/South America $37,600 $33,200 $33,000 $37,900 $40,800 $37,400 
Asia $41,600 $39,200 $41,600 $51,500 $55,400 $46,000 
Europe $48,900 $47,600 $49,800 $53,400 $60,000 $66,600 
Caribbean $36,200 $33,300 $36,200 $38,700 $38,000 $31,100 
Africa $37,600 $33,300 $41,500 $43,000 $36,800 $34,800 
Note: Recent arrivals refer to the foreign born who arrived within five years of the census or survey date. Based on family income in the 
calendar year preceding the census. Income standardized to a family size of three. For details, see 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/11/07/appendix-a-data-sources-and-methodology/. 
Source: Pew Research Center tabulations of 1970-2000 U.S. decennial census data and 2007 and 2013 American Community  
Survey (IPUMS) 
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Asia and especially Europe. It stagnated or declined for those from the rest of Central and South 
America, the Caribbean and Africa. The sharpest change in this measure was among recent 
immigrants from Europe, whose median adjusted family income increased by more than a third, 
from $48,900 in 1970 to $66,600 in 2013. The typical family income of recent arrivals from 
Mexico increased from $26,700 in 1970 to $31,100 in 2013. Though the median family income of 
new arrivals from Asia was higher before the Great Recession ($55,400 in 2007), over the long 
haul since the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, the median family income of immigrants 
from Asia increased from $41,600 in 1970 to $46,000 in 2013.  
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Chapter 4: U.S. Public Has Mixed Views of Immigrants and 
Immigration 
Americans have complex views about immigrants living in the U.S. today. On balance, U.S. adults 
are somewhat more likely to say immigrants are making American society better in the long run 
(45%) than to say they’re making it worse (37%). Yet these views vary widely by education, race 
and partisan affiliation. And when asked what one word comes to mind when they think about 
immigrants, “illegal” is cited most often (12%).  
These are among the findings of a nationally representative, bilingual survey of 3,147 adults from 
the Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel conducted online March 10 to April 6, 2015. 
The survey’s margin of sampling error is plus or minus 2.4 
percentage points at the 95% confidence level. 
Most Americans Say Immigrants Are Living in Their 
Community 
Since the 1960s, the nation’s immigrant population has grown 
rapidly and has dispersed across the country as areas in the 
southeastern U.S. and the Pacific Northwest—which are not 
traditional immigrant gateways—have experienced significant 
growth in their foreign-born populations in recent years (Pew 
Charitable Trusts, 2014). 
As a result, many Americans now live in places that have 
immigrant communities. According to the new survey, about 
three-quarters of U.S. adults (78%) say there are immigrants 
living in their community. Among all Americans, about a 
quarter of adults (27%) say there are many recent immigrants, 
in the community where they live, 31% say there are some and 
18% say there are only a few. Just 2% of U.S. adults say there 
are no recent immigrants in their community. 
Those who live in urban areas are the most likely to say there 
are many recent immigrants living in their community; 34% 
say so, compared with 17% of those living in a rural area and 
24% of those in the suburbs. Westerners are the most likely to 
say there are many recent immigrants in their community. 
FIGURE 4.1 
Majority of Americans Say 
There Are Recent 
Immigrants in Their 
Communities 
% 
 
Note: Those who did not answer the 
question are shown but not labeled. The 
question about recent immigrants was 
asked of those who said there are 
immigrants in their community or who did 
not answer the question. 
Source: Pew Research Center American 
Trends Panel survey conducted March 10-
April 6, 2015 (N=3,147) 
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About a third (35%) of people living in Western states say this, while 28% of those in the 
Northeast, 26% of those in the South and 17% of those in the Midwest say the same.  
Overall, about one-in-four (24%) Americans say they have a friend or relative who is a recent 
immigrant. This share is highest among those who were born outside the U.S. themselves (47%), 
younger Americans (36% of those ages 18 to 29) and Hispanics (39%) as well as those with college 
degrees (33%).  
One Word to Describe Immigrants 
When asked what one word first comes to mind when thinking 
about immigrants in the U.S. today, the word “illegal” is offered 
by 12% of American adults—more than any other word. Other 
respondents offered words such as “overpopulation” (5%), 
“legality” (4%), “jobs” (3%), “deportation” (3%) and “work ethic” 
(3%).  
Mixed Views of Immigrants’ Impact on U.S. Society 
Americans are more likely to say immigrants to the U.S. are 
making American society better than making it worse. 
According to the survey, a plurality of Americans (45%) say that 
immigrants coming to the U.S. make American society better in 
the long run, while 37% say they make society worse and 16% 
say immigrants don’t have much of an effect one way or the 
other. 
But there are major differences in the way different groups of 
Americans answer this question, with immigrants themselves, 
college graduates, Hispanics and younger Americans much 
more likely to be sanguine about the impact the foreign born are 
having on the United States, while Republicans, those with a high school diploma or less, and 
whites are more likely to have the most negative views of immigrants’ impact on the U.S. 
Hispanics are more likely than whites or blacks to say immigrants are making U.S. society better, 
possibly reflecting the groups’ strong recent immigrant roots.19 According to the survey, about six-
in-ten (61%) Hispanics say that in the long run, immigrants to the U.S. are making American  
                                                        
19 About 35% of U.S. Hispanics are foreign born, and Latin American immigrants alone make up half of the nation’s immigrants (52%). 
TABLE 4.1 
Immigrants in a Word 
% saying … comes to mind first when 
thinking about immigrants in the 
U.S. today 
Illegal 12 
Overpopulation/Many 5 
Legality (other than “illegal”) 4 
Jobs 3 
Deportation 3 
Americans/Myself/Everyone 3 
Work ethic 3 
Freedom 3 
Hispanics/Mexicans 2 
Costs/Freeloaders/Burden 2 
Note: Only top 10 responses shown. For a 
complete list, see survey topline in  
Appendix D. 
Source: Pew Research Center American 
Trends Panel survey conducted March 10-
April 6, 2015 (N=3,147) 
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society better while just 20% 
say they make it worse and 
17% say immigrants have not 
had much effect on U.S. 
society.  
By comparison, 44% of blacks 
say the impact of immigrants 
is positive, a plurality among 
them. But among whites, 
while 41% say immigrants 
make American society better 
in the long run, a similar 
share (43%) says immigrants 
make American society worse. 
The survey also finds sharp 
partisan differences in views 
of immigration’s impact on 
the U.S. Among Democrats, 
55% say immigrants are 
making American society 
better in the long run, while 
24% say immigrants are 
making things worse and 18% 
say they are not having much 
effect. But among 
Republicans, views are nearly 
the opposite: 53% say 
immigrants are making 
American society worse in the 
long run, while 31% say they 
are making things better. An 
additional 12% say 
immigrants are not having 
much effect on American 
society. Meanwhile, 
independents lean more positive than negative, but less so than Democrats: 45% say the impact is 
FIGURE 4.2 
Immigrants’ Impact on U.S. Society Seen as More 
Positive than Negative 
% of U.S. adults saying that immigrants to the U.S. are making American 
society … in the long run 
 
Note: Those who did not answer the question are not shown. Whites and blacks include 
only single-race non-Hispanics. Hispanics are of any race. 
Source: Pew Research Center American Trends Panel survey conducted March 10- 
April 6, 2015 (N=3,147) 
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positive on American society in the long run, 37% say it is negative and 16% say there is not much 
effect.  
Younger Americans are more likely than older Americans to see the impact of immigrants on the 
U.S. in the long run positively: 54% of those ages 18 to 29 say this, compared with 44% of those 
ages 30 to 49, 41% of those ages 50 to 64 and 39% of those ages 65 and older.  
There is also a large education gap in views: among those with a college degree, about two-thirds 
(64%) say immigrants make American society better in the long run. A far lower share among 
those with some college (44%) or with a high school diploma or less (32%) share this view.  
As might be expected, immigrants themselves are also more likely than non-immigrants to say 
immigrants make American society better in 
the long run. Fully 68% of immigrants say this 
is the case, while 42% of those who were born 
in the U.S. agree. 
U.S.-born adults who live in places with 
immigrant communities feel more positively 
about immigrants. About half (45%) of this 
group say immigrants make American society 
better in the long run, compared with 33% of 
those who say there are no immigrants living 
in their community. 
Public attitudes toward immigrants have 
grown more positive since the mid-1990s, 
according to Pew Research Center surveys 
(Pew Research Center, 2015a). About half of 
U.S. adults today (51%) say that immigrants 
strengthen the country because of their hard 
work and talents, compared with 41% who say 
that they are more of a burden because “they 
take our jobs, housing and health care.” In 
1994, opinions were flipped: Almost two-
thirds of Americans (63%) said immigrants 
were a burden, while 31% said they 
strengthened the country.  
FIGURE 4.3 
More Americans Today See Immigrants 
As a Strength than a Burden for the 
Nation 
% saying immigrants … our country 
 
Note: Those who gave voluntary responses of “Both,” “Neither” or 
“Don’t know/Refused” are not shown. Question wording: Please tell 
me whether the FIRST statement or the SECOND statement comes 
closer to your own views—even if neither is exactly right: 
“Immigrants today strengthen our country because of their hard 
work and talents,” OR “Immigrants today are a burden on our 
country because they take our jobs, housing and health care.” 
Source: Pew Research Center surveys 
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U.S. Adults Hold More Positive Views of Asian and European Immigrants than Others 
Americans’ views of immigrants differ widely depending on their region of origin, with immigrants 
from Asia and Europe seen more positively than those from Latin America, the Middle East and 
Africa. However, while about four-in-ten Americans say the impact of immigrants from Latin 
America and the Middle East has been mostly negative, only 22% say this about African 
immigrants while half say they have had 
neither a positive nor negative effect.  
The most positive reviews are reserved for 
Asian and European immigrants. According to 
the survey, 47% of U.S. adults say the impact 
of Asian immigrants on American society has 
been mostly positive, just 11% say their impact 
has been mostly negative and 39% say it has 
been neutral. When asked about the impact of 
European immigrants, views are similarly 
positive. Some 44% of U.S. adults say 
European immigrants’ impact on American 
society has been mostly positive, 9% say it has 
been negative and 45% say it has been neither.  
Meanwhile, Americans are more likely to say 
the impact of Latin American immigrants on 
U.S. society is mostly negative (37%) than to 
say it is mostly positive (26%). An additional 
35% say the impact of Latin American 
immigrants on U.S. society is neither positive 
nor negative.  
When it comes to immigrants from the Middle East, American’s views are just as negative as they 
are about Latin American immigrants. Some 39% of U.S. adults say Middle Eastern immigrants 
have had a mostly negative impact on American society, while 20% say the impact has been mostly 
positive and 39% say the group’s impact has been neither.  
Views of African immigrants are somewhat more mixed. While 26% of U.S. adults say the impact 
of African immigrants has been mostly positive and 22% say the impact has been mostly negative, 
half (50%) say it has been neither—a higher neutral view than for any other group of immigrants. 
FIGURE 4.4 
European and Asian Immigrants Viewed 
Most Positively 
% saying that the impact of immigrants from each 
region on American society has been …  
 
Note: Those who did not answer the question are not shown. 
Source: Pew Research Center American Trends Panel survey 
conducted March 10-April 6, 2015 (N=3,147) 
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There are some differences by race and ethnicity. Whites are more likely than blacks and 
Hispanics to say that Asian and European immigrants have a positive effect on American society, 
while Hispanics are the most likely to say that Latin American immigration has been a positive 
development for the U.S. For example, 49% of whites say that European immigrants have had a 
positive impact, compared with 34% of Hispanics. But just 23% of whites think Latin American 
immigrants have had a positive impact on American society, while 39% of Hispanics say the same. 
Almost identical shares of Democrats, Republicans and independents say European and Asian 
immigrants have had a positive effect on American society (though Republicans are more likely to 
say each of these groups has had a negative 
effect). But when it comes to the impact of 
Latin American, African and Middle Eastern 
immigrants, Democrats and independents are 
consistently more positive than Republicans. 
For example, Republicans are much more 
likely to say that Latin American immigrants—
the largest group of immigrants among today’s 
modern wave—have had a negative impact 
(58%) than to say they’ve had a positive 
impact (13%), while 36% of Democrats say 
they’ve had a positive impact and 23% say a 
negative impact. Among independents, 35% 
say the impact of Latin American immigrants 
has been mostly negative, while 27% say it has 
been mostly positive. 
 
FIGURE 4.5 
Six-in-Ten Republicans View Latin 
American Immigrants’ Impact on U.S. 
Negatively 
% saying that the impact of immigrants from Latin 
America on American society has been …  
 
Note: Those who did not answer the question are not shown. 
Source: Pew Research Center American Trends Panel survey 
conducted March 10-April 6, 2015 (N=3,147) 
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Impact of Immigrants Seen as Negative on Crime, Economy but Positive on Food, Music, 
Arts 
When asked whether immigrants are making some areas of U.S. life better or worse, the American 
public expresses mixed views. On the one hand, Americans see immigrants as making things 
better—for example, 49% say immigrants in the U.S. are making food, music and the arts better, 
while few see them harming these areas of life and 37% say they aren’t impacting these areas 
either way.  
On the other hand, fully half 
of U.S. adults say that 
immigrants make American 
society worse when it comes 
to crime, while just 7% say 
they are making things better 
and 41% say they are not 
having much effect.20 
Similarly, 50% say 
immigrants are hurting the 
American economy, 
significantly more than say 
they’re making it better (28%) 
or not having much effect 
(20%). In still other areas, the 
largest share of Americans 
expresses neutral views. When 
it comes to social and moral 
values and science and 
technology, close to half of 
adults think that immigrants 
don’t have much of an effect (45% and 56%, respectively). Yet, more say immigrants are making 
social and moral values worse than say that they are making them better (34% versus 18%, 
respectively), while the opposite is true in regard to science and technology (12% versus 29%, 
respectively). 
                                                        
20 No comprehensive data source exists to measure the effect of immigration on crime. Some studies find that higher immigrant populations 
are not associated with higher crime rates and that immigrants have lower incarceration rates than those born in the U.S. (Nowrasteh, 2015). 
Others suggest that areas with high growth in immigrant populations also experience higher levels of crime (Lee, 2009). 
FIGURE 4.6 
Half Say Immigrants in the U.S. Are Making Crime and 
Economy Worse  
% saying immigrants in the United States are making things … 
 
Note: Those who did not answer the question are not shown. 
Source: Pew Research Center American Trends Panel survey conducted March 10- 
April 6, 2015 (N=3,147) 
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Immigrants’ Impact on Local Communities Seen as More Neutral 
Even though the U.S. public has strong views about the impact nationally of immigrants on food, 
music and the arts, the economy, and crime, their views of immigrants’ impact in their own 
communities are more neutral.21 For example, among adults who say there are immigrants in their 
communities, about half say that immigrants don’t have much of an impact on crime in their 
community (53%), job opportunities (50%) and food, music and the arts (46%). And about four-
in-ten (41%) say immigrants don’t have much of an effect on community schools.  
To the extent that people think immigrants have had an impact on their communities, relatively 
few think they are making things better in most cases. For example, only 8% say immigrants 
lessen the crime problem in their communities, while 36% say they are making things worse. Only 
a small fraction say job opportunities for themselves and their families are better because of 
immigrants (11%), while three 
times as many say immigrants 
are making things worse 
(36%). Some 15% say 
immigrants are making 
schools better, while more 
than twice as many say they 
are having a negative impact 
on schools (41%). 
Meanwhile, even though 
about half of Americans say 
immigrants do not have much 
impact on food, music, and 
the arts in their communities, 
among those who do have an 
opinion, nearly five times as 
many say immigrants are 
making things better (42%) 
than say they are making 
things worse (9%). 
                                                        
21 This question was asked of those who said that, as far as they know, there are immigrants living in their community (78% of respondents) 
and those who did not answer the question (1%). 
FIGURE 4.7 
More Say Immigrants Have Little Effect in Own 
Communities 
% saying immigrants in the community where they live are making things … 
 
Note: Based on those who say there are immigrants living in their community as far as they 
know and those who did not respond. Those who did not answer the question are not 
shown. 
Source: Pew Research Center American Trends Panel survey conducted March 10- 
April 6, 2015 (N=3,147) 
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Why Do Immigrants Come to the U.S.? For Economic Opportunities, Most Americans Say  
When asked why most immigrants come to the 
United States, Americans overwhelmingly say 
it is for economic opportunities (74%). This far 
exceeds the share giving the reasons of conflict 
or persecution in their home country (10% 
believe this is the main reason), educational 
opportunities (4%), and being reunited with 
family (2%). 
Immigrants are just as likely as those born in 
the U.S. to say that economic opportunities are 
immigrants’ main reason for coming to the 
U.S.—75% and 74%, respectively. But 
immigrants are less likely to give conflict or 
persecution in their home country as a reason 
compared with U.S.-born adults—6% versus 
11%, respectively.  
While the U.S. public believes economic 
opportunities drive immigrants to come to the 
U.S., previous research suggests that these are 
not the only or even most common reason 
given by two of the largest immigrant groups—
Hispanics and Asians. A 2011 survey of 
Hispanic adults (Taylor, Lopez, Martínez and Velasco, 2012) found that among Hispanic 
immigrants, while most (55%) cited economic opportunities as the main reason they came to the 
U.S., they also cited family reasons (24%), educational opportunities (9%), and conflict or 
persecution in their home country (5%). Among Asian immigrants, by contrast, other reasons were 
cited more often than economic opportunities for coming to the U.S. According to a 2012 survey of 
Asian Americans (Pew Research Center, 2012), 31% of Asian immigrants cited family reasons as 
the main reason, followed by 28% who cited educational opportunities, 21% who cited economic 
ones and 9% who indicated conflict and persecution.  
 
FIGURE 4.8 
Most Americans Think Immigrants 
Come to U.S. for Economic 
Opportunities 
% saying, in their opinion, the main reason most 
immigrants come to the U.S. is … 
 
Note: Those who did not answer the question are not shown. 
Source: Pew Research Center American Trends Panel survey 
conducted March 10-April 6, 2015 (N=3,147) 
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Most Americans Say Immigrants Are Not Assimilating 
About two-thirds (66%) of Americans say that 
immigrants generally want to hold on to the 
customs and way of life of their home country, 
while just about a third (32%) believe 
immigrants want to adopt American customs 
and way of life. A large share of the foreign 
born themselves (55%), say that immigrants to 
the U.S. generally want to hold on to the 
customs of their home country, while 42% say 
immigrants want to adopt American customs.  
Just as most Americans believe immigrants 
want to hold on to their home country’s 
customs, about six-in-ten (59%) also say that 
most recent immigrants do not learn English 
within a reasonable amount of time. At the 
same time, 76% of Americans say adult 
immigrants in the U.S. need to learn English 
to succeed.  
Among immigrants themselves, most (56%) 
believe most recent immigrants do learn 
English in a reasonable amount of time, while 
43% say they do not. But just like the general 
public, most immigrants (77%) say learning 
English is important for success in the U.S. 
The view that immigrants generally don’t want to assimilate is particularly widespread among 
Republicans; 81% say this, compared with 66% of independents and 55% of Democrats who say 
the same. Some three-quarters of Republicans (74%) say immigrants do not learn English in a 
reasonable amount of time, compared with 45% of Democrats. Independents fall in between, with 
59% saying immigrants do not learn English quickly enough. 
Those who have relatives or friends who are immigrants have views similar to immigrants. They 
are more likely than those who don’t have any foreign-born friends or relatives to think that most 
recent immigrants learn English within a reasonable amount of time (51% vs. 36%). But they are 
FIGURE 4.9 
Most Americans Say Immigrants Are 
Not Adopting American Customs or 
Learning English Quickly Enough 
% saying immigrants in our country today generally 
want to … 
 
% saying adult immigrants in the United States … 
 
% saying most recent immigrants … within a reasonable 
amount of time 
 
Note: Those who did not answer the question are not shown. 
Source: Pew Research Center American Trends Panel survey 
conducted March 10-April 6, 2015 (N=3,147) 
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slightly less likely than those without close immigrant ties to think immigrants need to learn 
English to succeed (71%, compared with 78%).  
Most Americans Say U.S. Immigration System Needs Changes 
Americans mostly believe that the U.S. immigration system needs changes. According to the new 
survey, 54% say the immigration system needs 
major changes and an additional 28% say it 
needs to be completely rebuilt. Only 16% say 
they think it works pretty well and requires 
only minor changes. This negative assessment 
of the U.S. immigration system is also held 
among those most likely to interact with it—
immigrants. Half of this group (also 54%) 
thinks the immigration system needs major 
changes, though they are more likely than the 
general public to say that it works pretty well 
(25%) and less likely to think it needs to be 
completely rebuilt (18%). 
These findings are similar to those found in a 
2013 Pew Research survey of U.S. Hispanics 
and U.S. Asians (Lopez et al., 2013). Overall, 
62% of Hispanics and 47% of Asians said that 
the U.S. immigration system needs to be 
completely rebuilt or needs major changes.  
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4.10 
Majority of Americans, U.S. Immigrants 
Say U.S. Immigration System Needs 
Major Changes 
% saying the immigration system in this country … 
 
Note: Those who did not answer the question are not shown. 
Source: Pew Research Center American Trends Panel survey 
conducted March 10-April 6, 2015 (N=3,147 total, n=239 
immigrants) 
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Half of Americans Say Immigration to U.S. Should Be 
Decreased 
As for how many immigrants are coming to the U.S., about half 
of Americans say that immigration should be decreased (49%), 
while 34% think it should be kept at its present level and 15% 
say it should be increased.  
Republicans are twice as likely as Democrats (67% vs. 33%) to 
think immigration to the U.S. should be decreased. And the 
U.S. born (51%) are more likely than immigrants (30%) to say 
immigration should be decreased. 
When it comes to the government deciding who should be 
allowed to legally immigrate to the United States, a majority 
(56%) would prefer giving priority to people who are highly 
educated and highly skilled workers, even if they don’t have 
family members in the U.S., over people who have family 
members already living in the U.S., even if 
they are not highly educated or highly skilled 
workers (37%). 
Democrats are evenly split on this issue, with 
47% saying the government should give 
priority to highly educated and highly skilled 
workers, and another 47% saying preference 
should go to immigrants who have family 
members already living in the U.S. 
Republicans lean toward giving priority to 
highly educated and highly skilled workers 
(65%), as do independents (59%). 
People who are most highly educated 
themselves are most likely to support giving 
priority to highly educated and highly skilled 
workers (61% of those with a college degree or 
more vs. 55% of those with some college or 
less). Younger Americans (59% of those ages 
FIGURE 4.11 
Half Say Immigration 
Should be Decreased 
% saying immigration should be … 
 
Note: Those who did not answer the 
question are not shown. 
Source: Pew Research Center American 
Trends Panel survey conducted March 10-
April 6, 2015 (N=3,147) 
PEW RESEARCH CENTER                       ST7 
FIGURE 4.12 
Republicans Prefer Giving Higher 
Priority to Skilled Worker Immigrants 
% saying the government should give higher priority to 
those who … in deciding whether people should be 
allowed to legally immigrate to the U.S. 
 
Note: Those who did not answer the question are not shown. 
Source: Pew Research Center American Trends Panel survey 
conducted March 10-April 6, 2015 (N=3,147) 
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18 to 49 vs. 52% of those ages 50 and older) and whites (60% vs. 42% of blacks and 48% of 
Hispanics) are also particularly likely to say this. Immigrants’ views closely mirror those of the 
U.S. born on this question. 
Relatively Little Knowledge About U.S. Immigration Facts22 
In addition to asking about people’s views of 
immigrants and immigration policy, the 
survey tested people’s knowledge of some key 
facts about immigration to the U.S. today. 
Almost half (47%) of respondents correctly 
answer that 13% of today’s U.S. population 
was born in another country.23 But 35% of 
Americans say that the U.S. foreign-born share 
is actually higher: 28% say about four-in-ten 
Americans are foreign-born, and 7% say that 
more than half of the U.S. population is 
foreign born. Just 8% of U.S. adults say the 
U.S. foreign-born share is less than 13%.  
When it comes to the characteristics of 
immigrants, the U.S. public is less 
knowledgeable. For example, about a third 
(34%) of respondents correctly say that 26% of 
all immigrants in the U.S. today are living here 
illegally. But about as many overestimate this 
share: 22% of U.S. adults say that 45% of the 
U.S. immigrant population is living here 
illegally, and 14% answer that 62% of U.S. 
immigrants are in the country illegally. An 
additional 20% say that 9% of U.S. immigrants 
are living here illegally. 
Americans are especially unaware of recent changes in the origins of immigrants who arrived in 
the past five years. Fully two-thirds (69%) say Latin American immigrants make up the largest 
                                                        
22 The share who did not answer the question was higher for each of these knowledge questions (around 10%) than for the rest of the 
questionnaire. 
23 This answer of 13% was based on the most recent figure (from the 2013 American Community Survey) at the time the survey fielded. 
FIGURE 4.13 
Americans and U.S. Immigration Facts 
What percentage of today’s U.S. population was born in 
another country? 
 
What percentage of immigrants in the U.S. today are 
living here illegally? 
 
Over the last five years, the largest group of immigrants 
to the United States has come from... 
 
Note: The statement that 13% of the U.S. population was born in 
another country was based on the most recent figure (from the 
2013 American Community Survey) at the time the survey fielded. 
Those who did not answer the question are not shown.  
Source: Pew Research Center American Trends Panel survey 
conducted March 10-April 6, 2015 (N=3,147) 
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group of recent U.S. immigrants. In fact, Asian immigrants are the largest group of recent 
immigrant arrivals, an answer given by only 7% of U.S. adults. An additional 13% of respondents 
answered Middle East, and 3% each answered Europe and Africa.  
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Chapter 5: U.S. Foreign-Born Population Trends 
The nation’s foreign-born population 
increased sharply between 1970 and 2000, but 
its rate of growth has since slowed, according 
to a Pew Research Center analysis of U.S. 
Census Bureau data. Even so, the share of the 
U.S. population that is foreign born—13.1% in 
2013—is approaching a historic high.24 
More than 41 million immigrants lived in the 
U.S. as of 2013, more than four times as many 
as was the case in 1960 and 1970. By 
comparison, the U.S.-born population is only 
about 1.6 times the size it was in 1960. 
Immigrant population growth alone has 
accounted for 29% of U.S. population growth 
since 2000. 
With rapid growth since 1970 in the nation’s 
foreign-born population, its share of the U.S. 
population has been rising, from 4.7% in 1970 
to 13.1% in 2013. This is below the record 
14.8% immigrant share in 1890, but this could 
rise to 18% by 2065 according to new Pew 
Research Center projections (see Chapter 2). 
Not only has the nation’s immigrant population grown rapidly, its demographic characteristics 
have also changed. In 1970, the majority of immigrants were U.S. citizens (64%), but in 2013 less 
than half held U.S. citizenship (47%). By 2013, most immigrants were from either Latin America 
or South or East Asia, a very different profile than that of immigrants in 1960 and 1970, who were 
mostly from Europe. 
This chapter paints a portrait of the U.S. foreign-born population from 1960 to 2013, including 
trends in countries and regions of birth, time spent living in the U.S., languages spoken, age, 
geographic settlement in the United States, marital status, and legal status and citizenship. 
                                                        
24 This chapter discusses trends up to 2013, the most recent year microdata is available from the American Community Survey. 
FIGURE 5.1 
U.S. Foreign-Born Population Reaches 
New High 
 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, “Historical Census Statistics on the 
Foreign-Born Population of the United States: 1850-2000” and Pew 
Research Center tabulations of 2010 and 2013 American 
Community Survey (IPUMS). Estimates for 1960-2000 shown here 
may differ from other reported estimates since they are based on 
U.S. Census Bureau tabulations of the full sample data and not 
public-use subsamples from IPUMS. 
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Accompanying it is a statistical portrait of the nation’s foreign born from 1960 to 2013. Also 
accompanying this chapter is an online interactive exploring the top country of origin among 
immigrants in each state from 1850 to 2013, reflecting waves of immigrants from Ireland, 
Germany, Italy and Mexico, among other countries.  
Regions and Countries of 
Birth 
A dramatic shift in the origins 
of U.S. immigrants has 
occurred since the passage of 
the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1965, which 
eliminated national origin 
quotas and cleared the way 
for immigration from non-
European countries. In 1960, 
84% of the nation’s 
immigrants were from Europe 
or Canada. By 1970, that 
share had dropped to 68% 
and by 1980 was just 42% as 
migration from Latin America 
surged.  
Not only did the European 
and Canadian share among 
immigrants fall, but so, too, did their numbers. In 1960, 8.2 million immigrants from Europe and 
Canada were living in the U.S. By 2013, that number had fallen to 5.9 million. Over the same 
period, the number of immigrants who were born in South or East Asia increased almost 
thirtyfold, from about 400,000 in 1960 to 10.7 million in 2013. Immigrants from Mexico are not 
far behind, with about 20 times as many Mexican immigrants in 2013 (11.6 million) as there were 
in 1960 (600,000).  
Immigrant populations born in other parts of the world have also experienced high rates of 
growth. Immigration from sub-Saharan Africa is the standout, with the population in 2013 (1.5 
million) about 133 times that of 1960 (only 11,000) (Anderson, 2015). Foreign-born populations 
FIGURE 5.2 
From Europe and Canada to Latin America and Asia:  
A Dramatic Shift in Immigrant Origins 
% of U.S. immigrants born in … 
1960 2013 
  
Source: Pew Research Center tabulations of 1960 U.S. decennial census data and 2013 
American Community Survey (IPUMS) 
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from other parts of Latin America (the Caribbean, South America, Central America) and the 
Middle East have also increased by factors of 10 or greater. 
As of 2013, Mexican immigrants were the single largest source country for the nation’s foreign 
born, (28%). The region of South or East Asia was not far behind at 26%. Other regions accounting 
for significant shares of the immigrant population were the Caribbean, at about 10% of the U.S. 
foreign born, Central America (8%), South America (7%), the Middle East (4%) and sub-Saharan 
Africa (4%). 
Italy was the top country of origin for U.S. immigrants in 1960 and 1970, followed by Canada and 
Germany. By 1980, however, the top 10 countries of origin had changed. Mexico shot to the top of 
the list, and Asian countries (the Philippines and China) were among the top 10. Mexico has been 
the top country of origin by a wide margin ever since. In 2013, China and India were the second 
and third biggest countries of origins for U.S. immigrants, respectively. 
 
 
 
TABLE 5.1 
Top Countries of Birth of Immigrants, 1960-2013 
 #1 Largest Country of Birth #2 Largest Country of Birth #3 Largest Country of Birth 
 Country of Birth 
% of Immigrant 
Population Country of Birth 
% of Immigrant 
Population Country of Birth 
% of Immigrant 
Population 
2013 Mexico 28 China 6 India 5 
2010 Mexico 29 China 5 India 5 
2000 Mexico 29 China 5 Philippines 4 
1990 Mexico 22 China 5 Philippines 5 
1980 Mexico 16 Germany 6 Canada 6 
1970 Italy 10 Canada 9 Germany 9 
1960 Italy 13 Germany 10 Canada 10 
Note: China includes Taiwan, Hong Kong, Mongolia and Macau. 
Source: Pew Research Center tabulations of 1960-2000 U.S. decennial census data and 2010 and 2013 American Community Survey 
(IPUMS) 
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Looking at the top countries of origin among immigrants in the U.S. by state, there is a shift from 
1960 to 2013. In 1960, while Mexico was the biggest country of origin in the border states 
(California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas), Canada and European countries such as Italy, 
Germany and the United Kingdom dominated the rest of the country. In 2013, Mexico was the top 
country of origin in 33 states, encompassing most of the West, South and Midwest. Immigrants in 
the remaining states have diverse origins, including the Caribbean, Central America, Canada, 
South and East Asia and Africa. 
 
Time Living in the U.S. 
The nation’s immigrants are more settled in 2013 than they were in 1990, when the share of those 
who arrived in the 10-year period before the census or survey was taken peaked. 
In 1970, 69% of immigrants had lived in the United States for more than 10 years. This share 
dropped after the influx of immigrants in the 1970s and 1980s, and by 1990 only 56% of 
immigrants had lived in the U.S. for over a decade. As of 2013, though, this share topped the 1970 
share, at 72%. 
MAP 5.1 
How America’s Source of Immigrants Has Changed in the States, 1960 and 2013 
Top country of origin by state and year 
1960 2013 
 
Note: China includes Taiwan, Hong Kong, Mongolia and Macau.  
Source: Pew Research Center tabulations of 1960 U.S. decennial census data and 2013 American Community Survey (IPUMS). For the full 
data, including maps from 1850 through 2013, see the online interactive:  http://www.pewhispanic.org/2015/09/28/from-ireland-to-
germany-to-italy-to-mexico-how-americas-source-of-immigrants-has-changed-in-the-states-1850-to-2013/   
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On the opposite end of the spectrum, the share 
of the foreign-born population who had 
immigrated within a decade prior to the survey 
peaked in 1990, at 44%, up from 31% in 1970. 
In 2013, this was back to a level similar to that 
seen in 1970 (28%). 
Some regional groups of immigrants followed 
this pattern of reaching a low in number of 
years lived in the U.S. around 1980 or 1990. 
However, several regions experienced a steady 
decline from 1970 to 2013. For example, the 
share of South Americans who had 
immigrated within 10 years of the survey 
steadily fell in each decade, from 75% in 1970 
to 28% in 2013. 
A larger share of immigrants from Europe and 
Canada had arrived in the past 10 years in 
2013 (22%) than had done so in 1970 (18%). 
Over the same period, though, the share of 
immigrants who had arrived in the past 10 
years fell dramatically among those from South and East Asia, Latin America and sub-Saharan 
Africa.  
FIGURE 5.3 
Length of Time in the U.S. Has 
Increased Since 1990 
% of foreign born who have lived in the U.S. … 
 
Source: Pew Research Center tabulations of 1970-2000 U.S. 
decennial census data and 2010 and 2013 American Community 
Survey (IPUMS) 
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Language Use 
The share of immigrants who 
speak only English at home 
declined from 30% in 1980 
(the first year the census 
asked about English-speaking 
ability) to 2000 (17%), but it 
has been steady since then, at 
16% in 2013.25 
Looked at another way, the 
share of U.S. immigrants who 
speak English “less than very 
well” grew from 43% in 1980 
to 50% in 2013. Meanwhile, 
the share who speak English 
“very well” rose slightly from 
27% to 34% over the same 
period. 
Among all immigrants ages 5 
and older, 16% say they speak 
only English at home. The largest share (44%) speak Spanish. An additional 6% say they speak 
Chinese (Mandarin or Cantonese), and 5% speak “Hindi and related” languages. Other languages 
spoken include Filipino/Tagalog (4%), Vietnamese (3%), French (3%) and Korean (2%). No other 
single language accounts for more than 2% of foreign-language immigrant speakers. 
Age 
Since at least 1960, the foreign-born population has had an older median age than the U.S.-born 
population. Most people who migrate internationally are of working age and a smaller share of 
immigrants are children compared with the U.S.-born population. But the gap has narrowed as the 
two groups took different trajectories, with immigrants getting younger and the U.S. born  
                                                        
25 The U.S. Census Bureau determines language use and English-speaking ability through a series of three questions asked of everyone 5 
years old and older. The first question asks if the person speaks a language other than English at home. Those who answer “no” are classified 
as speaking English proficiently. For those who answer “yes,” there is a second question that asks what language they speak. These answers 
are assigned to 381 language categories. The third question asks how well that person speaks English, with response options of “very well,” 
“well,” “not well” and “not at all.” This series of questions was asked in the 1980, 1990 and 2000 censuses. Since 2010, the questions have 
been asked on the annual American Community Survey (Ryan, 2013). 
FIGURE 5.4 
Half of Immigrants Proficient in English in 2013  
% of foreign born ages 5 and older who … 
 
 
 
Note: Respondents are asked if they speak a language besides English at home. If they 
answer yes, they are asked how well they speak English. 
Source: Pew Research Center tabulations of 1980-2000 U.S. decennial census data and 
2013 American Community Survey (IPUMS) 
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FIGURE 5.5 
Foreign-Born Age Pyramids 
% of foreign-born population in each age group 
            1960           2013 
  
U.S.-Born Age Pyramids 
% of U.S.-born population in each age group 
 
  
Source: Pew Research Center tabulations of 1960 U.S. decennial census data and 2013 American Community Survey (IPUMS) 
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population getting older. In 1960, immigrants had a median age of 57 years—more than double 
that of the U.S. born (27), reflecting the slowdown that was taking place in the arrival of new 
immigrants between the 1920s and the 1960s. The gap rapidly narrowed as a new wave of 
immigrants arrived in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s until 2000, when immigrants were on average 
only two years older than the U.S. born (37 vs. 35). By 2013, the gap had once again widened to a 
median age of 43 years among the foreign 
born and 35 years among the U.S. born, 
reflecting a more recent slowdown in 
migration from Mexico and other countries 
(Passel, Cohn and Gonzalez-Barrera, 2012). 
Immigrants from Europe and Canada have 
long had the highest median age among the 
foreign born at 59 years in 1960 and 52 years 
in 2013. As the overall composition of the 
foreign-born population has shifted from a 
large majority European and Canadian group 
to a plurality Mexican group, the median age 
has shifted more toward that of Mexican 
immigrants (39 years in 2013, a little younger 
than 43 years in 1960). South or East Asian 
immigrants account for another large part of 
the foreign-born population in 2013, and their 
median age was 43 years in 2013—up from 38 
years in 1960, though it reached a low of 31 
years in 1980. 
The age pyramid profiles of the foreign-born 
population also reflect this large shift over the 
years. In 1960, the foreign-born population was older than today, with a large portion of 
immigrants between ages 55 and 74. By 2013, though, immigrants were most likely to be between 
30 to 49 years old, and the overall age of the population was lower than in previous decades. 
The U.S.-born population, meanwhile, is growing older. In 1960, during the tail end of the baby 
boom, the population skewed young, with the single largest age group younger than age 5. As of 
2013, the Baby Boomer generation has aged, and the most recent generation, the Millennials, was 
a comparable size, creating a more uniform age pyramid. 
FIGURE 5.6 
Immigrant Population Median Age 
Decreases through 1990, but Rises 
Since Then 
Median age, by overall foreign born and region of birth 
 
Source: Pew Research Center tabulations of 1960-2000 U.S. 
decennial census data and 2010 and 2013 American Community 
Survey (IPUMS) 
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Geographic Settlement 
The South has by far seen the biggest increase in its foreign-born population, from less than 1 
million in 1960 to 13 million in 2013. In more recent years, between 2000 and 2013, the foreign-
born population in the South increased by 55%. The Northeast, Midwest and West each had more 
modest increases of about 20% to 30% over the same period. The South and West each accounted 
for about 40% of the overall change in the U.S. in this period, compared with 14% in the Northeast 
and 7% in the Midwest. 
As the nation’s foreign-born population has more than quadrupled since 1960, many states have 
experienced exponential growth. In particular, the foreign-born populations in Georgia, Nevada 
and North Carolina have increased more than thirtyfold. California has had the largest numerical 
increase, from 1.3 million in 1960 to 10.3 million in 2013. 
The share foreign born has risen in most states since 1960. All of the states experiencing decreases 
are located in the far north (Montana, North and South Dakota, Michigan, Vermont, New 
Hampshire and Maine). 
The foreign-born population has become more evenly dispersed across the country over time. For 
example, nearly half of immigrants (47%) lived in the Northeast in 1960, but only 22% did so in 
2013. The share living in the South, meanwhile, increased from 10% in 1960 to 32% in 2013. 
Even so, the five U.S. counties with the largest foreign-born populations in 2013 (Los Angeles 
County, Calif.; Miami-Dade County, Fla.; Cook County, Ill.; Queens County, N.Y.; and Harris 
County, Tex.) accounted for fully 20% of the U.S. immigrant population. The population has 
become more dispersed since 1990, when the top five counties accounted for 30% of the 
immigrant population. 
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Marital Status 
Among immigrants to the U.S., the share who are married has declined steadily since 1960 (from 
68% in 1960 to 60% in 2013). The decline comes as immigrants are more than twice as likely to 
have never been married as they were in 1960 (24% in 2013, up from 10% in 1960) and more likely 
to be divorced and separated. 
This decline in marriage rates among immigrants is a small change compared with the trend 
among their U.S.-born counterparts. Among those born in the U.S., the share who are married fell 
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from 73% in 1960 to just 48% in 2013, as the 
share never married rose from 15% to 31% 
over the same period. The share that is 
separated, divorced and widowed follows 
similar patterns to those of the foreign born. 
The share of people who live in a married 
couple household has taken a similar 
trajectory. In 1960, 77% of immigrants lived in 
a married couple household, compared with 
64% in 2013. The share fell even more steeply 
among the U.S. born, from 85% to 59%.  
Meanwhile, the shares of both the foreign born 
and the U.S. born living in female 
householder, male householder, or non-family 
households have all risen. The share of 
immigrants living in households with a female 
householder almost doubled, from 7% in 1960 
to 14% in 2013, with a similar pattern among 
the U.S. born (8% to 18%). Some 4% of the 
foreign-born population lived in households 
headed by a male householder in 1960, rising to 9% in 2013 (compared with 2%, increasing to 6% 
among the U.S. born). While the share of immigrants living in non-family households has been 
relatively stable (at 12% in 1960 and 13% in 2013), those born in the U.S. are more than three 
times as likely to be living in a non-family unit as they were in 1960 (5% in 1960, compared with 
17% in 2013). 
Legal Status of U.S. Immigrants 
As of 2012, the plurality of immigrants were naturalized citizens, at 42%. An additional 27% were 
legal permanent residents, and 4.5% of foreign-born residents are temporary legal residents such 
as students. As of 2012, unauthorized immigrants—those in the country illegally—made up about a 
quarter of the foreign-born population (26%), numbering more than 11 million (Passel, Cohn, 
Krogstad and Gonzalez-Barrera, 2014). 
From 1990 to 2007, the unauthorized immigrant population grew sharply and steadily, rising from 
3.5 million to a peak of 12.2 million in 2007—more than tripling within two decades. Since then, 
FIGURE 5.7 
A Decline in Marriage, but Especially 
Among U.S. Born 
% of adults ages 18 and older who are married 
 
Source: Pew Research Center tabulations of 1960-2000 U.S. 
decennial census data and 2010 and 2013 American Community 
Survey (IPUMS) 
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though, growth has leveled off. The population 
stood at 11.3 million in 2014, statistically 
unchanged since 2009 (Passel and Cohn, 2015). 
A slowdown in immigration from Mexico is 
responsible for much of this leveling off 
(Gonzalez-Barrera and Krogstad, 2015). The 
number of unauthorized Mexican immigrants 
peaked at 6.9 million in 2007 and has been on 
the decline ever since, reaching 5.9 million in 
2012 (Passel and Cohn, 2014). Mexicans make 
up a slight majority of unauthorized 
immigrants (52% in 2012). 
FIGURE 5.8 
U.S. Foreign-Born Population, 2012 
 
Note: All numbers are rounded independently and are not adjusted 
to sum to the total U.S. figure or other totals.  
Source: Pew Research Center estimates for 2012 based on 
augmented American Community Survey data from Integrated 
Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) 
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Appendix A: Methodology 
Population Estimates and Projections: Definitions, Methods and Data Sources 
Overall Methodology 
The national projections presented here use a variant of the basic cohort component model in 
which the initial population is carried forward into the future by adding new births, subtracting 
deaths, adding people moving into the country (immigrants), and subtracting people moving out 
(emigrants). The model used for Pew Research Center projections and historical population 
estimates was presented in a previous report (Passel and Cohn, 2008); it is the cohort component 
method modified to incorporate immigrant generations by Edmonston and Passel (1992). In this 
application, five generation groups for U.S. residents are defined and then collapsed to the three 
conventional generation groups:  
(1) Foreign-born population, or the first generation;  
(2) U.S.-born population of foreign (or mixed) parentage, or the second generation;  
(3) U.S.-born population with U.S.-born parents, or third-and-higher generation: 
(3.a) Puerto Rican-born population (includes all people born in U.S. territories);  
(3.b) Mainland-born population (i.e., people born in the 50 states plus the District 
of Columbia) with at least one Puerto Rican-born parent; and  
(3.c) Mainland-born population with mainland-born parents plus people born in 
foreign countries to U.S. citizen parents (i.e., the population born abroad of 
American parents).  
In the projection methodology, each of the five generation groups is carried forward separately. 
Immigrants and emigrants enter and leave the first generation; migrants from Puerto Rico and 
other U.S. territories enter (and leave) the Puerto Rican-born population. Births are assigned to 
generations based on the generation of the mother and a matrix allowing for cross-generational 
fertility. All births to first-generation women are assigned to the second generation; all births to 
the Puerto Rican-born population are assigned to the Puerto Rican parentage population (group 
3.b). Most births to the second and third-and-higher generations are assigned to the third-and-
higher generation, but some are assigned to the second generation to allow for mixed generation 
couples that include immigrants. Likewise, most births to women of Puerto Rican parentage are 
assigned to the third-and-higher generation, but some are assigned to the Puerto Rican parentage 
population to allow for mixed couples including Puerto Rican-born migrants. The generational 
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assignment matrix (or G matrix) is based on race/ethnic origin but is allowed to vary dynamically 
in the 2015-2065 projections based on relative generational sizes. 
For these projections, the entire population is divided into six mutually exclusive racial/ethnic 
groups:  
(1) Hispanic origin;  
(2) White alone, not Hispanic;  
(3) Black alone, not Hispanic;  
(4) Asian or Pacific Islander alone, not Hispanic (generally called “Asian”);  
(5) American Indian/Alaska Native (AIAN) alone, not Hispanic; and 
(6) Two-or-more races, not Hispanic 
The report also includes a historical analysis using data developed with the same projection 
methods and estimates of the demographic components. The components are estimated so as to 
reproduce as closely as possible a series of benchmarks—the decennial censuses from 1960 to 
2000 and estimated populations for 2005, 2010 and 2015 by age, sex, race/Hispanic origin and 
generation with adjustments for census undercount. The projections and historical analyses use 
five-year age groups up to 85 years and older by sex. The projections are done for five-year time 
steps from July 1, 2015 to July 1, 2065; the historical estimates also include five-year time steps 
from 1960 to 2015. 
The remainder of this section describes the underlying data and assumptions for the projections 
and historical analyses. The first section describes the benchmark populations and the methods 
for defining and measuring the racial/ethnic groupings and the generational groups. The next 
sections treat the assumptions for the major demographic components of immigration, fertility 
and mortality for 2015-2065, with a particular emphasis on immigration. Within each of these 
components, the data and the methods used to define the historical population and components of 
change are described. 
Demographic Components of Population Change 
Demographic components of population change account for all additions and subtractions from 
the national U.S. population. Births and deaths are the largest of the components, but 
measurement of immigration is far more complicated because there are multiple channels of entry 
to and exit from the U.S. population. For some of parts of the immigration component, such as 
legal immigration, the available data are better and accurate measurement is easier than for 
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others, such as unauthorized (sometimes called “illegal”) immigration. The measurement methods 
differ among the immigration components, in part, because of the nature of the data and, in part, 
because some of the immigration concepts dictate particular methods. 
The demographic components included in the population projection model are: 
Births (or fertility rates); 
Deaths (or mortality rates); 
Immigration — 
Total Immigration (including legal immigrants, refugees, asylees and unauthorized 
immigrants—but not broken out separately); 
Emigration; 
Net Movement from Puerto Rico and other U.S. Territories; 
Net Temporary Migration; 
Other Minor Components 
Definitions (Race, Hispanic Origin and Generations)  
Racial/Ethnic Groups 
The race/Hispanic population groups used for the projections and in constructing the benchmark 
populations are mutually exclusive and encompass the entire U.S. population. They are almost 
identical to groups used by the Census Bureau in their current population estimates (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2015), intercensal population estimates for 2000-2010 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013) and 
recent population projections (U.S. Census Bureau, 2014). For the historical estimates and 
projections, the Asian (not Hispanic) and Native Hawaiian and other Pacific Islander or NHPI (not 
Hispanic) populations are combined in order to be consistent with pre-2000 data and because of 
the small size of the NHPI population.  
In constructing the benchmark populations by age, sex, race-Hispanic origin and generation, we 
used microdata from the Integrated Public-Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) for decennial censuses 
of 1960-2000 and the American Community Survey (ACS) for 2001-2013. The race and Hispanic 
data collected in the decennial censuses and ACS do not correspond exactly to the definitions used 
in the Census Bureau’s population estimates and projections, nor do they match to the definitions 
used here. Consequently, a number of modifications had to be made in setting up the benchmark 
populations. The Hispanic origin variable is available in the 1980 Census and later and was used to 
construct the Hispanic population estimates. For 1960 and 1970, IPUMS created a Hispanic origin 
variable roughly comparable to the post-1980 data using information on place of birth, mother 
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tongue, surnames and family relationships. This IPUMS variable was used for the benchmark data 
on the Hispanic population. 
In the 2000 Census and the 2001-2013 ACS, respondents are permitted to select more than one 
race. Most individuals who do so are classified as “two or more races,” with a few exceptions. First, 
if the two races are Asian and NHPI, the individuals are classified in our population estimates as 
“Asian.” Next, among non-Hispanics, some individuals are classified as “some other race,” a 
category not used in the Census Bureau’s the Census Bureau’s population estimates. Individuals 
who choose two races, one of which is “some other race” and the other is one of the five specified 
races (white, black, Asian, NHPI, AIAN), are classified in the specified race. The few non-Hispanic 
individuals who chose “some other race” are grouped with the white, not Hispanic population; for 
the 1960-1990 Censuses, the very few non-Hispanics of “some other race” were grouped with the 
white, non-Hispanic population. 
Multiple Race, 1960-1990. These race assignment procedures do not yield completely consistent 
data across the 1960-2013. In particular, the data for 1960-1990 do not include a classification for 
non-Hispanics of mixed race of “two or more races.” To provide consistent data, we constructed 
estimates of people in 1960-1990 who would be in that group in 2000 and later. To start these 
estimates, we mapped the two-or-more-races population in the 2000 Census and the 2005-2013 
ACS into single races using the IPUMS variable RACESINGD, which provides the most probable 
single race for individuals who chose more than one race group, on a case-by-case basis. By 
combining the remapped multiple race populations with the single race populations, we 
constructed a population for 2000 that is consistent with data as collected in the 1960-1990 
Censuses. From these data, we construct estimates of the share of each age-sex-race/Hispanic 
origin group that provided multiple race responses in the 2000 Census (and in ACS data for 2001-
2013). These percentages were estimated separately for the native population and for the foreign-
born population subdivided by five-year periods of entry. 
The percentages of the historically consistent U.S.-born race populations that identified as two-or-
more races were then applied to the same U.S.-born cohorts in 1960 through 1990 to estimate the 
population of native population by single race and of two or more races. For the foreign-born 
population, similar percentages were calculated for age-sex groups in pre-1990 entry cohorts; 
these shares were then applied to the same age-sex-period-of-entry cohorts in earlier censuses. 
The same calculation was done for the “Puerto Rican-born” population. The result of these various 
estimation procedures is a set of population figures for 1960, 1970, 1980 and 1990 subdivided by 
age, sex, race/Hispanic origin (according to post-2000 definitions) for the foreign-born 
population, the population born in Puerto Rico and outlying areas, and the remaining U.S.-born 
population. For 2000-2013, the same groups are available from tabulations of IPUMS data. 
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Projected Race-Hispanic Origin. Both the historical population estimates for 1960-2015 and 
projections for 2015-2065 use race/Hispanic origin categories consistent with current data from 
the ACS. For the projections, births are assigned to the race/Hispanic origin category of the 
mother. The definitions, usage, practices and race/ethnic identities in the future might be quite 
different. In particular, marriage across race/Hispanic origin categories has been increasing 
(Wang 2015) and future generations may choose to identify differently. Consequently, the 
projections presented here should be treated as the representing the continuation of the current 
race/Hispanic origin categories.  
The methodology used for the projections includes parameters for assigning births to 
race/Hispanic origin categories other than the category of the mother. These parameters permit 
modeling of race/Hispanic intermarriage, childbearing with parents of different groups and 
changing patterns of self-identification. A particular example of the potential of such modeling is 
the projected population of two or more races. In the projections presented here, births in the two-
or-more-races category come only from mothers in this population. It is likely, however, that 
future births in this group will also come from mothers (and fathers) in the specific race/Hispanic 
origin categories. Future projections will incorporate alternative assignments of births to groups 
other than mothers’. 
Generations 
The full array of generations can only be obtained directly from the 1960 and 1970 Censuses 
because these two include the questions on nativity, citizenship and parents’ places of birth that 
are required to produce tabulations of these five generations. In censuses since 1970 and the ACS, 
the parental birthplace questions were dropped, so the censuses of 1980, 1990 and 2000 and the 
2001-2013 ACS can provide direct data only for the foreign-born, Puerto Rican-born, and U.S.-
born populations; this U.S.-born population encompasses the second generation—generation (2), 
the mainland-born population of Puerto Rican parentage—generation (3.b), and the mainland-
born population with mainland-born parents—generation (3.c). For the benchmark populations of 
1980, 1990, 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015, two different approaches were used to estimate the 
shares of the third-and-higher generation population in each of the three constituent groups. One 
approach is “forward looking,” i.e. based on 1960 and 1970 populations carried forward to the 
benchmark dates and the other “backward looking,” i.e., based on post-2000 data from the 
Current Population Survey (CPS). 
In the forward-looking approach, the U.S.-born population by generation in 1960 or 1970 was 
projected forward (using the basic projections methodology) to the benchmark dates for 1980 and 
later. The U.S.-born population within each age-sex-race/Hispanic origin group (that was alive in 
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1960 or 1970) at each benchmark date was distributed to the more detailed generations using 
these projections. The initial approximations are based on the average of the 1960-based and 
1970-based projections. 
Beginning in 1994, the CPS includes the data needed to construct the fully-detailed five 
generations—country of birth, citizenship and country of birth of parents(s). Then, in 2003, the 
CPS race question allowed respondents to choose more than one race response, mirroring the 
2000 Census, the existing ACS data for 2001-2002 and the yet-to-be-conducted ACS for 2003-
2013. The CPS sample is too small to provide very precise estimates of generational distributions 
for some of the smaller groups. Accordingly, multiple monthly CPS and March supplements were 
averaged over 2003-2007 to estimate distributions for 2005, over 2008-2012 for 2010 and over 
2010-2015 for 2015. Within age-sex-race/Hispanic origin cohorts, we estimated the share of the 
U.S.-born population in each of the constituent generations. These shares were applied to the 
same cohorts based on their ages in 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005, and 2010 to provide alternative 
estimates of the generational distributions. Next, the CPS-based backward-looking estimates were 
averaged with the 1960-1970-based forward looking estimates. A final adjustment involved 
checking the benchmark estimates for consistency with the census data. 
Benchmark Population Estimates: 1960–2015 
The basic population distributions (by age, sex, race/Hispanic origin and generation) for the 
benchmark dates through 2010 are based on the census and ACS figures developed with the 
procedures outlined above. Several further steps are required to produce an internally consistent 
set of population figures across time. Because of differential undercounts by age and across 
censuses, data for age-sex-race/Hispanic groups are generally not consistent over time. For 
example, black males at ages 10-14 and 15-19 have generally had lower undercount rates than the 
age groups 10 years older, 20-24 and 25-29 (Robinson, 2001); often the differences for the cohorts 
from one census to the next can be as much as 10 percentage points. This difference means that 
projection of these teenage cohorts to the next census date based on components of change, even 
when measured with extreme accuracy, will be 10 percentage points high when compared with the 
results of the subsequent census for the cohorts who are now in their 20s. 
To reduce inconsistencies due to differential patterns of undercount across censuses, the 
benchmark populations and historical estimates are adjusted for census undercount using 
estimates based on those produced by the Census Bureau (Robinson, 2001 for data from the 1960-
2000 Censuses and from Mule, 2012 for the 2010 census-based data used for 2005-2015). Overall, 
undercount rates are lowest for the white and Asian populations; higher for males than females; 
higher for young children and for adults aged 25-49. Pew Research Center analysis of data for the 
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foreign-born population and of estimates measuring unauthorized immigration has found that 
undercount rates for the first generation are significantly higher than for the U.S.-born population 
(see Passel and Cohn 2014). 
Adjustments for census undercount were 3.1% for the 1960 Census, 2.7% for 1970, 1.0% for 1980, 
1.9% for 1990 and only 0.1% for 2000. The differential undercounts for the foreign-born 
population are driven largely, but not entirely, by the relatively poor coverage of unauthorized 
immigrants. Accordingly, differences between undercount rates for the U.S.-born and foreign-born 
populations are larger in more recent years when the number of unauthorized immigrants in the 
country is larger. Thus, adjustments for undercount of the immigrant population in 1960 and 
1970, when there were few (or no) unauthorized immigrants in the country differ by less than 1 
percentage point from the overall adjustment. However, in 1980 and later, the undercount rates 
for the foreign-born are significantly larger than the overall adjustments—2.6% in 1980, 5.5% in 
1990 and 3.2% in 2000. 
Population Estimates for 2005-2015 
Initial population estimates for 2005 and 2010 were based on tabulations of ACS data from 
IPUMS. For 2005, however, the data were augmented with records for the group quarters 
population and the weights were adjusted to be compatible with the Census Bureau’s intercensal 
population estimates that take into account results of both the 2000 and 2010 Censuses. (See 
Passel and Cohn 2014 and Passel, Cohn and Gonzalez-Barrera 2013 for a description of these 
alternative weights and their impact in the population estimates.) Assignments from the three 
generations available in ACS data (foreign born, Puerto Rican born and U.S. born) to the full five-
generation array used in our estimates and projections is based on projections from 2000 and 
earlier plus CPS data for surrounding years. Undercount adjustments for 2005 and 2010 used the 
detailed rates from 2000 with minor calibrations for 2010 results (Mule 2012). 
For 2015, alternative population estimates were needed because the most recent ACS data for age-
sex-race/Hispanic origin-generation groups was from the 2013 ACS or 2014 CPS. The data for 
2015 by age-sex-race/Hispanic origin come from the Census Bureau’s Vintage 2014 population 
estimates (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015) for basic data and for monthly data through June 2015. 
First, we generated estimates for July 1, 2015 by extrapolating forward one month from the June 1, 
2015 estimates. Next, the population in each age-sex-race/Hispanic group is distributed to 
foreign-born, Puerto Rican-born and U.S.-born generations based on distributions by cohort from 
the 2010-2013 ACS extrapolated to 2015. Then, the distribution was adjusted to the full five 
generations using projections from 2000 and earlier plus the most recent CPS data available. 
Finally, undercount rate adjustments for 2015 used the same rates as in 2010. As a check on the 
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estimates for 2005, 2010 and 2015, projections from 2000 were used to identify misalignments 
and make final adjustments. 
 
 
TABLE A1 
Benchmark Population Estimate by Race and Ethnicity and by Generation,  
1960-2015 
In thousands 
 Total White Black Hispanic Asian 
American 
Indian/ 
Alaska Native 
2 or more  
races 
1960 179,701 152,216 18,548 6,410 1,053 443 1,031 
1970 203,603 168,209 21,925 9,792 1,695 595 1,386 
1980 225,882 178,324 25,851 15,319 3,611 877 1,900 
1990 252,875 188,268 29,816 24,109 6,939 1,229 2,514 
2000 282,650 194,673 34,321 37,219 11,311 1,524 3,602 
2005 297,532 197,297 36,265 44,560 13,600 1,652 4,160 
2010 310,603 198,593 38,236 51,245 15,761 1,771 4,996 
2015 323,517 200,050 40,271 56,975 18,232 1,916 6,073 
        
    ----------------------------3rd and higher generation---------------------------- 
 Total 
1st  
generation 
2nd  
generation Total 
Mainland-born 
with mainland-
born parents 
Puerto  
Rican  
born 
Mainland-born 
with P.R.-born 
parent(s) 
1960 179,701 10,089 24,713 144,899 143,894 702 303 
1970 203,603 9,839 24,454 169,309 167,733 940 636 
1980 225,882 14,004 23,361 188,517 186,390 1,146 982 
1990 252,875 20,714 24,312 207,849 205,042 1,513 1,295 
2000 282,650 32,186 28,357 222,107 218,776 1,706 1,625 
2005 297,532 38,243 31,442 227,847 224,301 1,772 1,775 
2010 310,603 41,747 34,828 234,028 230,273 1,833 1,921 
2015 323,517 44,867 38,474 240,177 236,235 1,905 2,038 
Note: Whites, blacks, Asians and American Indian/Alaska Native include only single-race non-Hispanics. Asians include Pacific Islanders. Two 
or more races are multiple-race non-Hispanics. Hispanics are of any race. “First generation” is foreign born; “second generation” is people 
born in the U.S. with at least one foreign-born parent. “Third and higher generations” are people born in the U.S. with U.S.-born parents. 
Mainland-born is those born in the 50 states or D.C. Puerto Rican-born includes those born in Puerto Rico and other U.S. territories. See text 
for more details. 
Source: Pew Research Center estimates for 1965-2015 based on adjusted census data 
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Immigration 
The immigration assumptions are critical for both the projections and the historical analyses. 
Immigration increased substantially over the 1960-2005 period with particularly large increases 
for Hispanics and Asians. The rapid growth in the Hispanic population, for example, enabling 
Hispanics to surpass blacks as the largest minority population shortly after 2000 is attributable 
principally to the very large numbers of Hispanic immigrants arriving since 1965. 
Immigration has been the most difficult demographic component to forecast. It is directly affected 
by national policies in ways that fertility and mortality are not. In addition, some immigration 
flows, especially of unauthorized immigrants can be very sensitive to economic conditions in the 
U.S. and abroad as flows can increase in economic boom times and drop when the economy is 
slow. Although many of the social and economic factors affecting migration trends are reasonably 
well-known, there is no broadly accepted theoretical framework that can be readily applied in a 
projections perspective (Howe and Jackson, 2005). (See Passel and Cohn, 2008 for a discussion of 
frameworks for projection and longer-term historical analyses.)  
Historical Immigration, 1960-2015 
Total immigration to the United States moved in a steadily upward direction from the 1930s 
through 1995-2000. From 1960-1965 to 1995-2000, the average annual flow of new immigrants 
increased more than fivefold (from about 330,000 per year to 1,770,000). Much of this increase 
was due to very significant growth in Hispanic immigration, with much of it from Mexico and 
much of it unauthorized. After 2000, the increase stopped and flows dropped very slightly for 
2000-2005 (to an average of about 1,660,000). With the onset of the Great Recession of 2007-
2009, immigration dropped dramatically after 2007, largely due to a decrease and then a reversal 
of unauthorized immigration from Mexico (Passel, Cohn and Gonzalez-Barrera 2012 and 
subsequent Pew Research Center reports on unauthorized immigration). For the 2005-2010, 
immigration flows (1,310,000 per year) were about 20% below those of the previous five years. 
Immigration remained slightly below this level after 2010 as unauthorized immigration flows fell 
to essentially zero (Passel and Cohn, 2015).  
Separation of total immigration flows into legal and unauthorized is difficult. Although we have 
measures of the size of the unauthorized population at various points, the flows can be difficult to 
measure, especially for the period before 1995. Moreover, projection of legal and unauthorized 
immigration separately requires an assessment of future legislation affecting the legal status of the 
current and future immigrant populations. Accordingly, both the historical analyses and 
projections deal with the total immigration flow of both legal and unauthorized immigrants 
combined without attempting to differentiate them by legal status. 
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Initial estimates of immigrant arrivals for each five-year period from 1960-1965 through 2010-
2015 were generated by tabulating data from the 1970-2000 censuses and 2001-2013 ACS. 
Generally, the “closest” census to the time interval was used to estimate immigrant arrivals by age, 
sex, race and Hispanic origin. The 1970 Census provided data for 1960-1964 and 1965-1969 based 
on a 3% merged sample from IPUMS; the 5% IPUMS data from the 1980 Census was used for 
1970-1974 and 1975-1980; the 5% IPUMS data from the 1990 Census was used for the two five-
year intervals in the 1980s; and the 5% IPUMS data from the 2000 Census provided the detailed 
data for 1990-1994 and 1995-1999. Note that only the 2000 Census includes the multiple race 
category needed for the historical analysis and projections. Detailed tabulations by race from the 
2000 Census for pre-1990 periods of arrival were used to modify the estimates of arrivals for the 
two or more races group for 1960-1964 through 1985-1990 to conform to the post-2000 race 
categories using the same procedures described above for the benchmark populations. 
ACS data provide information on annual arrivals by race for 2000-2013 with multiple 
observations on most years. For example each of the 13 years of ACS data has an estimate of 
immigrants arriving in 2000 whereas only the 2012 and 2013 ACS have information on 2012 
arrivals (and. even then, the 2012 ACS covers only part of the year). For the initial estimates of 
immigrant arrivals covering 2000-2004, 2005-2009 and 2010-2012, we selected the data year 
with the largest number of arrivals in the race/Hispanic group. Generally, this was the data year 
with the first full-year accounting of the arrivals; for example, an estimate of arrivals for the full 
calendar year of 2006 is first available from the 2007 ACS. For calendar year 2013, we estimated 
full-year arrivals from the partial-year data of the 2013 ACS using average inflation factors for the 
previous three years (e.g. the ratio of full-year arrivals in 2012 from the 2013 ACS to partial-year 
arrivals for 2012 observed in the 2012 ACS). For 2014 arrivals, we used the average across 2011-
2013. 
The final estimates for immigrant arrivals for each of the five-year periods through 2010-2015 
were developed from the basic population projection model and the population benchmarks for 
1960-2015. The first step involved estimating the foreign-born population for 1970 from the 
benchmark 1960 population and initial estimates of immigrant arrivals for 1960-1965 and 1965-
1970 (approximated by the 1960-64 and 1965-70 arrivals just described), together with estimates 
of mortality and emigration (see below). This initial estimate of the foreign-born population in 
1970 fell short of the 1970 benchmarks for each of the race/Hispanic origin foreign-born groups. 
The estimates of immigrant arrivals were then adjusted upward for each group by the amount 
necessary to hit the 1970 benchmarks. This process was repeated using the revised estimate of the 
1970 foreign-born population as a base for estimating the 1980 foreign-born population. 
Comparison of this initial 1980 foreign-born estimate yields adjustment factors for the 1970-1975 
and 1975-1980 arrivals of each race/Hispanic origin group. This iterative estimation-adjustment 
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process was repeated for 1980-1990, 1990-2000, 2000-2005, 2005-2010 and 2010-2015. The 
resulting estimates of total immigrant arrivals for each period (expressed as average annual 
values) are shown in Figure A1. 
These data on five-year arrivals for 1965-1970 through 2010-2015 (plus temporary migrants as 
described below) are the basis for the estimate of 58.5 million arrivals during 1965-2015 shown in 
Table 1 of this report. Information by country and region of birth for the entire period was 
generated from the arrivals in each five-year period classified by country or region of birth and 
race/Hispanic origin. These detailed tabulations were adjusted to the race/Hispanic origin totals 
estimated from the iterative fitting process just described. Not all of the 58.5 million arrivals are 
still in the U.S. in 2015. Using the population projection model, it is possible to estimate how many 
of these immigrants arriving over the 50-year period were still in the U.S., how many had died and 
how many had left the country. Of the 58.5 million arrivals, about 10.8 million had emigrated from 
the U.S. and 4.3 million died. The remaining 43.4 million represent about 97% of the 2015 foreign-
born population.  
Projected Immigration, 2015-2065 
The future levels of immigration assumed for these projections incorporate both short-term and 
long-term trends. Since the mid-1990s, total immigration flows of Hispanics have declined quite 
sharply—dropping by more than half from about 950,000 per year to about 425,000 per year. The 
rate of decrease has slowed substantially, but our short-term projection for 2015-2020, which 
incorporates annual data for recent years, assumes a slight further decrease to about 355,000.  
The other large flows in recent years have been Asian immigrants. Here, the absolute flows 
increased from about 365,000 per year in the late 1990s to 435,000 for 2010-2015 with most of 
the increase occurring in recent years. Again, the short-term annual changes point the way to a 
continuation of this trend so we are projecting an increase to about 485,000 for the 2015-2020 
period.  
Overall then, our projection for 2015-2020 is about 1.2 million immigrants per year or 
approximately the same as during the 2010-2015 period. 
This projected immigration for 2015-2020 represents about 3.7 new immigrants annually per 
1,000 people in the country. Viewed in this way— as a rate, immigration flows are projected to be 
lower than any time since the early 1970s when average annual immigration of less than 700,000 
(Figure A1) represented about 3.3 new immigrants per 1,000 people. Over the long history where 
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U.S. immigration has been measure, going back to 1820, the immigration rate averaged about 4.4 
immigrants annually per 1,000 people (Passel and Cohn, 2008).  
 
In the longer-range projections for this report, we took into account the immigration rate over the 
very long term and over the last 40 years. Further, the projected aging of the U.S. population 
through 2030 inherent in these projections points to a decrease in the share of the U.S. population 
in the working ages that would be slowed somewhat with increased immigration flows. Thus, 
immigration levels after 2020 are projected to increase for the next 10 years at a rate slightly above 
the population growth rate and then after 2030 to increase by about 1% per year, or a rate 
equivalent to the overall U.S. growth rate over the last 30 to 50 years. With these assumptions, by 
2060-2065, the immigration rate will return to a level slightly below the rates over the last 40 
years (4.6 per 1,000 versus 4.8). The average number of immigrants per year will climb from 
about 1.2 million during 2010-2015 to 1.5 million for 2030-2035 to about 2.0 million in 2060-
2065 (Figure A1). The projected percentage increases in immigration flows after 2020 are applied 
to all race/Hispanic origin groups. Consequently, Asian immigration will continue to be higher 
than Hispanic immigration, and these two groups will account for a large majority of future 
immigration flows (Figure A2). 
FIGURE A1 
Average Annual Immigration, Estimated and Projected, for Five-Year Periods:  
1960-1965 to 2060-2065 
In millions 
 
Note: Intervals begin mid-year and do not overlap. Immigration excludes temporary migration. 
Source: Pew Research Center estimates for 1965-2015 based on adjusted census data; Pew Research Center projections for 2015-2065 
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Other Components 
In addition to the inflows of immigrants, there are several other much smaller flows that are part 
of a full demographic model of the U.S. population: net temporary migration (a first-generation 
flow), net movement from Puerto Rico (a flow into the Puerto Rican-born population), net 
movement of civilian citizens (a flow into the U.S.-born population) and flows accounting for the 
FIGURE A2 
Average Annual Immigration for Racial and Ethnic Groups, Estimated and Projected, 
for Five-Year Periods: 1960-1965 to 2060-2065 
In thousands 
 
Note: Intervals begin mid-year and do not overlap. Whites, blacks and Asians include only single-race non-Hispanics. Hispanics are of any 
race. Asians include Pacific Islanders. Other includes remaining single-race groups and multiple-race groups that are non-Hispanic. 
Immigration excludes temporary migration. 
Source: Pew Research Center estimates for 1965-2015 based on adjusted census data; Pew Research Center projections for 2015-2065 
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U.S. armed forces abroad. Each is treated somewhat differently in both the historic population 
estimates and the projections. 
Temporary migration consists mainly of foreign-born people admitted for temporary residence in 
the U.S for periods of one year or longer. The two largest groups of temporary migrants are foreign 
students (mainly in colleges and universities) and guest workers (mostly with advanced degrees of 
special skills). For this temporary group, there tend to be large numbers entering every year and 
somewhat smaller numbers leaving. Over the last 25 years (since 1990), about 700,000 more 
temporary migrants have arrived than departed, representing a net increase in the foreign-born 
population of about 28,000 per year. In recent years the numbers have been increasing by about 
1% per year; this rate of increase is assumed to continue to 2050, at which point the flows are 
assumed to level off. This temporary flow is dominated by Asians who account for almost three-
quarters of net temporary migration since the mid-1990s. This flow is treated as part of the total 
immigration flow discussed above. (See Passel and Cohn, 2008 for a description of data sources 
for this population.) 
The flow into the population born in U.S. territories is largely Hispanic (almost 90% for 1965-
2015) and is dominated by movement between Puerto Rico and the United States. For the historic 
population estimates, the flow into the Puerto Rican-born population was estimated with the 
iterative process of adjusting initial estimates (in this case from the Census Bureau’s population 
estimates) to flows required by the benchmark populations. For 1965-2015, net movement into the 
Puerto Rican-born population amount to almost 1.6 million people or 30,000 per year. Flows have 
been much higher recently, especially from Puerto Rico to the U.S. (Cohn, Patten and Lopez, 
2014). For the projections, this flow is assumed to increase by about 25% for 2015-2020 (to 
190,000) over the 2010-2015 levels. It is assumed to remain at this level for the next five years and 
then decrease slowly to about 130,000. The assumed decrease is a result largely of projected drops 
in the number of people in Puerto Rico who might migrate, a trend that is a consequence of past 
outmigration and very low levels of fertility in Puerto Rico. 
The projections shown here are for the population residing in the United States. Members of the 
U.S. military serving outside the country are not part of the resident population, but they almost 
all came from the resident population before they were sent abroad. To take this group into 
account, we use estimates of the U.S. military abroad from the Census Bureau (e.g., U.S. Census 
Bureau 2014) that are available for our estimate dates (i.e., every five years from 1960 to 2015). 
The data on the armed forces outside the U.S., which are available by age, sex and race/Hispanic 
origin, are distributed to generation groups using data on the military population residing in the 
U.S., which comes from the IPUMS census files. The estimate for the initial estimate date in an 
interval (e.g., 1960) is added to the population before the demographic component rates are 
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applied; then, the estimated figures for the final estimate date (e.g., 1965) are subtracted to give 
the resident population at the final estimate date. This procedure is used for the historical 
estimates and for the projections. In the projections beyond 2015, the size and age-sex-
race/Hispanic origin-generation distribution of the military overseas is held constant at the 2015 
level—a total of about 275,000.  
Two other components—net recruits plus deaths to the armed forces overseas and net movement 
of civilian citizens—have almost no impact on the estimated or projected population. They 
represent, on average, less than 5,000 people per year and mainly affect the third-and-higher 
generation which numbers about 240 million currently. For the projection, values are set to the 
average over the last 20 years and assumed to change in concert with the third-and-higher 
generation. 
Emigration 
Emigration of legal immigrants has proved to be another elusive component of population change. 
The measures used in the historical analysis incorporate revised measures based on variations of 
“residual” calculations using successive censuses to incorporate the detailed census figures on the 
foreign-born population (Passel, 2004, has a detailed description of the estimation methodology), 
as well as estimates used in previous Pew Research Center projections (Passel and Cohn, 2008) 
and new Census Bureau research for their population projections (U.S. Census Bureau 2014). The 
new Census Bureau measures, which rely on repeated estimates of emigration by duration of 
residence from successive ACS data sets, provide rates of emigration by sex for recent arrivals (less 
than 10 years in the U.S.) and those with 10 or more years in the U.S., separately for Hispanic and 
non-Hispanic immigrants.  
Because emigration rates for recent arrivals are much higher than for longer-term immigrants, we 
revised the methods used for Pew Research Center estimates and projections to keep track of 
immigrant arrival cohorts. First, we divided the foreign-born population at each date into three 
groups based on duration of residence—those in the U.S. for less than five years, those in the U.S. 
for five to 10 years and those in the U.S for 10 years of more. To carry the foreign-born population 
forward for the next five years, we applied mortality and emigration rates to each of these groups. 
Mortality rates were the same for all three groups, but the emigration rates applied to latter two 
groups were the lower, long-term emigration rates. The survivors of the groups in the U.S. for five 
to 10 years and for 10 years or more at the initial date were combined into the group at the final 
date who had been in the country for 10 years or more. To illustrate with a specific example, the 
foreign-born in 1980 who had been in the U.S. for five to 10 years came in 1970-1975 and those 
who had been in the U.S. for more than 10 years had come before 1970; the survivors of these two 
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groups who had not emigrated by 1985 represented the foreign-born population that had come to 
the U.S. before 1975 or the group who, in 1985, had been in the country for 10 or more years.  
The higher short-term emigration rates are applied to the foreign born in the U.S. for less than five 
years at the initial date (e.g., those in 1980 who had come to the U.S. during 1975-1980 in our 
example). This group at the end of the estimation period (1985) becomes the group in the U.S. for 
five to 10 years. The new immigrants who arrive during the estimation interval (1980-1985) also 
are subject to the higher, short-term emigration rates and become the group with less than five 
years in the U.S. at the end date (e.g., 1985). This procedure of moving the foreign-born 
population in each duration-of-residence category to the next one over each five-year period is 
used in the historic estimates and the projections. 
Emigration levels increased steadily for most groups from the early 1960s, when the annual 
average was about 150,000 through the late 1990s, when it was about 275,000. In large part 
because of the Great Recession of 2007-2009, emigration rates and emigration levels increased for 
the 2005-2010 period, especially for the Hispanic population. Overall emigration for the five-year 
period averaged just under 400,000. The Hispanic emigration rate went up by about 50 percent 
from 44 per 1,000 during 2000-2005 to 62 per 1,000 for 2005-2010. For 2010-2015, emigration 
rates dropped slightly and average annual emigration dropped to about 350,000. The number of 
short-term immigrants (i.e., those with the highest emigration rates) had decreased because of the 
downturn in new immigration so emigration decreased in absolute numbers. 
Going forward from 2015, we applied the Census Bureau’s emigration rates without any 
adjustments beyond the distribution to more detailed age groups. These rates yielded lower levels 
of emigration for 2015-2020 (about 220,000 per year) than the levels observed in the historic 
estimates for 1990 and later. Emigration is projected to increase steadily to about 370,000 per 
year for the 2060-2065 population because of the increasing size of the foreign-born population 
and the growth in the number of new immigrants. 
Fertility 
Historical Fertility, 1960-2015 
The fertility patterns used in the historical population estimates are drawn from a number of 
disparate sources. The overall patterns that emerge are relatively consistent across time. Fertility 
rates for foreign-born women within a race/Hispanic group are generally higher than rates for 
U.S.-born women. Generally, rates for second-generation women are between those of immigrant 
women and third-and-higher generation women.  
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For most of our analysis, the fertility measure used (and reported here) is the total fertility rate 
(TFR). TFR is an age-standardized measure that can be interpreted as the average lifetime births 
per woman. Because we have data over a considerable time period, we can report and analyze the 
TFR in a given year (i.e., the period TFR) which is the sum of the age-specific birth rates across all 
women during the year, and the cohort TFR which follows cohorts of women over time throughout 
their childbearing years. The number of births in a year and over time can be affected both by the 
level of the TFR and by the underlying age pattern of fertility (e.g., whether childbearing in a 
cohort is concentrated in younger or older ages). Over time in the U.S., there has been a trend to 
later childbearing, which is captured by increases in the mean age at which women give birth. 
A major source for developing the historic measures of fertility is data from the June Supplements 
to the CPS, which ask questions on date of birth for the most recent child and number of children 
ever born. CPS supplements for June 1995 and for even-numbered years for June 1996-2010 
permit tabulation of births by age for the full five “generations” we defined initially; the sample 
sizes are quite small for many of the groups so it is necessary to aggregate some categories across 
multiple years to compute reliable TFRs. The same June CPS Fertility Supplements collect 
information on children ever born through 2014. These data permit an assessment of lifetime 
births (essentially) for cohorts that have reached ages beyond 40. (An earlier CPS fertility 
supplement in June 1986 has some of the same information, but the sample sizes are quite small 
for many groups.) 
The ACS asks women if they had a birth with in the 12 months before they responded to the 
survey. These data can be used to estimate fertility rates for foreign-born, Puerto Rican-born and 
U.S.-born women. Because the ACS has a very large sample size (1% of the US population in 2005 
and later), generally reliable age-specific rates and TFRs can be estimated for all race/Hispanic 
groups, even those seriously underrepresented in the CPS. Finally, census data from 1960-1990 
provide information on lifetime births. For 1960 and 1970, data can be developed for the full five-
generation categorization of women; for 1980 and 1990, it can be developed for the more 
restricted three generations as with the ACS. Because the data are available across a 30-year 
period, it is possible to follow birth cohorts over time and develop estimates of completed lifetime 
births and some age patterns of fertility. 
From these disparate data sources, we pieced together an initial set of period TFRs by 
race/Hispanic origin and generation for 1960 through 2013. Two other sets of estimates were also 
available—those from Passel and Edmonston (1994) for 1960-1990 and from Passel and Cohn 
(2008) for 1960-2005. These combined datasets provided the basic input for the historic analysis 
of generational fertility. 
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In developing the final fertility estimates for the historical data, we imposed a number of 
constraints on the resulting TFRs. First, the total number of births in each five-year period (1960-
1965 through 2005-2010) had to agree with totals of registered births from the National Center for 
Health Statistics—by racial/ethnic group when available. Also, the survivors of births at the end of 
each estimation period had to agree with the totals for the appropriate age group in the benchmark 
populations. For example, births during 1960-1965, when survived to 1970, had to agree with the 
U.S. population ages 5-9 years in the 1970 benchmark; similarly births in 1965-1970 survived to 
1970 had to agree with the U.S. population younger than 5 in 1970; births for 2000-2005 had to 
agree with the U.S. population younger than 5 in the 2005 benchmark population. This agreement 
with benchmarks was only required for the “first” benchmark; thus, survivors of births for 1960-
1965 were not required to agree with the population aged 15-19 in 1980 or 25-29 in 1990. Then, 
finally, the generational distribution of the surviving births at the first benchmark were required to 
agree with the estimated mainland-born populations of the second and third-and-higher 
generations at the first benchmark.  
The total fertility rates resulting from of this iterative fitting process are shown for 1965-1970 and 
2010-2015 in Table A2. Consistent with other data on births and fertility rates, the estimates show 
sizeable drops in the TFR for all race/Hispanic groups. The TFR increased for Hispanic immigrant 
women while other groups showed decreases; this anomalous pattern probably reflects a 
significant change in composition of Hispanic immigrants between 1970 and 2015 as well as 
differences in the recency of arrival. In general, second-generation women had lower TFRs than 
immigrant-women in the same group; by 2010-2015, differences between the second generation 
and third-and-higher generations were not large and not consistently in one direction. Data for 
2005-2010 are not shown, but previous Pew Research Center analyses have documented notable 
declines in fertility following 2007, with especially large drops among immigrant women 
(Livingston and Cohn, 2012). These declines appear to have continued past 2010 and are reflected 
in the historical fertility patterns, especially for Hispanic and Asian immigrant women. 
In implementing the multigeneration projection methodology, a “G-matrix” is required to 
distribute the births of mothers in each generation to a generation for the children. Births to 
immigrant mothers always go into the second generation, and all births to Puerto Rican-born 
women go into the Puerto Rican-parentage population. For the second and third-and-higher 
generations, some births are distributed back to the second generation as a result of cross-
generational childbearing of mixed-generation couples made up of first-generation men and 
second generation or third-and-higher generation women. This matrix is estimated for each race 
group using data on mixed-generation couples from the Current Population Surveys for 1995–
2010. Analysis of the initial G-matrices showed a strong relationship between the percentage of 
cross-generational births and the relative sizes of the generations. Accordingly, this relationship is 
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built into the historical analyses and prospective projections to allow for dynamic changes in 
cross-generational marriage patterns. 
 
Projected Fertility, 2015-2065 
The overall patterns of fertility for the projections are driven by the initial values for 2010-2015 
and a set of assumed “ultimate” fertility values for 2060-2065. The basic assumption is an overall 
convergence of fertility levels across generations and race/Hispanic groups. The ultimate values 
cluster around 1.9 children per woman. Immigrant women are assumed to have slightly higher 
ultimate rates (by about 0.1-0.2 children per woman). Hispanic immigrants are assumed to 
continue to have higher fertility but their TFR is projected to drop from about 3.3 to 2.3 lifetime 
births. Asian women tend to have lower project fertility with third-and-higher generation women 
having a projected TFR of 1.7; note that this implies an increase from their estimated fertility level 
in 2010-2015 of 1.6. 
TABLE A2 
Total Fertility Rate for Population Estimates and Projections, by Race-Hispanic 
Origin and Generation: 1965-1970, 2015-2020 and 2060-2065 
Lifetime average children per woman 
 --------------Total-------------- ----First generation---- --Second generation-- 
Third and higher  
--------generation-------- 
 
1965- 
1970 
2010- 
2015 
2060- 
2065 
1965- 
1970 
2010- 
2015 
2060- 
2065 
1965- 
1970 
2010- 
2015 
2060- 
2065 
1965- 
1970 
2010- 
2015 
2060- 
2065 
Total 2.48 1.89 1.90 2.59 2.58 2.06 2.59 1.84 1.88 2.47 1.76 1.85 
             
White 2.37 1.71 1.88 2.31 1.76 2.00 2.43 1.75 1.90 2.37 1.70 1.86 
Black 2.94 1.91 1.90 (z) 1.90 2.10 (z) 1.83 1.89 2.93 1.90 1.85 
Hispanic 3.10 2.53 1.94 3.13 3.35 2.30 3.33 2.01 1.90 3.05 1.98 1.85 
Asian 2.37 1.66 1.88 2.30 1.70 1.90 2.66 1.59 1.90 2.28 1.61 1.75 
American Indian/ 
Alaska Native 4.05 2.03 2.00 (z) (z) (z) (z) (z) (z) 4.04 2.01 2.00 
2 or more races 2.61 1.86 1.86 (z) 2.20 2.00 (z) 1.79 1.90 2.56 1.80 1.82 
(z) - Population too small to compute reliable rate. 
Note: Whites, blacks, Asians and American Indian/Alaska Native include only single-race non-Hispanics. Asians include Pacific Islanders. Two 
or more races are multiple-race non-Hispanics. Hispanics are of any race. “First generation” is foreign born; “second generation” is people 
born in the U.S. with at least one foreign-born parent. “Third and higher generations” are people born in the U.S. with U.S.-born parents. 
Source: Pew Research Center estimates consistent with generational population estimates for 1960-2015; assumed ultimate values for 
2060-2065 
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The age patterns for current and ultimate fertility are drawn from the recent Census Bureau (2014) 
projections that show differential age patterns over time and across groups. Once the initial and 
ultimate levels and patterns were determined, the intermediate projected fertility rates were 
developed by imposing smooth trends on cohorts, not on the time period TFRs. The cohorts 
reaching 25-29 in 2065-2070 (i.e., women born in 2040-2045) are assumed to have the ultimate 
level and age-pattern of fertility for their race/Hispanic origin group. Fertility projections were 
developed for 30 groups of women (five generations for six race/Hispanic groups). Some groups 
have increasing TFRs; others, decreasing; and a few, relatively constant. Notwithstanding the 
complex pattern of changes assumed, the TFR for the total population stays within a very narrow 
range, going from 1.89 in 2010-2015 to 1.90 for 2060-2065, and never exceeding 1.96. 
Mortality 
Survival rates by age, sex and race/Hispanic origin are drawn directly from recent Census Bureau 
(2014) population projections and official life tables for 1959-61 through 2010. The Census Bureau 
projections provide estimates of projected deaths (by single year of age for males and females) for 
every year from 2014 through 2060 for race/Hispanic groups that correspond well with those in 
the Pew Research Center projections—Hispanics; non-Hispanics for single race white; single races 
for black, Asian, Native Hawaiian and other Pacific Islanders and American Indians and Alaska 
Natives; and for people of two or more races. In addition, the projected populations corresponding 
to the projected deaths are available for the same groups by single ages and sex for every year 
through 2060.  
From the death and population data, we constructed full life tables for every year; then we 
condensed them to abridged life tables. From these life tables, we estimated five-year survival 
rates for five-year age groups with standard life table methods. For the first nine five-year periods 
in our projections (e.g., 2015-2020 through 2055-2060), five-year survival rates were derived by 
averaging the rates from the starting year and the final year (e.g., 2015 and 2020 for the 2015-
2020 period). For our final projection interval (2060-2065), the rates from the 2060 life table 
were used. In applying the rates from the Census Bureau life tables, the Hispanic and non-
Hispanic white rates were applied to those groups in the projections; for the other groups of non-
Hispanics in the projection, the rates for the full group (including Hispanics) from the Census 
Bureau-based life tables were used. 
For the historic period of 1960 through 2015, not as much race/Hispanic origin detail is available 
in the mortality data. For 2014 and 2015, the Census Bureau projections provide the full detail just 
described. Official life tables for Hispanics are only available for 2006 and later; similarly, life 
tables for non-Hispanic whites and blacks only cover 2006 and later. There are no official life 
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tables for Asians, American Indians and Alaska Natives or the two or more races population for 
any of the years. For years where life tables for Hispanics are not available, survival rates for 
whites and blacks are assumed to apply to the non-Hispanic single-race populations of whites and 
blacks, respectively; for these same years, survival rates for whites are assumed to apply to 
Hispanics. When Asian or two or more races populations are not available (i.e., all years before 
2014), survival rates from the white population (non-Hispanic, if available) are assumed to apply 
to the Asian and two or more races populations. For the American Indian and Alaska Native 
population, survival rates for the group labeled “other than white” are assumed to apply. 
The final step in the process of deriving the five-year survival rates involves developing those 
estimates for specific years and then averaging across the years to get rates applicable to the 
projection intervals. For 1960, rates were developed from the U.S. Life Tables: 1959-61 (NCHS, 
1964); for 1970, from United States Life Tables: 1969-71 (NCHS, 1975); for 1980, from U.S. 
Decennial Life Tables for 1979-81 (NCHS, 1985); for 1990, from U.S. Decennial Life Tables for 
1989-91 (NCHS, 1997); for 2000, from U.S. Decennial Life Tables for 1999-2001 (NCHS, 2008), 
for 2005, from United States Life Tables by Hispanic Origin (NCHS, 2010 ); and for 2010, from 
United States Life Tables, 2010 (NCHS, 2014. (Note that the survival rates from the 2006 life 
tables are assumed to apply to2005 in the estimation process.) For each interval in the historic 
estimates, survival rates were estimated by averaging the nearest surrounding life tables. So, for 
1960-1965, the estimated survival rates were weighted average of the relevant 1960 rates (with a 
weight of 3.0) and the 1970 rates (with a weight of 1.0); for 1965-1970, the same rates were 
averaged, but the weights reversed. Finally, for 2010-2015, the survival rates for 2015 from the 
Census Bureau projections were averaged with the rates from the 2010 official life tables. 
Estimates of life expectancies at birth from the averaged life tables used in the population 
estimates and projections are shown in Table A3. There are large improvements for all groups 
between 1965-1970 and 2010-2015—nine to 12 years for men and six to 10 years for women. 
Between 2010-2015 and 2060-2065, all groups show improvements in life expectancy at birth, but 
not generally as large as the gains over the preceding 50 years. For men, life expectancies improve 
by another five to nine years and for women, three to seven years. By 2060-2065, female life 
expectancy at birth is in a range of 85-88 years; for men, the range is 81-84 years.  
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Contributions to Population and Growth 
The contribution of immigration to population growth goes beyond just the numbers of 
immigrants added to the population because once the immigrants have arrived in the country, 
they tend to have children in the U.S. In the long run, the immigrants themselves will die, but their 
U.S.-born offspring will multiply, having children themselves, grandchildren, and subsequent 
generations. The use of a population projection methodology permits measurement of future 
contributions of immigrants to population growth as well as an assessment of the role of past 
immigration in population change.  
In measuring the contribution of future immigration to the projected population in 2065 (or any 
other future date), an alternative population projection is carried out by setting future 
immigration (after 2015) to zero. In these projections, there are two components of immigration—
total immigration, consisting of combined legal and unauthorized immigration, and net temporary 
migration—that are set to zero. With this assumption, not only are no future immigrants added to 
the population, there is no other contribution from these immigrants to population change 
through future births, deaths, or emigration because all of these components are computed by 
applying rates to the population. The difference between the “zero immigration” projection and 
TABLE A2 
Life Expectancy at Birth for Population Estimates and Projections, by Race-Hispanic 
Origin and Sex: 1965-1970, 2015-2020 and 2060-2065 
In years 
 ----------------------------Men----------------------------  -----------------------Women------------------------- 
 
1965-* 
1970* 
2010- 
2015 
2060- 
2065  
1965- 
1970 
2010- 
2015 
2060- 
2065 
White 67.8* 77.0 84.5  75.2 81.6 87.5 
Black 60.4* 72.2 81.4  67.9 78.3 85.4 
Hispanic 67.8* 79.2 84.6  75.2 84.0 87.5 
Asian 67.8* 77.0 84.6  75.2 81.6 87.5 
American Indian/Alaska Native 61.1* 72.5 81.7  68.4 78.6 85.6 
Two or more races 67.8* 76.9 84.4  75.2 81.7 87.4 
*No separate data available; the values shown in this table and those used in generating the population estimates are assumed the same as 
for the white population (see text). 
Note: Whites, blacks, Asians and American Indian/Alaska Native include only single-race non-Hispanics. Asians include Pacific Islanders. 2 or 
more races are multiple-race non-Hispanics. Hispanics are of any race.  
Source: Based on United States Life Tables: 1959-61, U.S. Decennial Life Tables for 1969-71, United States Life Tables, 2010 (National 
Center for Health Statistics) and 2014 National Projections (U.S. Census Bureau) 
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the baseline projection represents the contribution of future immigrants to future population 
change at any future date. (To isolate the “pure” impact of future immigration, the G-matrices 
used to allocate births across generations are not allowed to vary dynamically but are fixed at the 
values of the baseline projection.) 
Following the work of Passel and Cohn (2008) and Passel and Edmonston (1994), this same 
methodology can be used to assess the contribution of past immigration to past population change 
because the time series of historical population estimates was developed with the population 
projection methodology. Thus, past immigration can be set to zero to estimate what would have 
happened in the past had there been no immigrants during the 1965–2015 period or during any 
other historical interval. This methodology works because the time series of population change has 
been constructed with rates of fertility, mortality, and emigration rather than past numbers of 
births, deaths, and emigrants. (Again, the G-matrix values are fixed at the values from the 
historical benchmark population estimates.) 
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Recent Arrivals: Data Sources 
Most of the analysis in this chapter is based on the 1970 to 2000 decennial census public use files 
and the 2007 and 2013 American Community Survey (ACS) public use files. The ACS is an ongoing 
survey that was developed by the Census Bureau to provide decennial census information on an 
annual basis. The ACS questionnaire is similar to the 2000 census questionnaire, with some added 
questions, and information collected by the ACS is consistent with the earlier decennial censuses. 
The public use files utilized are the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series provided by the 
University of Minnesota Population Center. Documentation can be found at 
https://usa.ipums.org/usa/. 
The 1980, 1990 and 2000 files used are the 5% samples. For 1970, six independent 1% samples are 
available. However, critical information on citizenship status (needed to identify if the person is 
foreign born) is available only in the Form 1 samples. So the 1970 file used is a 3% sample. The 
ACS files are 1% samples. 
Recent Arrivals 
For foreign-born persons who arrived within five years of the census or survey date, all the 
observations were utilized. Since the U.S.-born population is much larger, random subsamples of 
U.S.-born respondents were used to expedite processing times. For 1970, a 1% sample of the U.S.-
born population was used. For 1980, 1990 and 2000, a 0.5% subsample of U.S.-born respondents 
was employed. All the U.S.-born respondents from the ACS samples were included in the analysis. 
The population weights were adjusted to reflect the subsampling, and all the published figures are 
weighted. The unweighted sample sizes used in the tabulations are as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE A4 
 
Foreign-Born 
Recent Arrivals U.S. Born 
1970 51,393  1,932,606  
1980 168,143  1,063,673  
1990 224,338  1,157,905  
2000 345,999  1,262,171  
2007 54,682  2,671,703  
2013 48,136  2,775,364  
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The following table shows the countries included in each of the six regions of birth: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Educational Attainment 
In 1990, the Census Bureau redesigned the question on educational attainment. Until 1990, the 
question ascertained the highest year of school completed. Since 1990, years of school completed 
is available only for those who have not completed high school. For persons who have at least 
completed high school, the questionnaire queries as to the highest degree completed.  
TABLE A5 
Defining the Six Regions of Birth for U.S. Immigrants 
Central and South America Europe Africa 
Mexico Northern Europe North Africa 
Central America United Kingdom & Ireland Sub-Saharan Africa 
South America Western Europe  
 Central/Eastern Europe Other 
Asia Estonia Canada 
East Asia Latvia Atlantic Islands 
Southeast Asia Lithuania Australia & New Zealand 
Afghanistan Russia Pacific Islands 
India   
Iran Caribbean  
Nepal Cuba  
Bahrain Dominican Republic  
Cyprus Haiti  
Iraq Jamaica  
Israel/Palestine Antigua-Barbuda  
Jordan Bahamas  
Kuwait Barbados  
Lebanon Dominica  
Saudi Arabia Grenada  
Syria St. Lucia  
Turkey St. Vincent  
United Arab Emirates Trinidad and Tobago  
Yemen Arab Republic (North) Caribbean, other  
 West Indies, other  
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Before 1990, the number of years of college completed beyond four is available but the question 
did not query whether the respondent completed an advanced degree, so information on graduate 
degrees is not comparable before and after 1990. 
To bridge the education questions over time, standard practice is employed, and respondents 
before 1990 who have completed 12 years of schooling are assumed to have completed high school. 
Respondents who have completed four years of college are assumed to have finished at least a 
bachelor’s degree. Persons indicating that they attended less than one to three years of college are 
assigned to those who completed at least some college or a two-year degree. For more details, see 
https://usa.ipums.org/usa-action/variables/EDUC#comparability_section. 
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Survey Data: The American Trends Panel Surveys 
The American Trends Panel (ATP), created by the Pew Research Center, is a nationally 
representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults living in households. Respondents who self-
identify as internet users (representing 89% of U.S. adults) participate in the panel via monthly 
self-administered Web surveys, and those who do not use the internet participate via telephone or 
mail. The panel is being managed by Abt SRBI. 
Data in this report are drawn from the March wave of the panel, conducted March 10-April 6, 2015 
among 3,147 respondents (2,833 by Web and 314 by mail). The margin of sampling error at the 
95% confidence level for the full sample of 3,147 respondents is plus or minus 2.4 percentage 
points.  
All current members of the American Trends Panel were originally recruited from the 2014 
Political Polarization and Typology Survey, a large (n=10,013) national landline and cellphone 
random digit dial (RDD) survey conducted from Jan. 23 to March 10, 2014, in English and 
Spanish. At the end of that survey, respondents were invited to join the panel. The invitation was 
extended to all respondents who use the internet (from any location) and a random subsample of 
respondents who do not use the internet.26  
Of the 10,013 adults interviewed, 9,809 were invited to take part in the panel. A total of 5,338 
agreed to participate and provided either a mailing address or an email address to which a 
welcome packet, a monetary incentive and future survey invitations could be sent. Panelists also 
receive a small monetary incentive after participating in each wave of the survey.  
The ATP data were weighted in a multistep process that begins with a base weight incorporating 
the respondents’ original survey selection probability and the fact that some panelists were 
subsampled for invitation to the panel. Next, an adjustment was made for the fact that the 
propensity to join the panel and remain an active panelist varied across different groups in the 
sample. The final step in the weighting uses an iterative technique that matches gender, age, 
education, race, Hispanic origin and region to parameters from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2013 
American Community Survey. Population density is weighted to match the 2010 U.S. Decennial 
Census. Telephone service is weighted to estimates of telephone coverage for 2014 that were 
projected from the July-December 2013 National Health Interview Survey. It also adjusts for party 
affiliation using an average of the three most recent Pew Research Center general public telephone 
                                                        
26 When data collection for the 2014 Political Polarization and Typology Survey began, non-internet users were subsampled at a rate of 25%, 
but a decision was made shortly thereafter to invite all non-internet users to join. In total, 83% of non-internet users were invited to join the 
panel.  
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surveys, and for internet use using as a parameter a measure from the 2014 Survey of Political 
Polarization. Sampling errors and statistical tests of significance take into account the effect of 
weighting. The Hispanic sample in the American Trends Panel is predominantly U.S. born and 
English-speaking.  
In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical 
difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls. 
The Web component of the March wave had a response rate of 78% (2,833 responses among 3,634 
Web-based individuals enrolled in the panel); the mail component had a response rate of 61% (314 
responses among 512 non-Web individuals enrolled in the panel). Taking account of the response 
rate for the 2014 Survey of Political Polarization (10.6%) and attrition from panel members who 
were removed at their request or for inactivity, the cumulative response rate for the March ATP 
wave is 3.4%.27 
                                                        
27 Prior to the October wave, 962 Web panelists who had never responded were removed from the panel. Prior to the November wave, 37 mail 
non-Web panelists who had never responded were removed from the panel.  
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Statistical Portrait: Data Sources 
The statistical profile of the foreign-born population in the 50 states and the District of Columbia 
is based on Pew Research Center tabulations of the Census Bureau’s 2010 and 2013 American 
Community Survey (ACS) and the 1960-2000 decennial censuses. 
The ACS is the largest household survey in the United States, with a sample of more than 3 million 
addresses (http://www.census.gov/acs/www/methodology/sample_size_data/index.php). It 
covers the topics previously covered in the long form of the decennial census. The ACS is designed 
to provide estimates of the size and characteristics of the resident population, which includes 
persons living in households and group quarters. For more details about the ACS, including the 
sampling strategy and associated error, see the 2010 or 2013 American Community Survey’s 
Accuracy Statement provided by the U.S. Census Bureau: 
http://www.census.gov/acs/www/data_documentation/documentation_main/.  
The specific data sources for this statistical profile are the 1% samples of the 2010 and 2013 ACS 
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) provided by the University of Minnesota, the 5% 
samples of the 1980-2000 decennial censuses, a merged 3% sample of the 1970 decennial census 
(Form 1), and the 1% samples of the 1960 decennial census. The IPUMS assigns uniform codes, to 
the extent possible, to data collected by the decennial census and the ACS from 1850 to 2013. For 
more information about the IPUMS, including variable definition and sampling error, please visit 
http://usa.ipums.org/usa/design.shtml.  
Due to differences in the way in which the IPUMS and Census Bureau adjust income data and 
assign poverty status, data provided on these topics might differ from data on these variables that 
are provided by the Census Bureau. 
For the purposes of this statistical portrait, the foreign born include those persons who identified 
as naturalized citizens or non-citizens and are living in the 50 states or the District of Columbia. 
Persons born in Puerto Rico and other outlying territories of the U.S. and who are now living in 
the 50 states or the District of Columbia are included in the U.S.-born population. 
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Appendix B: Immigration Law Timeline 
TABLE 3 
Selected U.S. Immigration Laws and Executive Actions, 1790-2014 
1790 1790 Naturalization Act 
Excluded non-white people from eligibility to naturalize. Naturalization 
requirements included two years of residence in the country and “good moral 
character,” and an applicant must be a “free white person.” The Naturalization Act 
of 1795 extended the residency requirement to five years. In 1798, this was 
extended to 14 years, then back to five in 1802. 
1798 Alien Friends Act of 1798 
The Alien Friends Act authorized the president to imprison or deport any alien who 
was deemed dangerous to the U.S. This act was the first to authorize deportation 
for immigrants. It expired two years after it was enacted.  
1798 Alien Enemies Act of 1798 
The Alien Enemies Act authorized the imprisonment or deportation of male 
citizens (ages 14 and older) of a hostile nation during times of war; the act was 
used during World War II, and today a modified version permits the president to 
detain, relocate or deport alien enemies during war.  
1864 
Immigration Act of 1864  
(also known as An Act to Encourage 
Immigration) 
To address labor shortages due to the Civil War, this act made contracts for 
immigrant labor formed abroad enforceable by U.S. courts. It also created a 
commissioner of immigration, appointed by the president to serve under the 
secretary of state.  
1870 Naturalization Act of 1870 
Amends naturalization requirements to extend eligibility to individuals of African 
nativity or descent. 
1875 
Immigration Act of 1875  
(also known as Page Law or Asian 
Exclusion Act) 
Prohibited the immigration of criminals and made bringing to the U.S. or 
contracting forced Asian laborers a felony. It is the nation’s first restrictive 
immigration statute. 
1882 Chinese Exclusion Act 
Banned Chinese laborers from immigrating for the next 10 years and authorized 
deportation of unauthorized Chinese immigrants. Any Chinese immigrant who 
resided in the U.S. as of Nov. 17, 1880, could remain but was barred from 
naturalizing. The 1892 Geary Act extended this law for an additional 10 years and 
required that Chinese nationals obtain identification papers.  
1891 1891 Immigration Act  
Expanded the list of exclusions for immigration from prior laws to include those 
who have a contagious disease and polygamists. Permitted the deportation of any 
unauthorized immigrants or those who could be excluded from migration based 
on previous legislation. Made it a federal misdemeanor to bring unauthorized 
immigrants into the country or aid someone who is entering the U.S. unlawfully. 
Established a federal Bureau of Immigration.  
1903 
Immigration Act of 1903 
(also known as Anarchist Exclusion 
Act) 
Banned anarchists, beggars and importers of prostitutes from immigrating. It is 
the first U.S. law to restrict immigration based on immigrants’ political beliefs. 
1917 
1917 Immigration Act 
(also known as Asiatic Barred Zone 
Act) 
Banned immigration from most Asian countries, except the Philippines, which was 
a U.S. colony, and Japan, whose government voluntarily eliminated the 
immigration of Japanese laborers as part of the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907. 
Required immigrants over the age of 16 to demonstrate basic reading ability in 
any language.  
1921 1921 Emergency Quota Act 
First U.S. law to create numerical quotas for immigration based on nationality. 
Quotas were equal to 3% of the foreign-born population of that nationality in the 
1910 census. Immigration from Asian countries continued to be barred. 
Nationality quotas did not apply to countries in the Western Hemisphere, 
government officials or temporary visitors. Under this law, total annual 
immigration was capped at 350,000.  
Continued on next page 
PEW RESEARCH CENTER 
115 
PEW RESEARCH CENTER 
www.pewresearch.org 
TABLE 3 (continued) 
Selected U.S. Immigration Laws and Executive Actions, 1790-2014 
1924 Labor Appropriation Act 
Establishes U.S. Border Patrol as a federal law enforcement agency to combat 
illegal immigration and smuggling along the borders between inspection stations. 
In 1925, the agency’s duties expand to patrolling the seacoasts.  
1924 
Immigration Act of 1924 (also 
known as 1924 National Origins 
Quota Act or Johnson-Reed Act) 
Further restricted immigration decreasing the annual cap from 350,000 to 
165,000. Nationality quotas equaled 2% of the foreign-born individuals of that 
nationality in the 1890 census with a minimum quota of 100. As a result, the law 
favored migration from northern and western European countries with longer 
histories of migration to the U.S. while limiting migration from eastern and 
southern European countries with newer immigration patterns. Immigration from 
Asian countries continued to be barred, and the law added a formal restriction on 
Japanese immigration. Denied entry to the U.S. to anyone who is ineligible to 
become a citizen due to race (only whites and people of African nativity or descent 
were eligible).  
1942 Bracero Agreement 
A bilateral agreement between the U.S. and Mexico to permit Mexican nationals to 
serve as temporary agricultural workers during WWII labor shortages. Required 
employers to pay a wage equal to that paid to U.S.-born farmworkers and provide 
transportation and living expenses. In effect until 1964.  
1943 
Magnuson Act 
(also known as Chinese Exclusion 
Repeal Act of 1943) 
Repealed the Chinese Exclusion Act and established a quota of about 105 
Chinese immigrants per year. In contrast to other quotas, which are based on 
country of citizenship, the quota for Chinese was based on ancestry. Chinese 
residents were also eligible to naturalize. 
1952 
Immigration and Nationality Act 
(also known as McCarran-Walter Act) 
Formally removed race as an exclusion for immigration and naturalization and 
granted Asian countries a minimum quota of 100 visas per year (though this was 
still based on ancestry, not nationality; for example, a person with Chinese 
ancestry coming from the U.K. would be counted in the Chinese quota regardless 
of nationality/birthplace). Updated the national origins quota to one-sixth of 1% of 
each nationality’s population in the 1920 census. As a result, most spots were for 
immigrants from the United Kingdom, Ireland and Germany. Under this law, 
political activities, ideology and mental health, among other criteria, served as a 
basis for exclusion and deportation. This law also created quota preferences for 
skilled immigrants and family reunification.  
1953 Refugee Relief Act 
Authorized special non-quota visas for more than 200,000 refugees and allowed 
these immigrants to become permanent residents.  
1962 
Migration and Refugee  
Assistance Act  
In 1961, President Kennedy directed the secretary of the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare (forerunner to the Department of Health and Human 
Services) to create a program to provide medical care, financial aid, help with 
education and resettlement, and child welfare services for Cuban refugees. The 
Migration and Refugee Assistance Act formalized the Cuban Refugee Program and 
assisted individuals in the Western Hemisphere fleeing “persecution or fear of 
persecution on account of race, religion or political opinion.” 
1965 
1965 Immigration and Nationality 
Act 
(also known as Hart-Celler Act or 
1965 amendments) 
Replaced the national origins quota system with a seven-category preference 
system emphasizing family reunification and skilled immigrants. (Immigrants from 
the Western Hemisphere were exempt from the preference system until 1976.) 
No visa cap was placed on the number of immediate family members of U.S. 
citizens admitted each year. The Eastern Hemisphere was granted 170,000 of the 
total visas each year with a 20,000 cap per country. Beginning in 1968, the 
Western Hemisphere was given 120,000 visas annually with no specific country 
limits. 
1975 
1975 Indochina Migration and 
Refugee Assistance Act  
The Ford administration began evacuating 130,000 Vietnamese in early 1975 as 
it became clear that South Vietnam would fall to the communist North. This act 
extended the refugee delineation to include those fleeing Cambodia and Vietnam 
and designated funds for the relocation and resettlement of refugees. In 1976, it 
was amended to include Laotian refugees.  
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TABLE 3 (continued) 
Selected U.S. Immigration Laws and Executive Actions, 1790-2014 
1976/ 
1978 
Immigration and Nationality Act 
Amendments of 1976 and 1978 
The 1976 amendments to the 1965 law included the Western Hemisphere in the 
preference system and the 20,000 per year visa limits. This mostly affected 
Mexico at the time, since it was the only Western Hemisphere country that 
substantially exceeded 20,000 visas annually. In 1978, an amendment to the 
1965 law established a worldwide limit of 290,000 visas annually. This removed 
the prior Eastern and Western hemisphere caps. 
1980 The Refugee Act of 1980 
Creates a general policy for admission of refugees and adopts the United Nations’ 
refugee definition. Removes refugees from the immigration preference system, 
expanding the annual admission for refugees. The removal of refugees from the 
immigration preference system reduced the annual visa allocation to 270,000.  
 
Subsequent executive action and legislation for refugees included deportation 
relief and admission based on region or nationality. Examples include the George 
H.W. Bush administration’s protection of Chinese nationals from deportation after 
Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central 
American Relief Act of 1997 and the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 
1998. 
1986 
Immigration Reform and Control  
Act 
(also known as Simpson-Mazzoli  
Act) 
Granted a pathway to permanent residency to unauthorized immigrant workers 
who lived in the U.S. since 1982 or worked in certain agricultural jobs. 
(Approximately 2.7 million were granted this status.) Creates the H-2A visa for 
temporary, seasonal agricultural workers. Imposes sanctions on employers who 
knowingly hire unauthorized workers and increases border enforcement. 
 
 In 1987, the Reagan administration decided that minor children of parents who 
were legalized under the 1986 law should be protected from deportation. In 
1990, the George H.W. Bush administration decided that all spouses and 
unmarried children of people who were legalized under the 1986 law could apply 
for permission to remain in the country and receive work permits. (This policy was 
formalized in the Immigration Act of 1990.) 
1990 Immigration Act of 1990 
Increased annual immigration cap to 700,000 during fiscal years 1992-1994, 
followed by 675,000 as of the 1995 fiscal year, and revises the preference 
categories. This allocates 480,000 family-sponsored visas, 140,000 employment-
based visas, and 55,000 “diversity immigrant” visas annually. It also creates H-1B 
visas for highly skilled temporary workers and H-2B for seasonal, non-agricultural 
workers and revises the grounds for exclusion and deportation, particularly those 
based on political and ideological grounds. This act authorized the attorney 
general to grant “temporary protected status” (TPS) to nationals of countries 
suffering from armed conflicts, natural disasters or “other extraordinary and 
temporary conditions.” Today, the secretary of homeland security may designate a 
country for TPS under the same conditions.  
1996 
Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act 
Increases enforcement at the border and in the interior, including mandates to 
build fences at the highest incidence areas of the Southwest border. Establishes 
or revises measures for worksite enforcement, to remove criminal and other 
deportable aliens and to tighten admissions eligibility requirements. Expands 
restrictions laid out in the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act on access to means-tested public assistance programs for new 
legal permanent residents and unauthorized immigrants. 
2002 
Enhanced Border Security and  
Visa Entry Reform Act 
Requires an electronic data system be used to make available information 
relevant to admissions and removability of immigrants; mandates implementation 
of a visa entry-exit data system (which becomes US-VISIT). 
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TABLE 3 (continued) 
Selected U.S. Immigration Laws and Executive Actions, 1790-2014 
2002 Homeland Security Act  
In the wake of 9/11, the Homeland Security Act transfers nearly all the functions 
of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to the new Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), which includes U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS).  
2006 Secure Fence Act 
Following the failure of immigration reform legislation in the Senate, this law 
mandates the construction of a double-layered fence approximately 700 miles 
long (not yet completed, largely due to lack of funding) and increases staffing and 
technology at the Southwest border.  
2012 
Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals (DACA) 
Through an executive action by President Obama, young adults (ages 15 to 30) 
brought to the U.S. illegally as children can apply for temporary deportation relief 
and a two-year work permit. As of March 31, 2015, roughly 665,000 applicants 
had been approved for DACA.  
2014 
Deferred Action for Parents of 
Americans and Lawful Permanent 
Residents (DAPA) and DACA 
 Program Expanded 
A second executive action by President Obama, it allows unauthorized immigrant 
parents who have lived in the U.S. at least five years and have children who are 
U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents to apply for deportation relief and a 
three-year work permit. Also expands eligibility for DACA to any unauthorized 
immigrant who entered the U.S. illegally as a child. This executive action is on hold 
as a state challenge works its way through the courts.  
   
Source: See references at: http://www.pewhispanic.org/2015/09/28/selected-u-s-immigration-legislation-and-executive-actions-1790-
2014/ 
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Appendix C: Population Tables, 1965-2065 
 
TABLE C1A 
Estimated U.S. Population by Race and Hispanic Origin, 1965-2015, with and 
without Immigrants Entering 1965-2015 
 ------------------------------------Estimate------------------------------------  ----------Estimate with no 1965-2015 immigration---------- 
 Total White Black Hispanic Asian  Total White Black Hispanic Asian 
Population (in thousands) 
1965 193,419 161,750 20,504 8,092 1,326  193,419 161,750 20,504 8,092 1,326 
1975 214,042 173,061 23,876 12,229 2,531  208,697 171,300 23,486 10,196 1,440 
1985 238,211 183,167 27,767 18,944 5,111  223,477 179,784 26,567 12,593 1,525 
1995 267,487 192,062 32,177 29,867 9,015  237,156 186,446 29,905 15,238 1,617 
2005 297,532 197,297 36,265 44,560 13,600  244,838 188,330 32,369 17,531 1,643 
2015 323,517 200,050 40,271 56,975 18,232  251,548 189,027 34,580 19,928 1,611 
Percent of total 
1965 100% 84% 11% 4% 1%  100% 84% 11% 4% 1% 
1975 100% 81% 11% 6% 1%  100% 82% 11% 5% 1% 
1985 100% 77% 12% 8% 2%  100% 80% 12% 6% 1% 
1995 100% 72% 12% 11% 3%  100% 79% 13% 6% 1% 
2005 100% 66% 12% 15% 5%  100% 77% 13% 7% 1% 
2015 100% 62% 12% 18% 6%  100% 75% 14% 8% 1% 
Note: Whites, blacks and Asians include only single-race non-Hispanics. Asians include Pacific Islanders. Hispanics are of any race. Other 
races not shown but included in total. 
Source: Pew Research Center estimates based on adjusted census data  
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TABLE C1B 
Projected U.S. Population by Race and Hispanic Origin, 2015-2065, with and 
without Immigrants Entering 2015-2065 
 ------------------------------------Projection------------------------------------  ---------Projection with no 2015-2065 immigration--------- 
 Total White Black Hispanic Asian  Total White Black Hispanic Asian 
Population (in thousands) 
2015 323,517 200,050 40,271 56,975 18,232  323,517 200,050 40,271 56,975 18,232 
2025 350,347 204,317 44,588 67,318 24,986  336,676 201,466 43,320 63,491 19,510 
2035 374,137 204,959 48,151 77,941 32,510  343,189 198,561 45,234 69,312 20,084 
2045 394,795 202,803 51,091 88,060 40,759  343,409 192,224 46,191 73,704 20,186 
2055 416,607 201,775 53,937 97,514 50,097  341,324 186,320 46,695 76,416 20,062 
2065 440,923 202,380 56,684 106,953 60,509  338,158 181,358 46,748 78,082 19,578 
Percent of total 
2015 100% 62% 12% 18% 6%  100% 62% 12% 18% 6% 
2025 100% 58% 13% 19% 7%  100% 60% 13% 19% 6% 
2035 100% 55% 13% 21% 9%  100% 58% 13% 20% 6% 
2045 100% 51% 13% 22% 10%  100% 56% 13% 21% 6% 
2055 100% 48% 13% 23% 12%  100% 55% 14% 22% 6% 
2065 100% 46% 13% 24% 14%  100% 54% 14% 23% 6% 
Note: Whites, blacks and Asians include only single-race non-Hispanics. Asians include Pacific Islanders. Hispanics are of any race. Other 
races not shown but included in total.  
Source: Pew Research Center population projections 
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TABLE C2 
Estimated U.S. Population by Generation, 1965-2015, and Projected U.S. Population 
by Generation, 2015-2065 
 -----------------------Population (in thousands)-----------------------    ------------------------------Percent of total------------------------------ 
 Total 
1st 
generation 
2nd  
generation 
3rd and higher 
generation    Total 
1st  
generation 
2nd  
generation 
3rd and higher 
generation 
Estimated population 
1965 193,419 9,620 24,689 159,110    100% 5% 13% 82% 
1975 214,042 11,393 23,707 178,941    100% 5% 11% 84% 
1985 238,211 16,450 23,702 198,058    100% 7% 10% 83% 
1995 267,487 25,636 26,094 215,757    100% 10% 10% 81% 
2005 297,532 38,243 31,442 227,847    100% 13% 11% 77% 
2015 323,517 44,867 38,474 240,177    100% 14% 12% 74% 
Projected population 
2015 323,517 44,867 38,474 240,177    100% 14% 12% 74% 
2025 350,347 52,101 46,554 251,691    100% 15% 13% 72% 
2035 374,137 59,220 54,610 260,307    100% 16% 15% 70% 
2045 394,795 65,763 62,838 266,194    100% 17% 16% 67% 
2055 416,607 71,899 71,653 273,054    100% 17% 17% 66% 
2065 440,923 78,231 81,101 281,591    100% 18% 18% 64% 
Note: “First generation” is foreign born; “second generation” is people born in the U.S. with at least one foreign-born parent. “Third and higher 
generations” are people born in the U.S. with U.S.-born parents. 
Source: Pew Research Center estimates for 1965-2015 based on adjusted census data; Pew Research Center projections for 2015-2065 
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Appendix D: Survey Toplines 
 
 
2015 PEW RESEARCH CENTER’S AMERICAN TRENDS PANEL  
WAVE 10 MARCH 
FINAL TOPLINE 
March 10 – April 6, 2015 
TOTAL N=3,147 
WEB RESPONDENTS N=2,833 
MAIL RESPONDENTS N=31428 
 
OTHER QUESTIONS PREVIOUSLY RELEASED OR HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE 
 
ASK ALL: 
Now a different kind of question … 
 
ASK ALL: 
ST.1 What ONE WORD comes to mind first when you think about immigrants in the United States today? 
[OPEN-END] 
 
Mar 10-Apr 6 
2015  
12 Illegal 
5 Overpopulation/Lots/Many/Overwhelming 
4 Legality (other than “illegal”) 
3 Jobs 
3 Deportation/Go home/Restrict 
3 People/Myself/My family/Americans/Everyone 
3 Work ethic 
3 Freedom 
2 Hispanics/Mexico/Mexicans 
2 Costs/Freeloaders/Burden/Debt 
2 Fairness/Unfair 
2 Opportunity 
2 Workers/Labor 
12 General/other, positive 
11 General/other, negative 
26 General/other, neutral 
6 No answer/Uncodable  
 
OTHER QUESTIONS PREVIOUSLY RELEASED OR HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE 
 
ASK ALL: 
ST.2 As far as you know, do you think the immigration system in this country … 
 
Mar 10-Apr 6 
2015  
16 Works pretty well and requires only minor changes 
54 Needs major changes 
28 Needs to be completely rebuilt 
2 No answer 
 
                                                        
28 Question wording in this topline is that from the Web version of the survey. Question wording and format was adapted for the paper 
questionnaire delivered by mail; this questionnaire is available on request. All questions asked in both modes unless noted. 
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ASK ALL: 
ST.3 Generally, do you think immigrants coming to the United States … [RANDOMIZE RESPONSE 
OPTIONS 1 AND 2] 
 
Mar 10-Apr 6 
2015  
45 Make American society better in the long run 
37 Make American society worse in the long run 
16 Don’t have much of an effect on American society one way or the other 
3 No answer 
 
OTHER QUESTIONS PREVIOUSLY RELEASED OR HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE 
 
ASK ALL: 
ST.4 What percentage of today’s U.S. population was born in another country? 
 
Mar 10-Apr 6 
2015  
8 4% 
47 13% (Correct) 
28 39% 
7 55% 
10 No answer 
 
ASK ALL: 
ST.5 What percentage of immigrants in the U.S. today are living here illegally? 
 
Mar 10-Apr 6 
2015  
20 9% 
34 26% (Correct) 
22 45% 
14 62% 
9 No answer 
 
ASK ALL: 
ST.6 Over the last five years, the largest group of immigrants to the United States has come from… 
[RANDOMIZE RESPONSE OPTIONS] 
 
Mar 10-Apr 6 
2015  
7 Asia (Correct) 
3 Europe 
69 Latin America 
3 Africa 
13 Middle East 
5 No answer 
 
OTHER QUESTIONS PREVIOUSLY RELEASED OR HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE 
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ASK ALL: 
Now a few more questions about immigration to the United States … 
 
ASK ALL: 
ST.7 In your opinion, should immigration be kept at its present level, increased or decreased? 
 
Mar 10-Apr 6 
2015  
34 Present level 
15 Increased 
49 Decreased 
2 No answer 
 
ASK ALL:  
ST.8  Do you think immigrants in the United States are making things [RANDOMIZE: better, worse], or 
not having much effect in each of the following areas? [FOR EACH ITEM, RANDOMIZE RESPONSE 
CATEGORIES 1 AND 2 IN SAME ORDER AS QUESTION STEM] SOFT PROMPT TEXT “If you’re 
sure you want to skip, click Next” 
 
 Immigrants are 
making things 
better 
Immigrants are 
making things 
worse 
Immigrants are 
not having 
much effect 
No 
answer 
a. Crime     
Mar 10-Apr 6, 2015 7 50 41 2 
     
b. Food, music, and the arts     
Mar 10-Apr 6, 2015 49 11 37 3 
     
c. The economy     
Mar 10-Apr 6, 2015 28 50 20 2 
     
d. Social and moral values     
Mar 10-Apr 6, 2015 18 34 45 3 
     
e. Science and technology     
Mar 10-Apr 6, 2015 29 12 56 3 
 
ASK ALL: 
ST.8x As far as you know, are there any immigrants living in your community, or not? 
 
Mar 10-Apr 6 
2015  
78 Yes 
21 No 
1 No answer 
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ASK IF THERE ARE IMMIGRANTS IN RESPONDENT’S COMMUNITY OR MISSING (ST.8x=1,99) 
[N=2,641]:  
ST.9  Thinking specifically about immigrants in the community where you live, do you think they are making 
things [RANDOMIZE IN SAME ORDER AS ST.8: better, worse], or not having much effect in each 
of the following areas? [FOR EACH ITEM, RANDOMIZE RESPONSE CATEGORIES 1 AND 2 IN 
SAME ORDER AS QUESTION STEM] SOFT PROMPT TEXT “If you’re sure you want to skip, click 
Next.” 
 
 Immigrants are 
making things 
better 
Immigrants are 
making things 
worse 
Immigrants are 
not having 
much effect 
No 
answer 
a. Crime     
Mar 10-Apr 6, 2015 8 36 53 3 
     
b. Food, music, and the arts     
Mar 10-Apr 6, 2015 42 9 46 3 
     
c. Jobs opportunities for you 
and your family     
Mar 10-Apr 6, 2015 11 36 50 3 
     
d. Schools     
Mar 10-Apr 6, 2015 15 41 41 3 
 
ASK ALL: 
ST.10 In your opinion, what do you think is the main reason most immigrants come to the United States? 
[PROGRAMMING NOTE: RANDOMIZE RESPONSE OPTIONS 1 THROUGH 4] 
 
Mar 10-Apr 6 
2015  
4 Educational opportunities 
74 Economic opportunities 
10 Conflict or persecution in their home country 
2 To be reunited with family 
5 Some other reason 
4 No answer 
 
ASK ALL: 
ST.11 Which comes closer to your view—even if neither is exactly right? [RANDOMIZE RESPONSE 
OPTIONS 1 AND 2] 
 
Mar 10-Apr 6 
2015  
32 Immigrants in our country today generally want to adopt American customs 
and way of life 
66 Immigrants in our country today generally want to hold on to the customs 
and way of life of their home country 
2 No answer 
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ASK ALL:  
ST.12  Do you think the impact of immigrants from [INSERT ITEM; RANDOMIZE ST.12a-e] on American 
society has been … [RANDOMIZE RESPONSE OPTIONS 1 AND 2 IN SAME ORDER FOR ST.12a-
ST.12E] SOFT PROMPT TEXT “If you’re sure you want to skip, click Next.” 
 
 
Mostly positive Mostly negative 
Neither positive 
nor negative 
No 
answer 
a. EUROPE     
Mar 10-Apr 6, 2015 44 9 45 3 
     
b. LATIN AMERICA     
Mar 10-Apr 6, 2015 26 37 35 2 
     
c. AFRICA     
Mar 10-Apr 6, 2015 26 22 50 3 
     
d. ASIA     
Mar 10-Apr 6, 2015 47 11 39 3 
     
e. MIDDLE EAST     
Mar 10-Apr 6, 2015 20 39 39 3 
 
ASK ALL: 
ST.13 In your opinion, do most recent immigrants learn English within a reasonable amount of time, or don’t 
they? 
 
Mar 10-Apr 6 
2015  
39 Yes, they do 
59 No, they don’t 
2 No answer 
 
ASK ALL: 
ST.14 Do you think adult immigrants in the United States … [RANDOMIZE RESPONSE OPTIONS 1 AND 
2] 
 
Mar 10-Apr 6 
2015  
76 Need to learn to speak English to succeed 
22 Can succeed even if they don’t speak English 
2 No answer 
 
ASK ALL: 
ST.15 In deciding whether people from other countries should be allowed to legally immigrate to the United 
States, should the government give higher priority to … [RANDOMIZE RESPONSE OPTIONS 1 AND 
2] 
 
Mar 10-Apr 6 
2015  
56 People who are highly educated and highly skilled workers, even if they do 
not have family members in the U.S. 
37 People who have family members already living in the U.S., even if they are 
not highly educated or highly skilled workers 
6 No answer 
 
OTHER QUESTIONS PREVIOUSLY RELEASED OR HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE 
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ASK ALL: 
ST.16 Do you have any friends or relatives who are recent immigrants? 
 
Mar 10-Apr 6 
2015  
24 Yes 
75 No 
1 No answer 
 
ASK IF THERE ARE IMMIGRANTS IN RESPONDENT’S COMMUNITY OR MISSING (ST.8X=1,99) 
[N=2,641]: 
ST.17 How many recent immigrants would you say there are in the community where you live? 
 
Mar 10-Apr 6 
2015  
34 Many 
40 Some 
23 Only a few 
3 None 
1 No answer 
 
ASK ALL: 
USBORNP Were both of your parents born in the United States, including Puerto Rico or other U.S. 
territories, or not? 
 
Mar 10-Apr 6 
2015  
79 Yes, both parents were born in the U.S. (including Puerto Rico or other U.S. 
territories) 
7 No, one parent was born in another country 
13 No, both parents were born in another country 
1 No answer 
 
ASK ALL: 
USBORNG Were ALL of your grandparents born in the United States, including Puerto Rico or other U.S. 
territories, or not? 
 
Mar 10-Apr 6 
2015  
63 Yes, ALL grandparents were born in the U.S. (including Puerto Rico or other 
U.S. territories) 
35 No, AT LEAST ONE grandparent was born in another country 
2 No answer 
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ASK ALL: 
Q.24b Here are some pairs of statements. Please tell me whether the FIRST statement or the SECOND 
statement comes closer to your own views—even if neither is exactly right. The first pair is ... [READ 
AND RANDOMIZE PAIRS BUT NOT STATEMENTS WITHIN EACH PAIR]  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Immigrants today 
strengthen our country 
because of their hard work 
and talents 
Immigrants today are a 
burden on our country 
because they take our 
jobs, housing and health 
care 
(VOL.) 
Both/Neither/
DK/Ref 
May 12-18, 2015 51 41 8 
Jan 23-Mar 16, 2014 57 35 8 
Dec 3-8, 2013 53 35 11 
Oct 30-Nov 6, 2013 49 40 11 
Mar 13-17, 2013 49 41 10 
Jan 4-8, 2012 48 37 15 
Feb 22-Mar 14, 2011 45 44 12 
Aug 25-Sep 6, 2010 (RVs) 44 42 14 
Jul 21-Aug 5, 2010 42 45 13 
Jun 16-20, 2010 39 50 11 
Oct 28-Nov 30, 2009 46 40 14 
October 2006 41 41 18 
March 2006 41 52 7 
December 2005 45 44 11 
December 2004 45 44 11 
June 2003 46 44 10 
September 2000 50 38 12 
August 1999 46 44 10 
October 1997 41 48 11 
June 1997 41 48 11 
April 1997 38 52 10 
June 1996 37 54 9 
July 1994 31 63 6 
